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I. INTRODUCTION

"Jim, you will agree, I'm sure, that there's nothing more
destructive than a monopoly." [Boyle speaking]
"Yes," said Taggart, "on the one hand. On the other,
there's the blight of unbridled competition."
The proper course is always, in my opinion, in the middle.
So it is, I think, the duty of society to snip the extremes,
now isn't it?" [Boyle replied]
Orren Boyle and Jim Taggart, antagonists
Atlas Shrugged'
"Just as man can't exist without his body, so no rights can
exist without the right to translate one's rights into reality--to think, to work and to keep the results-whichmeans:
the right of property."
John Gait, protagonist
Atlas Shrugged2
Ayn Rand, in her celebrated novel Atlas Shrugged, illustrates the tension
between creating monopolies "for the social good" and promoting free market
competition. The "monopolies" described in Atlas Shrugged are all anticompetitive government actions granting a single company or groups of
companies unfair leverage over a specific commercial activity, such as
1. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 51 (1957).
2. Id. at 986.
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providing railroad services or manufacturing steel? The antagonists justify
this "monopolistic contror' as a way to promote the greater social good.4
Protagonist John Gait convinces all "prime movers" or "inventors" to
withdraw from society and go on strike until the monopolistic empire is
reduced to darkness for lack of intellectual stimulation and guidance.5
Unfortunately, in Atlas Shrugged,Ayn Rand fails to clearly distinguish
between an anticompetitive monopoly which restrains trade and law-granted
exclusive property rights in intellectual creations. The latter arguably have
"monopolistic elements," but their primary goal is to enhance rather than to
restrain trade! While an anti-competitive monopoly is clearly the antithesis

3. For example, government sanctioning of unfair practices in the railroad industry
included the Anti-dog-eat-dog Rule, which provided that:
[M]embers of the National Alliance of Railroads were forbidden to engage in
practices defined as "destructive competition"; that in regions declared to be
restricted, no more than one railroad would be permitted to operate; that in such
regions, seniority belonged to the oldest railroad now operating there, and that the
newcomers, who had encroached unfairly upon its territory, would suspend
operations within nine months after being so ordered....
Id. at 77. One could further distinguish between the government-granted monopolies of Atlas
and private stratagems such as "illegal price fixing" or "tying," which also restrain trade but are
initiated and controlled by the private sector in direct violation of antitrust laws.
4. See id. at 50-51 ("After all, private property is a trusteeship held for the benefit of
society as a whole."); see also id. at 780-81 (noting that "[a]s a policy of national survival, the
railroads of the country have been unified into a single team, pooling their resources").
5. Id. at 1045-84. Atlas Shrugged concludes with the world being plunged into both
literal and figurative darkness because electric power is no longer available and there are no
"prime movers" to assist in the "restoration of power." John Galt notes in his final speech to the
masses that the prime movers will not return until society is ready to appreciate their value and
their exclusive right to control their property and reap the requisite profits. Id. at 936-93.
6. See, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1.16
(3d ed. 1996). In fact, one can correctly label patent, trademarks and copyrights as "limited
monopolies" if one defines a "monopoly" as any "exclusive right' in an economically neutral
sense. See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1976)
(distinguishing lawful use of patents as "limited monopolies"); see also United States v. General
Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 486-88 (1926) (noting that the exclusive right of a patentee to seek and
dispose of products directly to consumers and to fix prices by which agents transfer title directly
to consumers, although monopolistic, is not in violation of antitrust laws, but antitrust misuse
of patents is "unlawfully extending monopoly").
7. When the antagonists blackmail prime mover Hank Rearden into signing a "Gift
Certificate" surrendering the "Rearden Metal" patent rights to the government, Ms. Rand fails
to make the property right/monopoly distinction between Mr. Rearden's legally-enforced
exclusive property right in Rearden Metal and the antagonists' monopolistic attempt to control
the steel industry by usurping that right. RAND, supra note I, at 523-31. Nonetheless, Ms. Rand
does make this distinction in other writings and has expressly advocated government granting
of patents and copyrights. She also alludes to a global "property right in all intellectual
property," which should, by definition, include trademarks. For a discussion of these distinctions,
see AYN RAND, THE AYN RAND LEXICON: OBJECrIVISM FROM A TO Z (1986) ("Patents and
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of free market competition, law-granted exclusive rights in intellectual
property often promote competition. In fact, this type of earned and
"exclusive" property right is exactly what John Galt advocates in his final
speech to the masses before they are cast into total darkness.8
Like Ayn Rand, courts also neglect making the "anti-competitive
monopoly/property right" distinction when evaluating both traditional
trademark rights, which protect the source identification and quality
assurance value of a trademark, and state dilution rights, which protect the
enhanced quality-assurance and advertising value of "famous" trademarks.
Thus, the resulting opinions fail to articulate a clear legal and economic
"property" basis for protecting against the likelihood of confusion or against
the dilution of a famous mark."
Twenty-eight states correctly protect against the "dilution," or whittling
away, of the "commercial magnetism"" of famous marks even in the
absence of confusion.' The typical state dilution statute protects against the

copyrights are the legal implementation of the base of all property rights: a man's right to the
product of his mind.").
8. RAND, supra note 1, at 985-93.
9. While the term "trademark" is used throughout this Article, I recognize that certain
concepts discussed also may apply (or not apply) to service marks, collective marks, and
certification marks as well.
10. For examples of how courts fail to distinguish between the monopoly and property
interests of the trademark holder, see Blanchard v. Hill, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (Ch. 1742); Shredded
Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 964 (2d Cir. 1918) (finding that the court must
cautiously protect against unfair competition to avoid creating "perpetual monopolies"); S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F,2d 129, 136 (6th Cir.) (finding that "[the right granted
to the owner of a registered trademark is a monopoly and should not be extended unless the
owner is clearly entitled thereto"), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 820 (1959). For examples of courts
failing to distinguish between these interests in dilution actions, see, e.g., Toho Co. v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Coffee Dan's warning against
trademark enforcement's destruction of competition); Coffee Dan's, Inc. v. Coffee Don's
Charcoal Broiler, 305 F. Supp. 1210, 1217 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (finding that a California
statute should be narrowly interpreted not to provide broad tradename protection to prevent
destruction of competition); Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 648 P.2d 393 (Ct. App. 1982),
afT'd, 659 P.2d 377 (Or. 1983) (recognizing that Oregon statute protected plaintiff although
disagreeing with the resulting policy that fostered monopolies).
11. Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1941). Justice Felix
Frankfurter found that a mark's owner made "every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the
market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol." Id. Further, he found "[i]f another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain
legal redress." Id. (emphasis added).
12. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1996); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-11 (i)(C) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b)
(1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-513 (1996 Supp.); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 765, Act 1035, § 15 (1993);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.113 (West 1996 Supp.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 1991);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I IOB, § 12
(1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1995);
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"dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark... notwithstanding the absence
of competition between the parties or the absence of confiusion as to the
source of goods or services."' 3 However, only a small minority of courts
have accurately applied their dilution statutes and granted relief when
appropriate. 4 Instead, numerous courts have ignored the statutory plain
meaning and erroneously inserted a "likelihood of confusion" standard to
deny dilution relief. 5 Others avoid any substantive dilution analysis by
hiding behind the federal preemption doctrine.16 By failing to clearly analyze
the legal basis for providing dilution protection, these courts have fallen and

§ 87-122 (1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-D (McKinney 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §
647.107 (1996 Supp.); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1124 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-2-12 (1992);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165 (Law. Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995);
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (1996).
Also, Ohio and New Jersey recognize common law dilution protection. See infra note 169.
13. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-D (McKinney 1996) (emphasis added) provides but one
example from the statutes listed at supra note 12. In sharp contrast, both the Lanham Trademark
Act and traditional state trademark laws protect against trademark uses which are "likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the" source or origin of the goods,
services or commercial activities. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1996).
14. Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 441 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Lisa M. Brownlee, Mead Data Central v. Toyota and Other Contemporary
Dilution Cases: High Noon for TrademarkLaw's Misfit Doctrine?,79 TRADEMARK REP. 471,
490-98 (1989) and Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationalefor Trademark-TradeIdentity
Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 607, 611-12 (1977), for a
discussion of conflicting court decisions regarding the requirement of confusion in dilution cases.
Cases cited by numerous treatise writers include: Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld Ltd., 828 F.2d
1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that likelihood of confusion is one ground for dilution which
mirrors traditional trademark protection); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432,438
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (expressly noting that the Allied court misapplied N.Y.'s statute by inserting
the non-competing uses limitation, did not exclude competitors, and found that Frito-Lay could
enforce the N.Y. dilution statute against competitor Bachman's diluting use of its RUFFLES
mark); G. Heileman Brewery Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1472 (E.D. Wis.
1987) (expressly holding that "[tihe protections of the Illinois Anti-Dilution Statute are
unavailable to a competitor which cannot obtain relief under the laws of trademark infringement
or unfair competition."), aft'd,873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989); Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied
Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977) (noting that, despite language in
the N.Y. statute that states dilution protection is offered "notwithstanding the absence of
competition or confusion," this protection was limited to non-competing cases since competing
cases were adequately protected under the Lanham Act). The Second Circuit had the final word
in 1993, holding that New York's dilution statute was applicable to competitors. Nikon Inc. v.
Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1993).
16. See, e.g., Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153, 1157-59 (7th Cir.) (issuing
preliminary -injunction based on Illinois Anti-Dilution statute), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019
(1984); Three Blind Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 303, 309 (D. Mass. 1995)
(holding that claim under state dilution statute was preempted by Lanham Act). See also United
States Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (N.D. Iowa 1987)
(holding that the Lanham Act preempts application of Iowa's dilution statute).
NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 57-3-10 (Michie 1992); N.Y.
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continue to fall victim
to the enticing, but false, rhetoric of dilution
7
"monopolyphobia."'1
The root of the monopolyphobia problem is the courts' inability to
properly categorize these rights as earned property. Trademark owners
develop marks which, through a combination of creativity and advertising,
become source identifiers for the corresponding goods or services, as well as
indicators of quality assurance and advertising power." Traditional trademark rights protect the source identification and quality assurance portions of
this earned "property" right. Likewise, dilution rights 9 are earned by owners

17. Judge Frank, in his seminal opinion Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137
F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943), coins the term "monopoly-phobia,"
which infected both judges and scholars and caused them to oppose granting trademark
"monopolies" for the protection of "consumer interests." Leading trademark scholar Beverly
Pattishall also used the phrase "monopoly phobia" in his seminal article which criticizes the
monopoly phobia that surrounded the passing of the Lanham Act. Beverly W. Pattishall,
Trademarks and the Monopoly Phobia, 42 TRADEMARK REP. 588 (1952). Later scholars have
combined the phrase into a single word, "monopolyphobia." E.g., Daniel M. McClure,
Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A CriticalHistory of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP.
305, 346-48 (1979).
18. See Jules Backman, The Role of Trademarks in Our Competitive Economy, 58
TRADEMARK REP. 219, 219 (1968); Thomas D. Drescher, Article and Report: The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks-FromSignals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301,
338 (1992); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark
Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270 (1988) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Economics of
Trademark Law] (arguing that trademarks "are signifier[s] used to distinguish a good or service
produced by one firm from the goods or services of other firms"). Trademark owners maintain
consistent quality over time and reduce consumer search costs. Id. at 271. Note that the Landes
and Posner article cited is a reprinted adaption of their previous article, William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987)
[hereinafter Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective]. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994). This
Lanham Act section requires that a mark be distinctive and capable of serving as a source
identifier for the respective goods or services to be registrable on the principle register:
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principle register on account of
its nature unless it(e) consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant is merely descriptive.
Id. Part (e) also excludes marks which are "deceptively misdescriptive," "primarily geographically descriptive' (except for collective marks and certification marks found in § 1054), "primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive," or "primarily merely a surname." Id.
19. The dilution doctrine traces its origin to the German Odol Case, wherein the court held
the plaintiff mouthwash manufacturer's mark, "Odol," was associated exclusively in the public
mind with its products. See Frank I. Schecter, The RationalBasis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813, 831-32 (1927). According to the court, the defendant's use of the mark in
selling steel, though clearly promoting non-competing goods, nonetheless detracted from the
uniqueness of the plaintiff's mark, used to promote its mouthwash, thus diluting its value. Id.
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of famous and distinctive marks? and protect against the blurring or
Frank Schechter's seminal 1927 article, The RationalBasis of TrademarkProtection,introduced
the doctrine of dilution into U.S. trademark jurisprudence, arguing that a trademark's uniqueness
should constitute the rational basis for protection because trademarks themselves sell products.
Id. at 819. Massachusetts was the first state to adopt Schechter's thesis, passing a dilution statute
in 1947. B.J. Meadows 1I, Note, TrademarkDilution:Its Development,Japan'sExperience, and
the New USTA Federal Proposal,22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 417, 425 (1988). New
York, Illinois, and Georgia followed the Massachusetts legislature and soon after adopted similar
statutes. Id. at 425 n.66. For a discussion of trademark dilution theory, see Robert Sueiro Del
Valle, The Enigma of Trademark Dilution, 24 REv. JUR. U.I.P.R. 235 (1990); Miles J.
Alexander, Dilution-A Blessing or a Curse? What Is It? How Do You Prove It? How Does It
Fit in with Traditional Trademark Law?, C962 Au-ABA 1, 3-4 (1994). In 1964, the United
States Trademark Association (now the International Trademark Association) amended its Model
State Trademark Bill to include the following provision:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality
of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade
name valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding
the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to
the source of goods or services.
Model State Trademark Bill § 12 (1964), reprinted in 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE=ITION § 22.04 (3d ed. 1996). From' 1966 to the present,
numerous other states have adopted dilution statutes patterned after the Model State Trademark
Act. Port, supra note 14, at 439. For a listing of the 26 states that have dilution statutes and
those that have amended their statutes to reflect the latest changes in the New Model Trademark
Bill introduced by the ITA in 1991, see supra note 12.
20. I must clarify that my use of the term "famous" is somewhat nontraditional. "Fame"
for dilution purposes goes beyond a mark simply being "nationally recognized and famous" such
as KODAK. Instead, a "famous" mark for dilution purposes is highly distinctive and has strong
selling power for its market. Distinctiveness goes beyond marks which are "unique and fanciful,"
such as KODAK and BUICK, and includes any ordinary term, such as "McDonald's" (a
surname) which, through the McDonald's corporation's creativity and advertising, has come to
acquire secondary meaning, identifying the fast food and related services of the McDonald's
Corporation.
Courts consistently hold that the distinctiveness and strength adequate for a mark to identify
origin of goods and services under traditional trademark rights is different from the "enhanced"
distinctive quality and strength required for a mark to be capable of dilution. See, e.g., Mead
Data Cent. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1989). Dilution
theory presumes a mental association between the two products' marks, which may be created
where plaintiff's mark holds a distinctive quality for a significant number of users of the
defendant's product. Id. at 1031. "In sum, the statute protects a trademark's 'selling power.'
Id. at 1030; see also Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 379 (Or. 1983) ("mhe
distinctiveness adequate to identify the origin of a product may be different from the distinctive
quality deserving of protection from dilution"); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Roadway Motor
Plazas, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1131, 1133 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that the "strength" is
determined after considering whether the mark is either distinctive or has acquired a secondary
meaning and the "fame" of the mark is not dispositive of the mark's strength for dilution
proposes as the selling power will ultimately determine the strength of the mark). Interestingly,
the original dilution statute proposed by the United States Trademark Association and
implemented by the majority of states that have dilution protection lacked any criteria to
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tarnishing of the enhanced quality assurance and advertising value or selling
power associated with these marks." Moreover, because dilution rights also
protect against "subliminal confusion," they further protect the source
identification function of qualifying marks." Indeed, these symbiotic
intellectual property rights epitomize the John Gait-type of law-granted,
earned property right.
Anti-dilution statutes create trademark rights which are grounded more
on "subliminal association" than on likelihood of confusion or deceit. These
statutes protect the "quality persona and advertising value" of a trademark
and prevent the "palming-off' or misappropriation of this value. Although
determine a mark's "strength" or "distinctiveness." Model State Trademark Bill, supra note 19,
§ 12. The New Model State Trademark Bill now includes a dilution provision that lists several
factors to determine whether a mark is "famous in this state" and entitled to protection against
a use "which causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the owner's mark." Model State
Trademark Bill § 13 (1992), reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 22. These factors
include:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark in this state; (B)
the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods and
services; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark in this
state; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E)
the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the owner's mark is
used; (F) the degree of recognition of the owner's mark in its and in the other's
trading areas and channels of trade in this state; and (G) the nature and extent of
use of the same or similar mark by third parties.
Id.
21. See, e.g., Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983). The
court notes that" '[d]ilution is an act which threatens two separable but related components of
advertising value. Junior uses may blur a mark's product identification or they may tarnish the
affirmative associations a mark has come to convey.' "Id. (quoting 3 RuDOLF CALLMANN, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 84.2, at 954-55 (4th ed.
1981) (internal quotation omitted)).
22. For an explanation of the importance of subliminal associations and how confusion
in source identification among consumers may result from crafty marketing of a trademark by
a secondary user, see Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1116-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Charles J. Faruki, Litigation Involving Trademarks: Preparingthe Trademark
Case for Trial, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 85, 110 (1990); Harry Schiller, First Amendment
Dialogue and Subliminal Messages, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 341 (1983).
23. See Mead Data Cent. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir.
1989) (quoting New York legislative history, 1954 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 49-50, that notes a mental
association of the two marks which causes a "whittling away of an established trademark's
selling power and value," as what the New York state statute is trying to prevent); Elizabeth
Cutter Bannon, Revisiting "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection:" Control of Quality
and Dilution-Estranged Bedfellows?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 65 (1990) (discussing
Schechter's dilution theories); see also Steven H. Hartman, Subliminal Confusion: The
Misappropriationof Advertising Value, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 506, 508 (1988) (analogizing
subliminal confusion protection to protection of the "commercial magnetism" and "advertising
value" of a trademark).
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numerous scholars acknowledge that dilution rights protect the advertising
value of a mark,24 few take the bold step of identifying dilution rights as
property that are entitled to protection from subliminal association/confusion.
This subliminal confusion is precisely what diminishes the quality, source
identification, and advertising value of "famous" marks. In fact, the "diluter"
of a famous mark such as KODAK, who uses the mark to identify a chain
of restaurants, for example, intentionally selects KODAK to capitalize upon
the subliminal association which will give his product the same "favorable
persona!' or "quality image" associated with Eastman Kodak.
It is much more difficult to shoehom dilution property protection into
a traditional "market tort' or "deceit based" theory that supports traditional
trademark actions utilizing the likelihood of confusion standard. Consequently, numerous scholars have challenged dilution statutes on both legal and
economic grounds. The prevailing theme of dilution opponents is that
dilution protection is a "dangerous monopoly" or an "unnatural expansion of

24. See Del Valle, supra note 19, at 244 (noting that "commercial magnetism" of the
senior mark is needed before there can be any whittling away of it); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 397, 403 (1990) (discussing various qualities of a mark protected by trademark law);
Pattishall, supra note 15, at 621-22 (noting that trademark dilution is a needed legal prohibition
of destructive damage to intangible, state-of-mind commercial values generated by commercial
endeavor); Michael L. Taviss, In Search of a Consistent Trademark Dilution Test: Mead Data
Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1449, 1470 (1990) (noting
that "[a]bout the only aspect of dilution theory on which all modem commentators and judicial
treatments appear to have agreed is that the quality being protected is a product's advertising
value, selling power, or commercial magnetism"). But see Milton W. Handler, Are State
Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK
REP. 269, 271 (1985) (noting that trademark law developed from the law of deceit to protect a
plaintiff from loss of business intended for plaintiff to a defendant producer of competing goals);
David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 584 (1991)
(refuting that advertising value is the primary protected interest of dilution). Welkowitz states
that "[t]he real justification for the use of dilution is more the protection of marks against
misappropriation than against 'whittling away.' "Id.; Port, supra note 14, at 486-87 (describing
tort dilution protection as allowing the owner to "attempt to control the manner in which
consumers or other manufacturers perceive of the mark," and arguing that dilution protection
would allow a monopoly of the idea of the mark itself, regardless of outside use).
25. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 24; Paul Heald, FederalIntellectual PropertyLaw and
the Economics of Preemption,76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 1006 (1991) (finding that "state antidilution
statutes clearly are preempted" as they "conflict with the goals of the Lanham Act"); Jonathan
E. Moskin, Dilution orDelusion: The Rational Limits of TrademarkProtection,83 TRADEMARK
REP. 122 (1993); David S. Welkowitz, Preemption,Extraterritoriality,and the Problem of State
Antidilution Laws, 67 TIUL. L. REV. 1 (1992); Welkowitz, supranote 24. Most recently, Kenneth
L. Port has joined the dilution opponents in his article The "Unnatural Expansion" of
Trademark Rights: Is a FederalDilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433
(1994).
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federal trademark rights," which is preempted by the Lanham Act,2 and that
it fails to provide economical and legally viable remedies.2 7
This Article explores the monopoly dichotomy and posits that state antidilution protection for famous trademarks is not an anti-competitive monopoly
but is instead a law-granted exclusive property right in the "quality image"
and "persona7' of a "famous and highly distinctive" trademark which
enhances free market competition.29 Instead of taking anything from the
public, the trademark owner, like an inventor, confers on it the greatest benefits?0 Although a trademark owner may select a word from the public
domain to identify her goods, she contributes "new property" to the public
in the quality assurance and source indication functions of the mark.3'
Unfortunately, as documented by scholars Pattishall and McCarthy,
courts have generally abused the term "monopoly" and have used it in a
"competitively destructive sense when evaluating the metes and bounds of
intellectual property rights. 32 Arguably, this hostility originated with the old

26. See Heald, supra note 25, at 1007-08.
27. Id.
28. "Persona" of a famous mark encompasses both its source identification and advertising
power. For example, COKE has a "persona" which includes recognition that cola sold under that
trademark is traceable to a source that produces a cola having a slightly more carbonated and
less sweet taste than competitive brands, such as PEPSI cola. The COKE persona further
includes the world-wide advertising power to create the image of the COKE drinker as "carefree, sophisticated, but willing to work to unite the world in 'peace and harmony.' " (remember
the Coke commercials featuring numerous children of various ethnic backgrounds singing I'd
Like to Teach the World to Sing). For an excellent discussion on the "persona" of trademarks,
see Ellen P. Winner, Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protectionfor a Trademark's
"Persona," 71 TRADEMARK REP. 193 (1981).
29. See, e.g., G.W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co., 130 F. 703, 705 (7th Cir.
1904) ("the trade-mark adopted by one is the exclusive property of its proprietor, and such use
of the genuine, or of such imitation of it, is an invasion of his right of property").
30. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1974); 1 ERNEST B.
LIPSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:6 (3d ed. 1984) (citing Parker v. Haworth, 18 F. Cas.
1135 (C.C.D. Ill. 1848)); see also id. at 42 (quoting Justice Roberts in United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) ('The term 'monopoly' connotes the giving of an
exclusive privilege for buying, selling, working or using a thing which the public freely enjoyed
prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the
public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the
community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.")).
31. See Rudolf Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition? The Importance of
the Property Concept in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 443, 459 (1947).
32. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 1.16 ("When used by judges and lawyers imbued with
antitrust principles, the designation 'monopoly' is not neutral: it connotes that intellectual
property rights like patents, trademarks and copyrights are somehow anti-competitive and antisocial."); see also Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1160 n.8
(6th Cir. 1978) ("The loose application of the pejorative term 'monopoly,' to the property right
of exclusion represented by a patent can be misleading. Unchecked it can also destroy the
constitutional and statutory scheme reflected in the patent system."); Pattishall, supra note 15
(discussing judicial reluctance to embrace the anti-dilution concept).
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English classification of commodity monopolies as patents.33 U.S. courts
subsequently classified the award of patent rights as a "limited monopoly"
and continued with similar classifications for copyrights and trademarks.'M
By blindly describing all legally-enforced exclusive property rights as
"monopolies" in the pejorative, anti-competitive sense, the granting of a new
intellectual property right is automatically viewed by society and the courts
in a negative light and is seen as a restraint on free trade.3" State and federal
dilution protection for famous trademarks is currently at the heart of this
monopolyphobia.
Part Il of this. Article sets up the dilemma surrounding the proper
categorization of anti-dilution rights as earned property. It evaluates the
enigma surrounding the term monopoly and the monopolistic elements of
intellectual property. Moreover, it distinguishes between intellectual property
rights and anti-competitive monopolies whose purpose and effect is to restrain
trade. Intellectual property rights are economically beneficial rights and are
best categorized as earned property rights. Like all property rights which
carry powers of exclusion, intellectual property rights include elements shared
by anti-competitive monopolies but are not per se anti-competitive. Indeed,
the scope and terms of protection outlined in the patent, copyright, and
trademark acts evince a balance between the creator's rights and the public's
right to freely utilize ideas to develop additional creative works. Finally, Part
II analyzes the monopolyphobia which originated with patents, spread to
traditional trademark protection, and presently surrounds the dilution doctrine.
Part III provides a working solution for interpretation of dilution statutes,
characterizing trademarks as property.' This important and controversial

33. Lipscomb, supra note 30; see also United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287,
330 (1948) (tracing patent monopoly to old English common law Statute of Monopolies).
34. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.05(1); see also Eastern Wine Corp. v. WinslowWarren Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d Cir.) (Judge Frank referring to the stigma of the term
"monopoly"), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943); Majestic Mfg. Co. v. Majestic Elec. Appliance
Co., 79 F. Supp. 649, 651 (trademark protection is "tantamount to a gift of exclusive ownership
of the use of an English word"), aff'd, 172 F.2d 862 (N.D. Ohio 1948); Coca-Cola Co. v. J.G.
Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224, 232 (D.C. Ark. 1916) ('The trade-mark laws, like the patent laws,
give the owner a monopoly which neither the Sherman Act nor any other act of Congress
forbids."); Sigmund Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14
LAW & CoNTrmp. PROBS. 323, 333 (1949).
35. See supra note 10.
36. The popular view is that trademarks are merely goodwill and "unlike statutory
copyrights or patents, are not rights in gross or at large." American Footwear Corp. v. General
Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979). Beverly Pattishall and other leading trademark
scholars are unwilling to go out on a limb and assert that trademarks are "property." In fact,
Pattishall stated:
True, in the sense that almost any legal right may, perhaps, be described as a
"property" right, so may trade-mark and trade identification rights be loosely
referred to as "property" rights. But in the ordinary sense they are not, and the
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step leads to an economic analysis to substantiate a basis for legally enforcing
traditional trademark property rights and the enhanced persona and quality
assurance property rights of famous marks under state dilution statutes.37 The
earned property classification eliminates the negative presumption surrounding
trademark rights and replaces it with the positive presumption that the creator
has earned this right and is entitled to a reasonable scope of protection which
will not detract from the free flow of information and ideas.
Part III draws direct parallels between these symbiotic rights and
illustrates how dilution protection against "subliminal confusion" complements, rather than conflicts with, traditional "likelihood of confusion"
protection, thereby eliminating any federal preemption problems. Part III
concludes by advocating that the New Model State Trademark Bill3" and

ordinary connotations of the words "property" and "ownership" lead only to error
and contradiction in resolving the questions which arise in trade identification
cases.... [There is actually involved no vesting of specific proprietary right in
any word or mark in protecting trade identity within the limits of the area of
likelihood of confusion. Such protection is all that is ever needed, and a recognition
of this true right is all that can exist compatible with the public interest.
Pattishall, supra note 17, at 602-03 (footnotes omitted).
37. Pattishall, Posner, and other scholars were willing to acknowledge that trademarks
enhanced free market competition. However, only Callmann was willing to be the "voice in the
wilderness" asserting that both traditional trademark and dilution rights are best categorized as
"property." See supra note 36. Callmann, in his early writings, however, neglected to fully
embrace the dilution doctrine, although today he is one of its most ardent supporters. Callmann,
supra note 31, at 465-67. Posner, on the other hand, continued to straddle the fence concerning
his "property" views of dilution rights. See Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note
18, at 306-09.
38. Model State Trademark Bill (1992), reprinted in 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §
22.04[2]. The original Model State Trademark Bill (MSTB) was promulgated by the United
States Trademark Association (now International Trademark Association (INTA) in 1949. Id. §
22.03[l]. Like the Lanham Act, that bill's goal was to foster uniformity among existing state
trademark statutes and address proposals mandating compulsory registration statutes. An antidilution section was added in 1964 and is the basis for the New York statute quoted in this
section and the majority of other state dilution statutes. Unfortunately, this early version failed
to clearly define what constituted "dilution of the distinctive quality" of a trademark. Id. §
22.04[l].
On September 23, 1992 the INTA's board of directors gave final approval to a new MSTB
that was revised to reflect present day issues and harmonize state trademark practices with recent
changes in federal trademark law. Andrew L. Goldstein, Bringing the Model State Trademark
Bill into the 90's and Beyond, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 226, 226, 236 (1993). The new MSTB's
dilution statute was the basis for the recently enacted Federal Dilution Act of 1995 and now
includes factors to evaluate whether a mark is "famous" and therefore capable of dilution, along
with a statutory definition of "dilution." Compare Federal Trademark Dilution Art of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051, 1125-1 127
(West Supp. 1996)) with Model State Trademark Bill § l(k), § 13 (1992), reprinted in
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 22.04[2].
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recently enacted Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995"9 are steps in the
right direction, but need fine tuning, particularly in defining dilution and
distinguishing tamishment. Once these statutes are amended to adequately
balance the trademark creator's rights against the public's right to 'the free
dissemination of ideas, Atlas will not shrug, but will welcome the addition
of another "earned" property right.

HI. THE PROBLEM: INrTELEcrTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AS ANTI-COMPETTvE "MONOPOLIES"

Presentday protection of trademarksis assailedalso as
encouragingmonopoly. That word is over-worked Its history
has given it a suggestion of illegality and undesirabilitywhich
renders it almost useless to convey accurately ideas which it
often [is] intended to express. There are far more monopolies
that are usefid and in the public interest than those that are
not. Literally it [monopoly] means to sell alone-to be the
exclusive seller Its extended meaning is as the name of any
exclusive right or proprty [sic] of which there are scores that
are known to us allY
A. Monopoly Overview
Interestingly, the term "monopoly" is conspicuously absent from the
Constitution and the plain language of the Patent, Copyright and Trademark
Acts.41 In fact, the legislative history surrounding The Trademark Act of
1946 expressly notes that "no monopoly is involved in trademark protection."42 As aptly put by former Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit:
A patent, under the statute, is property. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
Nowhere in any statute is a patent described as a monopoly.
The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very
definition of "property."... It is but an obfuscation to refer to

39. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. at 985.
40. Pattishall, supra note 17, at 593 n.12 (quoting HARRY D. NimS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 525 (4th ed. 1947)).

41. The Patent Act expressly refers to patents as property. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261
(1994) ('[p]atents shall have the attributes of personal property").
42. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.05[2] ('The matter has been approached with the
view of protecting trademarks and making infringement and piracy unprofitable. This can be
done without any misgivings and without the fear of fostering hateful monopolies, for no
monopoly is involved in trademark protection.") (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946), reprintedin 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1275).
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a patent as "the patent monopoly" or to describe a patent as an
"exception to the general rule against monopolies.'
It is therefore somewhat of an enigma how patents, trademarks, and to
a lesser extent copyrights, came to be viewed by the courts and society as
"monopolies." This is particularly true given that the "plain meaning" of a
statute is the first canon of statutory construction.'
The enigma surrounding the court's ability to get beyond intellectual
property "monopolyphobia" is best summarized by William Robinson in
1890:
[M]onopoly is not a mere question of words. It is the point of
departure for two distinct theories, under whose influence courts
and legislatures may be led to widely different conclusions as
to the dividing line between the rights to be conceded to
inventors and those to be reserved to the public.4

43. Schenk, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
44. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 181-83 (1896) (describing
patents and trademarks as monopolies); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir.)
(describing copyrights as "monopolies"), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); Shredded Wheat Co.
v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918) (describing trademarks as
"monopolies"); Qad, Inc. v. ALN Assocs., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing
Mercoil Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944) for the proposition that the
"lawful monopoly" of a patent cannot be extended to items not covered by the patent), affTd, 974
F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992). This syndrome affects even the most recent Supreme Court opinions.
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995) (trademark case
describing patents as "granting inventors a monopoly"); Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023,
1029 (1994) (describing copyrights as "monopoly privileges"); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (describing patents as "monopolies").
45. Genentech Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 941-42 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979)), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1126 (1994);
see Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute, 65 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 331, 331-32 (1983) (arguing
that the term "monopoly" is a misnomer for patents since it is conspicuously absent from the
Patent Act and since § 261 of the Patent Act expressly refers to patents as "personal property").
[Though "Let's ignore the statute" is a syndrome that can occur in any type of
case, it has been particularly egregious in patent cases.
Our concern here is with plain, simple disregardof the statute--evidenced in
the promulgation of some words and phrases [such as "monopoly"] that muddy the
decisional waters and other words and phrases that render the law as written by
congress a nullity.
Id. at 331.
46. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON,
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890).

THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §
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Although Robinson specifically refers to how broadly or narrowly courts
will enforce patent rights, this analogy applies to all forms of intellectual
property, including trademarks.
B. Intellectual PropertyRights as "Monopolies"?
"Patents, copyrights, and trade-marks excite two deeply
seatedfeelings. One is the feeling of any one who has originated anything of his right to claim an exclusive property in it and
to the trade growing out of it. The other is a hatred of monopoly. )Y"
William C. Robinson, in his 1890 patent treatise, points out that the term
"monopoly" comes from the Greek "mon," meaning "alone" and "polein,"
meaning "to sell." Thus, the literal translation of the term "monopoly" is
"the exclusive right to sell." 49 Webster's defines a "monopoly" as "control
that permits domination of... the market in a business.., for controlling
prices... achieved through an exclusive legal privilege."' Thus, the
economically neutral definition of monopoly is not per se anti-competitive,
but covers any exclusionary right such as real property rights. 5' To the
extent that patents, trademarks, and copyrights all contain rights to exclude
others from some aspect of the intellectual property each contains monopolistic elementS.
Patents, therefore, as exclusive property rights to make, use or sell an
invention for seventeen years, are by strict definition, "limited monopolies." Similarly, exclusive rights in trademarks and copyrights also qualify
as limited monopolies.' Nevertheless, each type of intellectual property
47. Loughron v. Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co., 286 F. 694, 697 (E.D. Pa.
1923), aff'd, 296 F. 822 (3d Cir. 1924).
48. See Robinson, supra note 46, at 3 n.1.
49. Id.
50. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1463 (1986).

51. See Robinson, supra note 46, § 12 (countering the view that monopolies can ever be
economically neutral). Robinson argues that even economically beneficial monopolies by their
exclusionary nature, must be to some degree anti-competitive. Id.
52. Pattishall, supra note 17, at 588 (stating that under the simple definition of
"monopoly," many individual rights, such as "one's own particular physiognomy... or one's
rights enumerated in the first ten amendments to the Constitution are individual monopolies.").
53. See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1976)
(distinguishing lawful use of patents as a "limited monopoly privilege"); see also United States
v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 487-89 (1926) (noting the exclusive right of patentee to seek
and dispose of products directly to consumer and to fix prices by which agents transfer title
directly to consumer, although monopolistic, is not in violation of antitrust laws, and describing
antitrust misuse of patents as unlawfully extending monopoly).
54. See Jack Daniel Distillery, Inc. v. Hoffman Distilling Co., 190 F. Supp. 841, 845-46
(W.D. Ky. 1960) (stating that trademarks and patents confer a monopoly right to keep others
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protection fails the anti-competitive monopoly definition, since each operates
to enhance competition, rather than to restrain trade."
The authority of Congress [re: Patent and Copyright Acts] is
exercised in the hope that "[t]he productive effort thereby
fostered will have a positive effect on society through the
introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into
the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens." 56
from obtaining a free ride on the owner's work), af'd, 298 F.2d 606 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 939 (1962); Swank v. Anson, 196 F.2d 330, 332 (1st Cir. 1952) (stating that valid patents
and trademarks confer monopoly rights to prevent the copying of one's product). A patent
"monopoly" is limited in the sense that the exclusive right to make use or sell lasts for only 17
years (for utility patents) or 14 years (for a design patent). 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 173 (1994). A
copyright is similarly limited by a time limit of usually the artist's life plus 50 years. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302 (1994). Copyrights are also limited because they confer only exclusive rights to derivative
works and copies. 17 U.S.C. § 10b (1994). Independent creation of an identical work is not
covered. See Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991).
55. Indeed, numerous courts have acknowledged that intellectual property rights generally
fall outside the antitrust scheme. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339
U.S. 827, 834 (1950) (holding that the "mere accumulation" of patent rights "is not in and of
itself illegal"); United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 214 (D. Del.
1953) (clarifying that "no judge has ever said" that a patentee who has properly used his/her
patent to produce a product "is guilty of monopolization" in the antitrust sense), aff'd, 351 U.S.
377 (1956).
Other courts have expressly advocated that intellectual property rights enhance competition.
See, e.g., Ives Lab., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("But the
law recognizes and approves monopolies of many kinds, of which patents, copyrights, and
trademarks or trade names or symbols are but examples. Each serves some end sufficiently
desirable to overcome the interest of society in unrestricted competition. Thus the law of
trademarks and unfair competition when it secures to businesses the fruits of their initiative and
enterprise is thought to encourage inventiveness, and to promote orderly and honest commercial
practices .. "),aff'd, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Lipscomb, supra note 30, § 1:3;
Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) ("[tlrademarks desirably
promote competition and the maintenance of product quality .... ). The Supreme Court also
analogizes trademark registration to property law as a "means for the registrant to quiet title in
the ownership of his mark." Id. at 198; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 428-29 (1984) (noting that patent law was intended to motivate creativity "and to
allow the public access to the products of their [the inventor's] genius after the limited period
of exclusive control" and further that society has an "interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce"). Other courts and scholars take a conservative view "that the
exclusive right of the inventor is ...a true monopoly" granted to reward the inventor and
limited in nature. WILLIAM B. BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 60-61 (1943);
ROBINSON, supra note 46, at 16-17 & n. 1. Other scholars have noted that granting exclusive
rights over general symbols or speech may be anti-competitive. See Timberg, supra note 34, at
330; Handler, supra note 24, at 272 (noting that in the law of trademarks, courts have been
troubled by the "monopoly implications of recognizing exclusive rights in words of common
speech").
56. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)).
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Patents, copyrights and trademarks are more properly categorized as
property, or at a minimum economically beneficial monopolies. In fact,
intellectual property rights are often analogized to state rights in real property:
"A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right
rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same
sanctions." Intellectual property rights are based on "earned property rights,"
namely the intellectual creations of the owner.58 Arguably, each intellectual
property right as created by its owner is an addition or contribution to the
public and takes little from the public domain5 9
In the case of patents, "[i]nstead of taking anything from the public, he
[the inventor] confers on it the greatest benefits." Similarly, although a
trademark owner may select a word from the public domain to identify her
goods, she contributes new property to the public in the quality assurance and
source indication functions of the mark 6' Indeed, Chief Judge Markey
noted, in response to the defense that to protect the Levi Strauss pocket tab
trademark would be to further an anti-competitive monopoly, that
"[Defendant's] pejorative use of 'monopoly' implies that Strauss's trademark
right is harmful and anti-competitive. On the contrary, the pocket tab
57. Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 69 (1877); see also Transparent-Wrap
Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 641 (1947) (" 'The owner of all property,
by withholding it upon any other terms, may, if he can, force others to buy from him; land is
the best example and every parcel of land is a monopoly.' ") (quoting Stokes & Smith Co. v.
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1946)); Roger E. Meiners & Robert
J. Staaf, Patents,Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 911, 915 (1990) (also drawing intellectual/real property analogy).
58. See United States Gypsum, 67 F. Supp. at 440-41 (quoting United States v. Motions
Picture Patents Co., 225 F. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (Tr. 7259-62 of oral argument)), rev'd, 333 U.S.
364 (1948); Consolidated-FruitJars,94 U.S. at 69; Lipscomb, supra note 30, § 1:9 (quoting
Daniel F. Webster: "what a man earns by thought, study and care, is as much his own, as what
he obtains by his hands ... invention, as a right of property, stands higher than inheritance or
devise, because it is 'personal earning' " (emphasis added)).
59. See BENNETT, supra note 55, at 61.
60. Parker v. Haworth, 18 F. Cas. 1135, 1136 (C.C. Ill. 1848) (No. 10,738); see also
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480; Lipscomb, supra note 30, § 1:6.
The term "monopoly" connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for buying,
selling, working, or using a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the
grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the
public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of
value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (citing WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY for the definition of "monopoly" and United States v. American
Bell Tel., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897) for the proposition that the inventor deprives the public of
nothing).
61. See Callmann, supra note 31, at 459 (arguing that trademarks indicate origin,
guarantee the quality of a product, and possess advertising value by discrediting the opposite
proposition as an "erroneous conclusion").
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trademark gives the public a reliable indication of source and thus facilitates
responsible marketplace competition. 6
Conversely, the anti-competitive government-regulated monopolies, such
as railroads or utilities, often involve grants for things already in the public
domain.63 They are designed to give the government discretion as to who
may enter an industry or obtain certain exclusive property rights.'M In the
majority of cases, the entity granted the anti-competitive monopoly has done
little to "earn" these rights. Instead, the monopoly is based on some perceived
development need, whose exponential start-up cost mandates the exclusion
of competition.65 Anti-competitive monopolies are continuously evaluated to
determine whether the controlled resources are being allocated efficiently or
whether redistribution is necessary.' Anti-competitive monopoly rights are
"generally transitory and often are not subject to exchange within the
market.. . " whereas intellectual property statutory "rights [ ] are exclusive
and alienable."67
Moreover, unlike the anti-competitive monopolies granted to utilities,
railroads, and, at least for now, major league baseball, intellectual "property"
rights are valuable to more than the specific groups that obtain passage of the
statutes. Indeed, under the Jeffersonian view that shaped the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, protecting the "exclusive property
rights" in the Sciences and Inventions for a limited period of time is the quid
pro quo for disseminating this information for future public use.' As noted
62. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.05[2] (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
632 F.2d 817, 821 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980) (bracketed substitution in McCarthy text)).
63. See id. §§ 1.15-.16.
64. See id. § 2.05[2].
65. For example, the start-up and regulatory costs for the early railroad lines and utilities
mandated granting a single or small group of entities control over specific geographical markets.
In these cases, it was perceived that competition would drive down profit to the extent that no
one would assume the risk of developing these much needed services for a nation undergoing
its industrialization. See generally Meiners & Staaf, supra note 57, at 920-21; see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical
Perspective, 62 TaVx. L. REV. 1263, 1268 (1984) ("[I]n certain markets with high start-up costs
no private entrepreneur would invest his money unless he was guaranteed freedom from
competitive entry.").
66. Meiners & Staaf, supra note 57, at 916.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 & n.2 (1966) (" 'Society may give
")
an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, [patents] as an encouragement to men ..
(quoting Jefferson's 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson, in VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
180-81 (Wash. ed. 1903)). In the same writing Jefferson refuses to view patents as property,
probably because this view became entangled with the French "natural rights" view, instead of
the pure Lockean view aligned with real property rights. Sometimes even framers cannot finetune the analysis! See also BENNETT, supra note 55, at 66-67 (citing letter from Jefferson to
Madison quoted in GOVN'T PRINTING OFFICE, CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION OF THE AMERICAN
PATENT SYSTEM: 1836-1936, at 28-29 (1937)). Bennett points out that Jefferson, as Secretary
of State, was the first administrator for the Patent Act of 1790. Id. at 66. Bennett further notes
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by the Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson, "[t]he basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent

monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility."
Simply put, patents, trademarks and copyrights are not monopolies in
the common anti-social/anti-competitive use of the word. Patents, trademarks,
and copyrights do not result in a restraint on trade. Rather, patents create
exclusive rights in inventive activity, which serve to enhance our technological base while encouraging further innovation, just as copyrights encourage
creative expression and trademarks encourage investment in good will,
quality, and advertising!' The trademark" 'monopoly is legally sanctioned
and not within the scope of those arrangements deplored by the antitrust
laws.' "' Because the goal of intellectual property rights is to contribute
new "property" and enhance competition, at a minimum, courts should
categorize intellectual property rights as economically beneficial monopolies.
Nonetheless, because the courts cannot resolve the ambiguity surrounding the
that although anti-competitive monopolies were generally repugnant to Jefferson, he did favor
the reward-based "patent system." Id. at 67; see also Lipscomb, supra note 30, § 1:9 (quoting
Jefferson's praise for the Patent Act of 1790); Meiners & Staaf, supra note 57, at 916-17
(arguing that intellectual property rights benefit "current and future members of society who will
have equal access to property and the enforcement of ownership rights by the judicial system").
Indeed, even Adam Smith, although against general anticompetitive monopolies in trade which
were "necessarily hurtful to the society," nonetheless "argued that a temporary monopoly granted
to the inventor of a new machine could be justified as a means of rewarding risk and expense."
Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the 19th Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST.
1, 7 (1950) (quoting ADAM SMrrH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. IV, ch. vii, pt. III, at 244 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 1928)).
69. Brener v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966); see also Universal Oil Prods. Co. v.
Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471,484 (1944) ("As a reward for inventions and to encourage
their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains
from keeping his invention a trade secret."); Machlup & Penrose, supranote 68, at 7 (noting that
Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith both favored patent rights under a "reward" theory).
70. See Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898,914 n.25 (6th Cir. 1978) (Markey, C.J.) (noting
that "a valid patent never confers a monopoly in the traditional historical, anticompetitive sense"
but is instead a property right which adds value) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961
(1979).
71. Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Trademarksandthe AntitrustLaw Complete Compatibility-No
DivorceNeeded, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 463, 476 (1975) (quoting LaMaur, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 607, 615-16 (D. Minn. 1973)); see also Union Nat'l Bank, Laredo v.

Union Nat'l Bank, Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that "the two principle
concerns of trademark law," preventing confusion and protecting investment in trademarks, "are
seen as promoting competition"); Jack DanielDistilleryInc., 190 F. Supp. at 845-46 (stating that
others may obtain a free ride on the owner's work when the owner does not have patent or
trademark monopoly rights). Trademarks can be used in tying arrangements which have been
held restraints of trade and violations of the Sherman Act. See Pattishall, supra note 17, at 588-

89 ("The avowed purpose of the anti-trast acts is to encourage competitive trade....");
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. A.J. Indus. Corp., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 668 (1970)
(distinguishing trademark rights from patent monopoly rights).
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term "monopoly," all intellectual property rights are best viewed "as a part
of a general private property rights scheme." Unfortunately, many courts
refuse to acknowledge that the monopolistic elements surrounding intellectual
property rights are the antithesis of anti-competitive monopolies. For example,
the Ninth Circuit in Ashcroft v. PaperMate Manufacturing Co. stated: "The
history of the American patent system is replete with the continuing tension
between a strong public policy against monopoly and a desire to encourage
inventions which will benefit the public. This tension has been resolved by
the courts setting a high and exacting standard for patent validity."'

72. Meiners & Staaf, supra note 57, at 917. The authors further point out that "nations that
have patents as a form of private property right are significantly more advanced technologically."
Id. (citing F. MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED
STATES 162-70 (1962)).
73. 1 IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE § 1-33 (5th ed. 1993) (quoting Ashcroft v. Paper
Mate Mfg. Co., 434 F.2d 910, 912 (9th Cir. 1970)). Professor Kayton does an admirable job of
distinguishing that monopoly, in the "antitrust sense, means something more" than the
economically-neutral "right to exclude." Id. § 1-32. Thus as long as alternative products are
available, a patent can never be a monopoly. Id.
Like all "property," patents, trademarks and copyrights can be "misused" in an anticompetitive manner which violates Federal Anti-trust Laws. See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that "infringement actions initiated and
conducted in bad faith" may violate antitrust law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Simpson
v. Union Oil, Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) ('The patent laws which give a 17-year monopoly
on 'making, using, or selling the invention' are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and
modify them pro tanto."); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 94-95 (1902) (finding
if contracts as mentioned in the escrow agreement were indeed entered into by the named
parties, the possibility existed that the resulting combination would be illegal). See also
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that
blanket licenses are subject to careful assessment under rules generally applied in Sherman Act
cases); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (holding
that patents are limited to the invention described and may not be extended to materials
necessary to the operation of the invention without running afoul of anti-monopoly laws); Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a trademark license may be
a "tying" product in violation of § I of the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972);
In re Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 83 F.T.C. 575 (1973) (Federal Trade Commission finding illegal
tying of trademark license where franchisor tied trademark license to various products, some of
which franchisor produced). Compulsory licensing of the misused intellectual property was often
the remedy provided in these cases. For an opinion clearly limiting the government's authority
to attack patent rights under the rubric of the Sherman Act, see United States v. Glaxco Group,
Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973). In Glarco, the Court noted that:
In arriving at this conclusion, [right of government to attack particular patent at
issue] we do not recognize unlimited authority in the Government to attack a patent
by basing an antitrust claim on the simple assertion that the patent is invalid. [ ].
Nor do we invest the Attorney General with a roving commission to question the
validity of any patent lurking in the background of an antitrust case.
Id. (citation omitted). This Article's scope does not extend to the intersection of intellectual
property and antitrust laws.
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This view of intellectual property as an anti-competitive monopoly
persists despite the Supreme Court's holding and Congress providing that
patents "shall have the attributes of personal property." 4 Surprisingly,
although the patent controversy was at the heart of this monopolyphobia, it
presently permeates both traditional trademark and dilution law'
C. Lanham Act and Dilution Doctrine as Recent
Examples of "Monopolyphobia"
There is anotherclause in the charter,that in order every
card-maker may know his cards, from another card-maker,
each tradershall lodge his mark or stamp with the receiver,to
prevent any fraud upon our loving subjects.
This is a colourable end,but ifany weight was to be laid
upon these colourable recitals, it would be establishing every
other monopoly.
For all the world knows, that there is a pompous recital
in every
monopoly,... accruingfrom such chartersof restric76
tion.
There is no element of monopoly involved at all.... A
trademark precludes the idea of monopoly. It is a means of
distinguishing one productfrom another; it follows therefore
that there must be others to distinguish from If there are
others there is no monopoly, andgf there is a monopoly there
is no needfor any distinguishing.
1. Introduction
In reporting the bill that became the Lanham Act, the Senate Committee
expressly noted that federal trademark rights were not monopolies. More
specifically, the Committee Report stated: 'The matter has been approached
with the view of protecting trade-marks [sic] and making infringement and
piracy unprofitable. This can be done without any misgivings and without the
fear of fostering hateful monopolies, for no monopoly is involved in trademark [sic] protection."7' Unfortunately, while Congress was evaluating the
metes and bounds of its new Trademark Act, the second cycle of judicial
74. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994); Transparent-WrapMach. Corp., 329 U.S. at 643 (holding that
"[a] patent is a species of property").
75. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.05[l].
76. Blanchard v. Hill, 26 Eng. Rep. 692, 693 (Ch. 1742).
77. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2.05[2] (quoting EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOODWILL,
TRADE ARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 50-52 (1914)) (ellipse in McCarthy).
78. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d. Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1275).
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hostility towards patents was in full swing and began to permeate trademark
79
rights. As noted by Judge Frank in Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler.
"[T]he courts' attitude towards [sic] patents, by a sort of intellectual osmosis,
affected their rulings concerning trade symbols. When, more recently, the
older, stricter, judicial views about patents re-emerged, this strictness, in part
at least, seems to have carried over into the trade-name decisions."'
Like the patent cases, use of the term "monopoly" during this period
was ever present when the objective was to limit the trademark rights at
issue.8 ' Indeed, the courts skillfully manipulated the balancing of the
trademark owner's rights against the public interest in free market competition. For example, in holding that DIETRIM did not infringe upon the
plaintiff's mark DIETENE because these words simply shared the "descriptive" term DIET, the court opined:

79. 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945).
80. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2.0511] (quoting StandardBrands, 151 F.2d at 41-42
(citations omitted)). Judge Frank was one of a few judges who openly took time to evaluate and
distinguish the monopolistic elements surrounding trademark protection. In StandardBrands, he
expressly questioned whether "monopoly" is an appropriate term to describe trademark rights:
"I use the word 'monopoly' advisedly, because basic in the consideration of cases like this is
the fact that judicial protection of any trade name necessarily involves a legalized monopoly
which does not-like patents, copyrights or public utility monopolies-rest upon any statute but
is entirely judge-made." StandardBrands, 151 F.2d at 38. He openly acknowledged that several
"special privileges" are "monopolies," such as real estate ownership, mine ownership and
utilities: "No one seriously questions whether there should be some monopolies; the only
question is as to what monopolies there should be, and whether and how much they should be
regulated legislatively or curbed judicially." Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137
F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943). Some courts, although improperly
categorizing trademarks as "monopolies," at least affirmatively distinguished these rights, along
with patents and copyrights, as economically beneficial and fostering free market competition.
See, e.g., Ives Lab., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In Ives
Lab., the court noted:
But the law recognizes and approves monopolies of many kinds, of which patents,
copyrights, and trademarks or trade names or symbols are but examples. Each
serves some end sufficiently desirable to overcome the interest of society in
unrestricted competition. Thus the law of trademarks and unfair competition when
it secures to businesses the fruits of their initiative and enterprise is thought to
encourage inventiveness, and to promote orderly and honest commercial
practices....
Id. (citations omitted).
81. See National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 506 (D.Mass.
1942) (explaining that some economists now find that trademark protection promotes
"undesirable monopolies"), afid, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944); Thomas Kerfoot & Co. v. Louis
K. Liggett Co., 59 F.2d 80, 89-90 (D. Mass. 1932) (holding that trademark "monopoly" cannot
be extended such that it becomes a "monopoly" over the goods), aft'd, 67 F.2d 214 (1st Cir.
1933).
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"No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a
trademark or tradename which would practically give him a
monopoly in the sale of any goods other than those produced or
made by himself. If he could, the public would be injured rather
than protected, for competition would be destroyed."'
As will be demonstrated in this section, this monopolyphobia surrounded the
passage of the Lanham Act and subsequently led to the negative presumption
that presently pervades enforcement of state dilution rights!8 3
2. Lanham Act "Monopolyphobia"
The Trade-Mark Act of 1946 (The Lanham Act) purported to introduce
additional substantive rights of trademark owners beyond those provided in
the common law.' Two distinct philosophies surrounded the passage of the
Lanham Act-"restrictionise' and "expansionist."" Leading trademark
scholar Beverly Pattishall noted that the "restrictionist" group was created
when the "anti-monopoly" thinking which surrounded patent law spilled over
into trademark law. The main goal of the "restrictionists" was to severely
restrict or narrow Federal trademark rights based on their monopolistic nature
and their function as a restraint of trade 6

82. Dietene Co. v. Dietrim Co., 121 F. Supp. 785, 787 (D. Neb. 1954) (emphasis added)
(quoting Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446 (1911) (citation
omitted)), rev'd, 225 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1955).
83. See, e.g., In re Pollak Steel Co., 314 F.2d 566, 570 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (protecting
functional nature of trademarks would create "perpetual monopolies"); Triangle Publications, Inc.
v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 982 (2d Cir. 1948) (stating that trademark-like protection fosters
monopolies), overruled by Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prod. Mfg., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.
1965); California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893, 899 (2d Cir.)
(discussing monopoly dangers inherent in trademark protection), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816
(1947); Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 771, 775-76 (E.D. Mo. 1966) (limiting
trademark monopoly to goods specified in registration), rev'd, 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1967);
Majestic Mfg. Co. v. Majestic Elec. Appliance Co., 79 F. Supp. 649, 650 (N.D. Ohio 1948)
(stating that granting of greater trademark protection could result in "monopolistic power"),
aff'd, 172 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1949).
84. S.REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1274, 1276-77 (1946); S.Chesterfield Oppenheim, The Public Interest in Legal Protection of
Industrial and Intellectual Prop., 40 TRADEMARK REP. 613, 622 (1950), quoted in Pattishall,
supra note 17, at 599.
85. "Expansionist" is a personally coined term to contrast Pattishall's categorization of the
monopolyphobia exhibited by restrictionists. See Pattishall, supra note 17, at 605 (noting that
"restrictionist trends" are "derived from the current 'monopoly phobia' ").
86. Id. at 589, 605. Interestingly, Pattishall was puzzled by how this "antimonopoly
thinking" ever "spill[ed] over illogically into the commercial identity field." Id. at 589. He
acknowledged that this "monopolyphobia" originated with patents and copyrights, but asserts that
"it [trademarks] bears no logical relation" to these areas and that it is a mistake to attempt to
align the three: "Yet, is not the public interest best served by the maintenance of the sanctity
of the means for individual identification in trade; for how can a strong competitive economy
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Pattishall cites Sigmund Timberg, a leading restrictionist, who summarized:
In retrospect, therefore, trade-marks, in addition to their role as
facilitating or enforcement mechanisms for competitive restraints
independently desired by private parties, may directly promote
restrain [sic] of trade. Thus, for example, trade-marks may on
occasion be the direct vehicles whereby monopoly power is
consciously brought to bear on actual or potential competitors .... In other cases, owners of trade-marks or trade names
become unconscious, albeit willing monopolists because the
trade-marks or names are indispensable means of describing
commodities in the market place. It may well be that these
direct, and perhaps often unintended, consequences of the use
of the trade-mark are socially more important than the positive
and purposive use of trade-marks to abet illegal conspiracies.
Allied with these considerations is the fact that the functioning
of the trade-mark system may place small business at a great
relative disadvantage compared with big business, and may
thereby promote the concentration of economic power in this
country faster than antitrust proceedings in the trade-mark field
can dissipate such concentration. 7
Unfortunately, during the decade surrounding passage and implementation of the Lanham Act, numerous courts adopted the restrictionist view,
thereby severely "restricting the scope of exclusive rights awarded plaintiffs
and correspondingly broadening the privileges of their competitors.""S
For example, in Creamette Co. v. Conlin, 9 the court held that the
plaintiff's use of the trademark CREAMEITE on macaroni products was not
sufficiently distinctive to be entitled to the broad range of protection which
would exclude the defendant's use of the same mark on ice cream products.' ° The court noted in part:
As applied to such an article it is a non-fanciful word because
as thus used it is descriptive.... Creamette is not so all
inclusive as to give the broad monopoly for its use which is
necessary to legally require a finding that.., the use of the
term on a frozen sweet or dessert product like ice cream is an
act of unfair competition which equity should enjoin?'

function without clear cut lines of identification?" Id. at 590.
87. Id. at 589 n.4 (quoting Timberg, supra note 34, at 333 (emphasis added)).
88. Id. (quoting Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Monopoly Versus Competition: Significant Trends in
Patent,Anti-Trust, Trade-Mark, and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 YALE L.J. 514, 531 (1944)).
89. 191 F.2d. 108 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952).
90. Id. at 112.
91. Id. (emphasis added). The court cited several cases for "the well established rule...
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Modem courts are not immune to trademark monopolyphobia when
seeking to narrowly apply the Lanham Acte or to preempt the state rights
at issue. Unlike courts of the Lanham Act era, however, modem courts are

that even a 'strong' trade name does not grant a monopoly for unlimited use." Id. (citing Philco
Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1943); Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe
Brewing Co., 117 F.2d. 347, 351 (4th Cir. 1941)). Further, the court noted the "situation is
analogous to that considered in Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969 (9th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951). Likewise, in Majestic Mfg. Co. v. Majestic Elec.
Appliance Co., 79 F. Supp. 649, 650-51 (N.D. Ohio 1948), aft'd, 172 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1949),
the court held that the mark MAJESTIC, as used to identify the plaintiffs coal and gas stoves,
lacked sufficient strength and distinctiveness to exclude another manufacturer from using the
same mark in connection with electric irons and toasters. Although acknowledging that there was
a broad spectrum of protection for "distinctive" marks, the court distinguished that marks such
as MAJESTIC, which were merely descriptive of a characteristic of the goods, were "afford[ed]
protection against their use in the narrow and restricted field only to which they have been
applied." Id. at 650. The court opined that "granting of greater protection would create a
monopolistic power not contemplated in the law relating to trade mark rights." Id. The court,
quoting Justice Southerland in American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 384
(1926), further noted: "It would be a serious matter if the law actually permitted any one who
chose to do so to organize a series of corporations with names containing these words [i.e.,
descriptive words such as 'majestic'].. . ." Id. at 650-51; see also Shredded Wheat Co. v.
Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 964 (2d Cir. 1918) (noting that "[u]nder the guise of
protecting against unfair competition, we must be jealous not to create perpetual monopolies");
Sunbeam Lighting Co., 183 F.2d at 973 (cautioning that "SUNBEAM's" trademark owners, even
with "well-earned reputation for quality in its line," cannot have a "legally enforceable
monopoly to this superlative term throughout the whole electrical world"); California Fruit
Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1947). In addressing the
range of Sunkist's protection, the court held:
Unless "Sunkist" covers everything edible under the sun, we cannot believe that
anyone whose I.Q. is high enough to be regarded by the law would ever be
confused or would be likely to be confused in the purchase of a loaf of bread
branded as "Sunkist" because someone else sold fruits or vegetables under that
name.
The unconscionable efforts of the plaintiffs to monopolize the food market by
the monopoly of the word "Sunkist" on all manner of goods sold ... should not
be sanctioned by the courts.
Id. Of course, today a court would likely find that use of the mark "Sunkist" on bread would
in fact likely cause confusion and therefore represent an infringing use under a reasonable zone
of expansion into the market theory, and thereupon virtually withdraw these words from the
public use as trade-marks.
Surprisingly, even Judge Frank, who cautioned against trademark "monopolyphobia,"
apparently crossed the line in a dissenting opinion where he argued: "Without doubt, the judgemade trade-name doctrine or concept fosters monopolies; and, generally speaking, the commonlaw tradition is inimical to monopolies (although opposition to monopoly when it takes the form
of an obsessive monopoly-phobia becomes absurd)." Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167
F.2d 969, 982 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting).
92. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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arguably better at disguising the negative presumption they attach to these
rights under the guise of protecting the public interest and by balancing the
trademark owner's rights against the right to disseminate information into the
public domain and promote free market competition. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court limited a state's ability to
protect against unscrupulous copying of boat hull designs (arguably trade
dress) by direct molding.' 4 In holding that Florida's direct molding statute
was preempted by Federal Patent Law, Justice O'Connor opined:
The Florida law substantially restricts the public's ability to
exploit an unpatented design in general circulation, raising the
specter of state-created monopolies in a host of useful shapes
and processes for which patent protection has been denied or is
otherwise unobtainable.... The patent statute's careful balance
between public right and private monopoly to promote certain
creative activity is a "scheme of federal regulation... so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it."95

93. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
94. Id. at 168. Although Justice O'Connor distinguished that this holding was not to
conflict with state unfair-competition statutes "protect[ing] against copying of nonfunctional
aspects of consumer products which have acquired secondary meaning," arguably many of the
"boat hull designs" would qualify as "distinctive" enough to meet this standard. Id. at 158.
Moreover, the statute merely prevented copying by "direct molding," thus leaving the design at
issue available to the "public domain" to be copied by other methods. Id. at 146 (court noting
the interpretation of the statute by Florida Supreme Court Justice Shaw, dissenting).
95. Id. at 167 (second omission in original) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Not surprisingly, the use of the term "monopoly" is also conspicuously
absent in modem trademark cases where the Court is expanding the trademark rights at issue
or "broadly" interpreting the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763 (holding that
trade dress may be protected under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act based on a finding of
inherent distinctiveness, without proof that the trade dress has secondary meaning). Justice White
stated:
[A]dding a secondary meaning requirement could have anticompetitive effects,
creating particular burdens on the start-up of small companies. It would present
special difficulties for a business ... that seeks to start a new product in a limited
area and then expand into new markets. Denying protection for inherently
distinctive nonfunctional trade dress until after secondary meaning has been
established would allow a competitor, which has not adopted a distinctive trade
dress of its own, to appropriate the originator's dress in other markets and to deter
the originator from expanding into and competing in these areas.
Id. at 775; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1300 (1995). The use of the
word "monopoly" is limited in Qualitex, an opinion holding that color alone can meet the basic
legal requirements for use as a trademark and is therefore registrable under the Lanham Act. Id.
at 1302. This is particularly telling since Justice Souter had to address respondent's argument
that using color alone as a trademark would ultimately "deplete" the available colors in the
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Unfortunately, state and lower federal courts evaluating dilution rights
have yet to accept these rights as economically beneficial. As evidenced in
the next section, monopolyphobia has gone beyond traditional trademark
rights and presently engulfs the dilution doctrine.
3. Dilution 'Monopolyphobia"
In his seminal article, which introduced the notion that a distinctive
mark might be diluted by a nonconfusing appropriation, Schechter recognized
that his thesis would be attacked as promoting the establishment of anticompetitive monopolies among trademark holders.
Despite almost seventy years of debate, even the most ardent opponents
of dilution protection have rarely managed to proffer more than cavalier
assertions that the doctrine undermines competition. This failure suggests that
their assumption that the monopolyphobia, which permeated early discussions
of trademark protection under the Lanham Act, is equally germane in an
evaluation of the dilution doctrine.
Courts have been reluctant to grant relief in a dilution cause of action,
largely out of fear of encouraging anti-competitive monopolies.' Judicial
distrust of the doctrine, which is the product of criticism that dilution
protection invites abuse by monopolistic interests, results in the harassment
of small, local businesses, has a deleterious impact on the free use of
language, and threatens to swallow competition.98 Raising the elusive
"spectre of monopoly," without providing a compelling reason as to
precisely why such protection is anti-competitive, is enough to dissuade most
courts from granting relief on the basis of trademark dilution, despite much
scholarly work urging a contrary approach."m For example, a New York
court has evaluated that state's experience with the dilution doctrine:
The dilution approach has been recognized but "sparingly
applied" by the New York courts. The New York Courts cling
to the talismanic standard of likelihood of confusion....
Perhaps these decisions may be attributed to the ambiguity as
public domain to be selected by others as marks. Id. at 1305-06.
96. Schechter, supra note 19, at 833.
97. Pattishall, supra note 15, at 615-16; Beverly W. Pattishall, The CaseforAnti-Dilution
Trade-MarkStatutes, 43 TRADEMARK REP. 887, 887-88 (1953) [hereinafter Anti-Dilution TradeMark].
98. Anti-Dilution Trade-Mark, supra note 97.
99. Handler, supra note 24, at 272. This phrase is Handler's.
100. Welkowitz, supra note 24, at 546; Port, supra note 14, at 446.
In its traditional incarnation, the doctrine has applied solely to non-confusing uses, and
hence, most trademark holders have sought relief only from non-competitors, as they are most
likely to trade on the strength of the mark in a fashion which does not engender confusion
among consumers. Port argues that by protecting the selling power of a mark outside its primary
market, on non-competing goods, dilution protection risks granting monopolies in trademark
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to the identification of the right of action in either "dilution" or
"distinctive quality," and to the absence of definition of the
latter phrase with the risk that the statute may be read to grant
a monopoly 0to the first user as a result of stare decisis effect of
a judgment.' '
The mystical and perplexing inability of courts to accurately interpret and
apply dilution statutes stems, then, not from ignorance of the doctrine but
from a fundamental antipathy to even the "spectre of monopoly."'"
holders. Port, supra note 14, at 452-53. In his assessment, Port merely echoes the historical
aversion to protecting marks outside their principal markets. The reasoning of the Second Circuit
in S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson reflects this recalcitrance to recognize dilution protection:
It is true that a merchant who has sold one kind of goods, sometimes finds himself
driven to add other "lines" in order to hold or develop his existing market; in such
cases he has a legitimate present interest in preserving his identity in the ancillary
market, which he cannot do, if others make his name equivocal there. But if the
new goods have no such relation to the old, and if the first user's interest in
maintaining the significance of his name when applied to the new goods is nothing
more than the desire to post the new market as a possible preserve which he may
later choose to exploit, it is hard to see any basis for its protection. The public may
be deceived, but he has no claim to be its vicarious champion; his remedy must be
limited to his injury and by hypothesis he has none. There is always the danger
that we may be merely granting a monopoly, based upon the notion that by
advertising one can obtain some "property" in a name.
S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940).
Both scholars and jurists, then, have expressed reservations about extending protection for
marks in non-competing markets, thus attacking perhaps the most basic premise of the dilution
doctrine.
101. Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 340
N.Y.S.2d 532, 542-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (citations omitted).
102. Handler, supra note 24, at 272. Yet another criticism of dilution protection is that it
creates a monopoly of the idea in the abstract, contrary to even the law of copyright. Port
explains:
Copyright law does not grant protection for the idea in the abstract, but only the
expression of the idea in the form of the actual work or invention to prohibit
granting monopolies for which society receives nothing in return. Monopolies in
ideas in the abstract or monopolies in information run counter to all justification
of intellectual property protection.
A federal statute protecting "super trademarks" from dilution would create a
copyright in the mark itself, as well as in the abstract idea of the mark in the minds
of the consumer and manufacturers .... Under dilution theory, the trademark
holder not only controls each expression of the mark, but also attempts to control
the manner in which consumers or other manufacturers perceive of the mark. In
this matter, dilution theory attempts a monopolization of the idea of the work even
outside of any use. In that respect, dilution theory violates the idea/expression
dichotomy.
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In addition to economic objections, the doctrine's opponents also have
engaged in philosophical critiques of dilution protection as encouraging
monopolies. Port argues that proponents of dilution protection la6k firm
theoretical ground." Employing a Lockean analysis to justify the doctrine
fails, according to Port, because the trademark holder has not exerted any
work on the mark in non-competing markets, the very focus of dilution
protection."'° In his view, the doctrine promotes "government-subsidized
monopolies in the mark to the first comer, regardless" of the work exerted on
it."°5 It is thus unfair and monopolistic, in Port's view, to extend the
holder's control over its mark into a realm where it has not sown.1'°
Opponents of dilution statutes also advance arguments grounded in
trademark jurisprudence"'° and in the nature of the dilution cause of
action" in an effort to undermine the doctrine. Initially, the focal point for
much of the dispute surrounding the monopolistic tendencies of the dilution
doctrine is the level of distinctiveness a mark must acquire before it deserves
protection."' 9 Handler, for instance, has argued that expanding dilution
protection to any mark that has acquired a "secondary meaning" presents the
a complete, government-granted monopoly in the relevant
holder with
'0
language."
Finally, the monopolyphobia that has infected so many courts has
prompted G.H.C. Bodenhausen, scholar and professor of intellectual property
at Utrecht University, to caution against an overzealous advocacy of dilution
protection."' He stated:
In view of the frequently conservative standpoint of Courts and
the antimonopolistic tendencies to which they are sometimes
prone, disappointments could result, and, in the long run,

Port, supra note 14, at 486-87. It is the contention of these scholars that in protecting the
subliminal connection, via dilution statutes, between the trademark holder and consumers of its
product, which created by a substantial investment in the selling power of a distinctive mark,
the first user is granted a monopoly inimical to fundamental notions of intellectual property
jurisprudence.
103. See Port, supra note 14, at 487.
104. Id. at 473-74, 487.
105. Id. at 487; see also Welkowitz, supra note 24, at 540 (contending that granting
dilution protection for less distinctive marks results in an unearned, "artificial advantage in the
marketplace").
106. Port, supra note 14, at 474.
107. Id. at 487 (asserting that "[a] federal dilution statute.., would grossly expand the
common law concept of trademark as our system has recognized it for hundreds of years").
108. Id. (maintaining that "[t]here is also no satisfactory theoretical justification supporting
a federal dilution cause of action").
109. Brownlee, supra note 15, at 472, 482-83.
110. Handler, supra note 24, at 278-79.
111. G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Scope of Protection of Famous Trademarks, 46 TRADEMARK
REP. 718, 722-23 (1956).
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trademarks might prove to be protected even less effectively
than before! For the time being I would, therefore, reject such
a total revolution in trademark law."'
While the stifling threat of monopoly is almost palpable to some courts and
scholars, other commentators and jurists have debunked this fear by
explaining precisely why dilution protection actually encourages competition
and thwarts unwanted monopolies rather than producing the deleterious
3
effects on free market interaction urged by the doctrine's opponents."
The next section of this Article rebuts the numerous arguments noted
above and posits that once trademark rights are correctly viewed as property,
dilution rights can be clearly and concisely defined in a manner which
ensures a harmonious balance between earned property rights and the free
dissemination of words and ideas.
ITM.THE SOLUTION: PROPERLY CATEGORJ7ING
TRADITIONAL TRADEMARK AND DILUTION
RIGHTS AS "PROPERTY"

Bear in mind that the right to property is a right to
action, like all the others: it is not the right "to an object" but
to the action and the consequences of producing or earning
that object. It is not a guarantee that a man will earn any
property, but only a guarantee that he will own it if he earns
it. It is the right to gain, to keep, to use and to dispose of
materialvalues ... Patents and copyrights [and trademarks]
are the legal implementation of the base of all property rights:
a man's right to the product of his mind.""
Although trademarkprotection may have had its start in
common law as an action in fraud, over the past one hundred
fifty years it has come to focus also on protecting property
interests in trademarksthemselves. This shift is the result of the
recognition of the purposes trademarks serve in the modern
impersonal economy. They act as a means of identifying a
product as coming from or being associated with a particular,
although anonymous source, and inducingsubsequentpurchases by customers.
112. Id. at 723.
113. See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
114. Rand, supra note 1, at 213, 352-54. I added trademark rights to the Ayn Rand quote,
because it appears from her discussions on intellectual property and "individual rights" in
general, that these rights would fall within her description. Of course, as will be discussed
shortly, there are distinctions between patents, copyrights and trademarks, but these distinctions
are insufficient to exclude traditional trademark and dilution rights from the "property"
categorization.
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Thus, trademark law now pursues two relatedgoals-the
prevention of deception and consumer confusion, and, more
fiudamentally,
the protection of property interests in trade5
marks.1

A. Introduction
On the opposite end of the monopolyphobia spectrum were leading
scholars such as Edward Rogers; who advocated a broad and "expansive"
interpretation of the Lanham Act, reasoning that "[i]dentification of businesses
and goods is the essence of free competition and the opposite of monopoly."' 6 These scholars, along with progressive courts, were responsible for
turning around the restrictionist view of trademarks and expansively viewing
trademarks as possessing source identification, quality-control, and good-will
components which are "protectable" intellectual property rights."7
However, at this early juncture, few scholars were willing to go out on
a limb and justify the "expansionist' view of the Lanham Act under a
trademark as a "property right' doctrine. Instead, Pattishall, for example, cited
the basis for the early courts restrictionist view as a "confusion of trade

115. Ameritech Inc. v. American Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987).
116. Edward S. Rogers, The LanhamAct and the Social Function of Trade-Marks,14 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 176 (1949); see also Leslie D. Taggart, Trade-Marks: Monopoly or
Competition?, 35 TRADEMARK REP. 25, 26, 36 (1945). Taggart finds,

[tlo call a thing a monopoly is merely to apply an ugly word to it.... Even the
status of marriage is a monopoly which the law tries valiantly to protect.
After more than fifty years experience with the Anti-Trust Laws, if trade-marks
were an anti-trust problem, there would likely be some evidence of it. The absence
of such decisions is the strongest proof that trade-marks are properly well outside
the ever-increasing jurisdiction of the Anti-Trust Division.
Id. at 35-36.
117. As early as 1943, Judge Frank held that the protection of monopolies in trade names
rests on the social interest in primarily protecting, not the consumer, "but the businessman who
has gained a strategic advantage, through building up of good-will, against unfair practices by
competitors who desire to poach on that good-will." EasternWine Corp., 137 F.2d at 958. Judge
Frank further noted that "the legal protection of trade-names does not engender competition; on
the contrary, it creates lawful monopolies, immunities from competition. And the legally
forbidden invasions of those monopolies might often benefit consumers." Id. at 957.
One could further deduce that the early courts attached a negative presumption to trademark
rights by refusing to label these rights as "monopolies" in its economically-neutral sense, but
instead by attaching a negative or anti-competitive component to this term. This made it virtually
impossible to view these rights in a positive light as "earned" property. Judge Frank used the
term "monopoly" in an economically neutral sense which equated "exclusive rights" with
"monopoly" power. Judge Frank expressly cautioned against "monopoly phobia' or pejorative
view of any monopoly automatically being "anti-competitive." Id. at 958-59.
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identification law with that of patents or copyrights, to which it actually bears
no logical relation.""'
Indeed, The Supreme Court has recently begun to view trademarks as
"economically beneficial" intellectual property rights by broadly interpreting
the Lanham Act to include "inherently distinctive" trade dress and single
shades of color which serve as source identifiers." 9
Nonetheless, the popular view remains that trademarks are merely
goodwill incapable of having "rights in gross" separable from the respective
business or service.'" ° Obviously, courts and leading scholars are overlooking the fact that trademarks fall within the scope of intellectual "proper-

118. Pattishall, supra note 17, at 590 (citing Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Woe Unto You TradeMark Owners, 49 MICH. L. REV. 1103 (1951)). Pattishall asserts that a strong economy must
have clear cut lines of trade-identification to function properly. Id. at 591. Trade-identity serves
the two-fold benefit of first, assuring that the customer obtains the product he or she wants, and
second, providing the benefit of goodwill and the ability to compete in the national market with
others, based on one's own reputation, products, and private identity. Id. Thus, trade-marks
cannot be anti-trust "monopolies" which restrain trade, but are instead economically-essential
"monopolies" which foster consumer protection and enhance free-market competition. "Trade
identity," according to Pattishall, encompasses the law of trademarks, trade-names and unfair
competition. See id. at 589-90; see also id. at 592 ("In the rush to destroy the monopolies that
were stifling commercial competition, and with it the initiative which had made the nation great,
the very means and basis for this competition and indivdual [sic] initiative has suffered and is
now being undermined.").
Pattishall's view is supported by a leading line of trademark cases holding that, unlike
patents and copyrights, there is no right in gross in trademarks. In United Drug Co. the Court
found:
There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to
an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed.
The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition; the
right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function
is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect
his good will against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not the subject
of property except in connection with an existing business.
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90,97 (1918) (citing Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-14 (1916)).
119. For example, in Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767, the Court held that trade dress can be
"inherently distinctive" and that proof of secondary meaning is not required to register trade
dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See also id. (J. White noting that grafting a secondary
meaning requirement on trade dress protection could have anti-competitive effects). Similarly,
in Qualitex, 115 S.Ct. at 1302, the Court broadly held that color alone can meet the basic legal
requirements for use as a trademark and is therefore registrable under the Lanham Act.
120. See, e.g., United Drug, 248 U.S. at 97 (noting a trademark is not property like a
copyright or patent); Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 412 (noting "that a party has a valuable
interest in the good-will of his trade or business, and in the trade-marks adopted to maintain and
extend [that good-will]"); American Footwear,609 F.2d at 663 (noting "that trademark rights,
unlike statutory copyrights or patents, are not rights in gross or at large"); Jeremiah D.
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ty."'1' Despite the literal reference to property, they are reluctant to view
patents and copyrights as property and summarily reject the idea that
trademarks should be categorized as earned property rights.' " Interestingly,
the early courts correctly categorized trademark rights as "a property right for
the violation of which damages may be recovered in an action at law, and the

McAuliffe, The Dilution Concept in International Trade, 61 TRADEMARK REP. 76 (1971).
McAuliffe finds:
Inherent in the traditional approach is the idea that the trade-mark has a 'specialty'
i.e., a 'being' only out of its association with a certain line of goods and beyond
that it has no existence and, therefore, no rights. Hence the rule that "the trade, and
not the mark, is to be protected.
Id.
121. Consider whether the majority has accurately applied the holding of Hanover Star
Mills and United Drug. Do these cases limit a trademark to being merely "goodwill," or do they
instead support the earlier trademark cases, which asserted that there is a property right
associated with trademarks, albeit different in scope and nature than the property right associated
with patents and copyrights? See, e.g., United Drug, 248 U.S. at 98 (citing the Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879), for the proposition that "[piroperty in trade-marks and the right
to their exclusive use rest upon the laws of the several States, and depend upon them for security
and protection.. .
122. See Chadwick v. Covell, 23 N.E. 1068 (Mass. 1890). Then Judge Holmes opined:
When the common law developed the doctrine of trade-marks and trade-names, it
was not creating a property in advertisements more absolute than it would have
allowed the author of Paradise Lost, but the meaning was to prevent one man from
palming off his goods as another's, from getting another's business or injuring his
reputation by unfair means, and, perhaps, from defrauding the public.

Id. at 1069; see also E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)
('The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of
certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary
requirements of good faith."); Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Duchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33,
35 (2d Cir. 1937) (Judge Augustus Hand noting that a "trade-mark is not property in the
ordinary sense but only a word or symbol indicating the origin of a commercial product."), cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 640 (1938).
See also Pattisball, supra note 15, at 624 (criticizing the "Schechterian-Callmann 'property
right' philosophy" for dilution as "repugnant to the judicial sensibilities because of potential for
abuse and obnoxious monopoly, but also because it collides resoundingly with a fundamental
tenet of Anglo-American trade identity law--that there is no property right as such in a mark")
(citations omitted). As previously noted, Beverly Pattishall and other leading trademark scholars
are unwilling to go out on a limb and assert that trademarks are "property." Pattishall, supra
note 1, at 602. Indeed, Pattishall asserts that a trademark "bears no logical relation" to "patents
or copyrights" and that trademark monopolyphobia resulted from courts and scholars incorrectly
linking these rights. Id. at 590.
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continued violation of it will be enjoined by a court of equity, with
compensation for past infringement."'"
This section establishes that trademarks are most effectively protected
under a property rights analysis, since this serves the two-fold purpose of
avoiding the negative presumption surrounding the term "monopoly" and of
establishing an earned exclusive right to use which is protectable under both
traditional tort and trespass theories. 4 This section further notes that the
dilution doctrine is indeed viable protection against the persona, quality
assurance, and source identification "property" of famous and highly
distinctive marks. It concludes by noting that the property theory for dilution
is most readily accepted if dilution rights are clearly and concisely defined.
In defining these rights, drafters should keep in mind the inevitable balance
between free market competition and rewarding property rights, which is so
carefully maintained in the federal patent, trademark and copyright acts."z
123. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92; see also Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 293, 296
(1865). The Derringercourt noted that
[t]he right of property [in trade marks] does not in any manner depend for its
inceptive existence or support upon statutory law, though its enjoyment may be
better secured and guarded and infringements upon the rights of the proprietor may
be more effectually prevented or redressed by the aid of the statute than at common
law.
Id.
Note also that the Internal Revenue Service views trademarks as capital asset "property" for
tax accounting purposes. See CALLMANN, supra note 19, § 17.07 n.2 (citing United States
Mineral Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 177 (1969)).
124. 1 CALLMANN, supra note 21, § 1:15 (stating that competitive "traditional trademark
uses" are easily protected under the law of unfair competition which is grounded in the tort of
deceit (palming off), with the Lanham Act being a subset of this area). Callmann posits however,
that non-competing uses and the "independent property value" of a trademark are best protected
under a "property right" theory which goes beyond unfair competition and protects against any
trespass of the property rights of source identification, quality assurance, and advertising value.
See id. § 1.15 and 3 CALLMANN §§ 17.01, 17.07, 17.10-12 (noting that the classical function of
trademarks, namely source identification, is the basis for development of traditional trademark
law protecting against likelihood of confusion, which is grounded in the law of deceit).
Callmann further notes that property rights are protectable under the law of trespass and breach
of contract. Since dilution opponents argue that dilution falls outside of the scope of traditional
trademark protection by being grounded in the tort of trespass, rather than deceit, the property
theory diffuses their argument by harmonizing dilution as a protectable "property" right against
the trespass upon the source identification, quality assurance and advertising values of famous
and highly distinctive trademarks. This will be further developed in section C of this part.
125. See Randolph S. Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of Attribution
Under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 45, 78 (1995) ("The
boundaries of the Patent and Copyright Acts reflect legislative decisions, with judicial
interpretation, as to what material should be left to the public domain and what material should
be the subject of private rights."). The author further notes that
[b]oth patent and copyright law have strong policies favoring the free dissemination
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Careful balancing of these rights will ensure that the new Federal Dilution
Act of 1995 avoids the monopolyphobic reaction which surrounded earlier
state dilution statutes.'2
B. Trademarks as "Property"
The Common-law protection that can be granted to a trademark on the basis of a property right is most extensive. It is
usually not determinedby the wording of a statute, nor does it
depend upon a particularrelationship.Relief, on this theory,
can be awardedfor any injury that would prevent or otherwise
delimit
the owner's full exploitation and use of his trade1
mark. 27
Under the Bentham "utilitarian" view, property is a legally-created right
consisting of
"an established expectation; of deriving certain advantages from
a thing which we are said to posses, in consequence of the
relation in which we stand towards it." There is no image, no
painting, no visible trait, which can express the relation that
constitutes property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a
mere conception of the mind."' 29

of information .... [P]atent law is structured to avoid granting any property rights

which essentially remove information from the public domain. This is reflected in
the requirements that a patentable invention be novel, non-obvious, not already in
use by the public, and that the inventor file for a patent in a timely manner.
In addition copyright law only protects originalexpression: the factual content
of a work cannot be protected....
Id. at 77-78 (footnotes omitted).
126. See supra pt. I.(C)(3).
127. 3 CALLMANN, supra note 21, § 17.11.
128. JESSE DUKEMn4ER & JAMES E. KRM, PROPERTY 56-57 (3d ed. 1993) (quoting
JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATIONI 11-13 (4th ed. 1882)). The authors acknowledge
that the utilitarian theory of property is the first clear break from the Lockean "natural rights"
theory. This theory reduces the concept of property to a "man-made" artifact, a social institution
and means of organization, whose underlying goal is wealth maximization while balancing the
relative social costs. Id. at 56-57. 'This view is without a doubt, the dominant view of property
today, at least among lawyers and especially among those working in law and economics." Id.
at 57.

129. Id. at 111-13. The Hume utilitarian theory of property similarly defines property rights
and the law of property:
[P]rivate ownership and its laws had no other origin or justification than utility. If
we suppose a society in which nature granted an unlimited supply of goods, we can
see that there [sic] no laws of property would arise.
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By plain language definition, Bentham law-granted property encompasses
both real and intellectual property, which is often distinguished from
qualifying as true property because of its "incorporeal nature."''
In sharp contrast, John Locke, who is credited with influencing both the
framers of the Constitution and contemporary courts, invoked a "natural
rights" or "labor" theory of property, which includes both utilitarian and
moral elements.' Basically, the Lockean property right "embraces virtually
any liberty or claim to which one was entitled under the law of nature."'32
Yet Locke struggled with delineating "common" 33rights, in which the public's
needs surpassed those created by the "laborer."'
The Laws of property, then, are conventions which men obey because it is to
their common interest to do so....
Id. (quoting RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 239-40
(1951)).
130. CALLMANN, supra note 21; Marlene B. Hanson & W. Casey Walls, Protecting
Trademark Good Will: The Casefor a FederalStandard of Misappropriation,81 TRADEMARK
REP. 480, 521 n.181 (1991) ("Real property (land) is tangible and unique. Its boundaries can be
marked, and it has an existence apart from its owner. Intellectual property (the right to control
and exploit an idea), on the other hand, is incorporeal and non-unique. Its boundaries cannot be
marked for others to see."). As demonstrated throughout this article, nothing could be farther
from the truth-the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Acts expressly require "uniqueness" in
their novelty, non-obviousness (patent), distinctiveness (trademark) and creative expression
(copyright). Moreover, each statute provides clear "boundaries" in scope and term of protection
which arguably take into account the "reward" or "earned property right" of the creator versus
free market competition and dissemination of information to the public.
131. See Wendy J.Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self-Expression:Equality andIndividualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1542-43, 1559 (1993) (citing
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967)).
132. Id. at 1559.
133. Id. at 1542-43. Specifically, Ms. Gordon maps out the four basic Lockean natural
rights as:
1) all persons have a liberty right to dispose of their efforts as they see fit, and 2)
all persons have a liberty right to use the common--"the earth and all its
fruits"--which God gave to humankind.... 3) all persons have two central duties
in regard to their resources. Each person has a duty to let others share in her
resources (other than her body) in times of great need, so long as the sharer's own
survival is not imperiled by such charity, and each has a duty to share any of her
nonbodily resources which would otherwise spoil or go to waste. 4) all persons
have a duty not to interfere with the resources others have appropriated or
produced by laboring on the common. This duty is conditional, and is a keystone
in the moral justification for [real and intellectual] property rights.
Id. at 1542-43 (citations omitted).
Unlike Gordon, who "argues that a properly conceived natural-rights theory of intellectual
property would provide significant protection for free speech interests," id. at 1535, I do not
believe that intellectual property rights are best supported under a natural rights theory, as it fails
to properly balance the public right to the free dissemination of ideas. Thus, this Article excludes
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Trademark and dilution rights are readily supported under the
Benthani/utilitarian approach, since courts and scholars will most readily
accept a property theory which takes a utilitarian approach while balancing
the competing interests of protecting the earned property of the owner against
having a free flow of ideas in the public domain to further society and free
market competition."
Like a voice in the wilderness, Rudolf Callmann was one of a few
scholars who agreed with the early courts and maintained that trademarks
were property. 35 As early as 1947, Callmann wrote that "it is only that
segment of the law of trade-marks which refers to the discord between
competitors that is part of the law of unfair competition."'36 Thus, trademark infringement includes both "passing-off," which is found when
competitors infringe upon a mark, and "trespass of trademark property,"
which is found most commonly when the infringing mark is used on non-

an extensive discussion on Locke. Instead, I support the Bentham/utilitarian property analysis
for trademark and dilution rights since it enables the legislature to delineate property limits that
take into account a balancing of free market competition versus the trademark's owner's creative
efforts and earned "right" by creating laws which best serve the common interest. For an
interesting critique of why dilution falls outside any of the popular property paradigms, see Port,
supranote 14. Interestingly, I feel Port focuses on why dilution fails the "natural" property right
paradigm; yet, he does not address the Bentham or Posnerian utilitarian "property" paradigm.
134. See CALLMANN, supra note 21, § 1.15; 3 CALLMANN, supra note 21, § 17.11 (citing
and quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) ("protection of
property is the foundation of society")). Justice Holmes noted that property is not a sacrosanct,
natural right, but "a creation of law." InternatioanilNews, 248 U.S. at 246. Indeed, patents and
copyrights similarly qualify as "property." This is evidenced by the plain language of the Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C. § 260 (1994) (Sec. 261 expressly referencing patents as "property"). As noted
throughout the article, both statutes, in limiting terms and scope of protection, inherently balance
the "common interest' and create a legal property right which is reasonable in both term and
scope of protection. This section establishes that traditional trademarks are utilitarian property
rights under the Lanham Act and that similar rights can be defined under a well-crafted dilution
statute.
Not all scholars agree that the Benthamite property paradigm best suits the intellectual
property analysis. Some see both it and the Posnerian view as being unduly tipped toward
utilitarianism and "wealth maximization," rather than seeking justice. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer,
Intellectual Property:A Non-PosnerianLaw and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV.
261 (1987). Indeed, some go so far as to call intellectual property rights "illegitimate stategranted monopol[ies]," and use an alternative law and economic view to evaluate these rights.
Id. at 263. Note that the Palmer analysis specifically addresses patents and copyrights. Id. at 264.
Parallel arguments against the utilitarian property paradigm can also be made for trademarks.
I posit that the utilitarian model is indeed the best for intellectual property because it inherently
builds in the "cost" for these property rights by statutory limits, which inherently leads to
balancing the "earned" right against the public's right to the free dissemination of information.
135. Callmann, supra note 31, at 454-56. Callmann's successors have similarly applied a
Bentham/utilitarian approach to evaluating trademark "property" rights. See CALLMANN, supra
note 21. Louis Altman is responsible for the latest update of the Callmann treatise and maintains
the original author's "trademarks are property" view.
136. Callmann, supra note 31, at 454.
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competing goods. In order to effectively protect against trespass of a mark,
the law must recognize an exclusive property right in trade-marks. 7
Callmann noted that courts are reluctant to define trademarks as property
because of the erroneous view that a trademark has no independent
"advertising" value or "persona," but is instead limited to its source
identification and "good-will" function."3
It is now well established that trademarks do serve multiple functions:
(1) source identificationrfmdication of origin, (2) guarantee of nature, quality
and characteristics of the goods or services and (3) advertising/commercial
magnetism.'39 Indeed, the latest wave of trademark scholars posit that

137. See id. at 465-66.
138. See id. at 458-60. As noted supra notes 119, 122, Hanover StarMilling is cited as the
source of the "goodwill" limitation on trademarks. Callmann cites the following statement made
by early courts after the Holmes-Hand qualified property shift away from trademarks as true
"property" to trademarks as a qualified property limited to the goodwill associated with the
goods or services:
"In its last analysis a trade-mark is a name or sign or symbol which indicates or
certifies that a given article or commodity is in reality what it claims or purports to be.
It has no intrinsic value whatever. It is merely a certificate of the truth. The property
in which it inheres is just as valuable intrinsically without the trade-mark as with it....
Take away the trade-mark and the property remains in every respect the same as it was
before."
Callmann, supra note 31, at 459 (quoting Commonwealth v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse
Co., 116 S.W. 766, 767 (Ky. 1909)) (omission in Callman); see also Reynolds & Reynolds Co.
v. Norick, 114 F.2d 278, 281 (10th Cir. 1940) (a trademark's "sole and exclusive function is to
designate, identify and point out distinctively the origin of the products to which it is attached").
Ellen Winner characterizes Frank Schechter, the American "father" of the dilution doctrine,
as pointed out in his seminal article, that
the failure of the courts to recognize a property right to a trademark "in gross," or
disconnected from the goods and services with which it has been used, arises out
of the history of trademarks. Trademark protection originated as a police measure
to prevent "the grievous deceit of the people" as to the source of the goods, and
the original common law action for infringement was in "deceit."
Winner, supra note 28, at 200 (quoting from Schechter, supra note 17).
139. See Bannon, supra note 23, at 66, 75 (noting that in a 1920 opinion, J. Holmes
acknowledged that a famous trademark was associated more closely in the public mind with the
product's quality than its origin) (citing Coca-Cola Co. v, Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143
(1920) (Holmes, J.)); see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916)
(articulating source identification function of trademark); Howard Dustless Duster Co. v.
Carleton, 219 F. 913, 915-16 (D. Conn. 1915) (addressing "public guarantee of origin and
quality"); Manhattan Shirt Co. v. Samoff-Irving Hat Stores, 164 A. 246 (Del. Ch. 1933), affd
per curium, 180 A. 928 (Del. 1934); Coca-Cola Co. v. State, 225 S.W. 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920) (holding that a trade mark, as an exclusive right to its owner, tends to guarantee the
character of the goods sold under it and "thus becomes 'a visible sign of an inward grace.' ");
CALLMANN, supra note 21, § 17.01-.03. Callmann cites Nathan Isaac, Traffic in Trade-Symbols,
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trademarks serve a fourth function of having "independent appeal through
image association," and thus that " 'trademark goodwill' " is a separate
"value in gross for the owner."'" Where opinions diverge, however, is in
rights" worthy of protection
whether these functions constitute "exclusive
4
under both property and tort theories.1 1

44 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1220 (1931), which describes the functions of origin and guarantee,
some of which include:
(1) the article bearing this name and mark is exactly like every other article bearing
this mark or name; (2) the article bearing this mark or name was manufactured by
us; (3) the article bearing this mark or name though not manufactured by us was
prepared according to our specifications and under our supervision; (4) the article
has been tested by us; ...(8) the article has certain qualities suggested by the
name or mark itself, such as purity or the inclusion of certain ingredients or the
like....
See also Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v. Lefco, 134 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1943) (stating that without
the right to advertise and display the mark, the right to use it would be of little to .no value).
140. Hanson & Walls, supra note 130, at 490; see Welkowitz, supra note 24, at 531-32
(acknowledging, although the author does not support the dilution doctrine, that trademarks are
now more often "products in their own right"); see also Winner, supra note 28, at 212. Winner
finds that:
The need for protection of a trademark's "persona" arises out of the "fad"
merchandising business, a relatively new phenomenon. Public desire to use
commercial trademarks for their symbolic value, in addition to identifying the
source of particular goods, has arisen as a result of the successful efforts of modem
mass advertising to turn those trademarks into symbols of such desirable qualities
as wealth, popularity, status, sex appeal, membership in discriminating in-groups,
good taste, intelligence, and the like. Trademark owners invest large sums to create
these symbolic associations, just as celebrities invest in the creation of their
"personas," but the courts do not sympathize as readily with commercial interests
as with personal interests.
Id.
This fourth function gives additional strength to the "property rights" view, since even if one
were to view trademarks as merely "goodwill," this goodwill in and of itself becomes a valid
exclusive right of the trademark owner. This is particularly true for famous and distinctive
marks. As will be developed in the next section of this Article, this fourth function may in fact
be the strongest basis for establishing well-defined dilution property rights.
141. Rogers remained adamant that "it is an erroneous notion the trademark itself is
property." See MCCARTHY, supra note 77, § 2.05[2]. Similarly, Beverly Pattishall emphatically
refused to accept a property theory for trademarks. Pattishall, supra note 17, at 602. Of course,
there are a long line of cases which similarly support this limited view. See United Drug Co.,
248 U.S. at 97 ("[t]here is no such thing as property in a trade-mark"); American Steel
Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926) (citing United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 97);
Papercutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 561 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that there is no
such thing as property in a trademark) (quoting Piroue v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1990) (quoting United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 91)); Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby
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Landes and Posner, in their seminal article The Economics of Trademark Law,42 establish that the tri-partite functions of trademarks best fit a
property rights analysis. They broadly define a property right as any "legally
enforceable power to exclude others from using a resource, without need to
contract with them."' 43 They acknowledge that intellectual property rights
include both the static benefit of preventing "overuse" of the resource and the
dynamic benefit of providing an incentive to "create" or improve upon
existing resources.'" According to the authors, each trademark function
confers its own benefit to the owner and to society under an economic
analysis
which justifies conferring a "property" right under a costs/benefits
1 45
model.

First, because a consumer can rely on the quality and consistency of
goods or services associated with a distinctive trademark, the source
identification "benefit" allows distinctive trademarks to reduce "consumer
search costs."'" For example, a famous brand name, such as TIDE, has
associated with it certain positive features for cleaning clothes which
consumers have come to rely on over the years. Thus, the average consumer
looking for a detergent possessing these qualities can go right to the brand
labeled TIDE without searching through numerous other brands, reducing his
or her overall search costs. In order to effectively reduce consumer search
costs, the source identification function must be inextricably linked to the

Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir.) (finding no property in a trademark except in
connection with an existing business while quoting United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 97), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
142. Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18. For a more extensive
treatment of this topic, including mathematical models, see id. For an alternative law and
economics approach to intellectual property rights which views these rights as "illegitimate
monopolies," see Palmer, supra note 134, at 263. Palmer notes that although Judge Posner is an
ardent critic of Jeremy Bentham regarding attitudes to the common law, Posner remains aligned
with Bentham regarding the utilitarian "property" analysis. Id. at 262 (citing RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 13-47 (1981) and G. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986)).
143. Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 266.
144. Id. The authors further point out that there are four costs associated with all property,
namely (1) "cost of transferring such rights. If this is too high, a property right may prevent
optimal adjustments to changing values... and a liability rule would be better;" (2) "rent
seeking"-they note that intellectual property creates high rent-seeking cost, because individuals
are continuously creating or inventing, thereby increasing the number of "rent seekers"; (3)
"protection and enforcement"; and (4) social cost of "restricting the use of property when it has
a public-good character." Id. at 266-67. The authors conclude that "intellectual property is a
particularly costly form of property" and therefore should be "limited in ways that physical
property is not." Id. at 268. They concede that this is adequately done by the various intellectual
property statutes that require non-obviousness for patents, creative expression for copyrights and
"distinctiveness" for trademarks. Id.
145. Id. at 266.
146. Id. at 270.
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quality control or guarantee "benefit."' 47 The trademarked goods or services
must possess a consistent quality over time and across consumers for a true
"source identification" and reduction in consumer search cost to occur."
Thus, the source identification and guarantee functions of trademarks
expenditures on the quality of the trademarked
encourage continued
149
goods/services.

Under the economic model of trademarks, there is a direct incentive to
spend resources to develop the advertising property or strength of a
trademark.?' The more the product is advertised under its trademark or
brand name, the broader the consumer base becomes. An increase in potential
consumers also increases the rate at which the favorable features associated
with the product or service will become well known, thereby lowering
consumer search cost. By lowering the consumer's search cost, the seller can
raise the price for its goods or services, which will quickly offset the initial
advertising costs and increase corporate profitability.' This translates into
higher priced goods/services for firms with strong marks, not because of any
particular market power, but because of the lower search costs associated
with the quality control benefit. Thus, a firm has a vested economic interest
in both marketing and advertising its trademark, while simultaneously

147. Id.
148. Id. at 269-70.
149. Id. The authors cite the following example:
[S]uppose a consumer has a favorable experience with brand X and wants to buy
it again. Or suppose he wants to buy brand X because it has been recommended
by a reliable source or because he has had a favorable experience with brand Y,
another brand produced by the same producer. Rather than investigating the
attributes of all goods to determine which one is brand X or is equivalent to X, the
consumer may find it less costly to search by identifing the relevant trademark
and purchasing the corresponding brand. For this strategy to be efficient, however,
not only must it be cheaper to search for the right trademark than for the desired
attributes of the good, but also past experience must be a good predictor of the
likely outcome of current consumption choices-that is, the brand must exhibit
consistent quality. In short, a trademark conveys information that allows the
consumer to say to himself, "I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am
about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the
attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier."
Id. (citing John F. Coverdale, Comment, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-onCompetition Test, 51 U. CHI.L. REV. 868 (1984)); see also Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272
F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (recognizing that buyers of a product may associate the name of
the product with its origin as well as with the product's attributes).
150. See Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 270.
151. Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 277-79. This is because
a good's full price is "its money prices[ ] plus the search costs [ ] incurred by the buyer ... "
with search costs decreasing relative to the increasing strength of the seller's trademark. Id. at
275.
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ensuring a consistent level of quality and features for the advertised goods or
services." Furthermore, from a financial accounting perspective, the actual
"economic value" of a trademark is readily quantifiable, as is any real or
personal property right.'53

152. Id. at 277-79. An important and widely recognized benefit of trademarks is:
mhat they give firms an incentive to improve the quality of their products.
Without an exclusive right to use one's own trademark, a firm that was producing
a lower-quality brand might attempt to free ride on firms producing higher-quality
brands by duplicating their trademarks and hoping that consumers would be misled
into believing the brands were equivalent. Since this would make it more costly for
consumers to distinguish higher-quality from lower-quality brands, it would lower
the incentive for a firm to incur the added cost that would be necessary to produce
a higher quality. Hence, the average quality of the product as a whole would be
lower than with legally enforceable trademarks.
Id. at 280. One might argue that for goods/services that are based on virtually identical formulas,
advertising dollars spent to strengthen a mark have the "anti-competitive" effect of duping the
public into purchasing "enhanced quality" which does not exist. Id. at 274. Chlorine bleach and
the various brands of "aspirin" or "acetaminophen" would be classic examples. Id. Yet the
authors successfully rebut this criticism by establishing that lowering search costs in these
instances is not necessarily "enhanced quality," but is instead promoting the quality assurance
that the product purchased does indeed consist of the actual "formula." Id. at 274-75.
The implicit economic model of trademarks that is used in that law is our model,
in which trademarks lower search costs and foster quality control rather than create
social waste and consumer deception. ... [T]he hostile view of brand advertising
has been largely and we think correctly rejected by economists .... That consumer
will be interested not in the formula but in the manufactured product and may
therefore be willing to pay a premium for greater assurance that the good will
actually be manufactured to the specifications of the formula. Trademarks enable
the consumer to economize on a real cost because he spends less time searching
to get the quality he wants. If this analysis is correct, the rejection by trademark
law of a monopoly theory of trademarks is actually a mark in favor of the
economic rationality of that law.
Id. at 275 (citing Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) and Carl Shapiro, Premiumsfor High
Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q.J. ECON. 659 (1983)); see also Backman,
supra note 18, at 226-27 ("Actual experience indicates that the "market power" associated with
brands usually is not very potent.... Consumers shift their purchasing in response to price
differentials, to more effective advertising, to dissatisfaction with a product, to health scares, and
to the desire to experiment.").
153. See, e.g., Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of
Trademarks in the Market Place, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 75, 81 (1974) (stating that in 1967 the
Coca-Cola Corporation documented that its trademarks were intangible assets (intellectual
property) with a value of 3 billion dollars). Similarly, during the same time period, MAXWELL
HOUSE was valued at $42 million, JELL-O at $35 million and SUN-MAID RAISINS at $5.6
million. Id. at 82; see also Drescher, supra note 18, at 301-02 (noting that the difference
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The Posnerian "utilitarian" property paradigm allows for a balancing of
the costs" relating to trademark property. Posner's paradigm achieves the
balance by requiring that the trademark exclusive rights are clearly defined,
with specific limits which balance competing interests-balancing a reward
to the trademark owner for conferring these economic benefits against
society's never-ending quest for both free market competition and free
dissemination of ideas.'55
First, the "rent seeking" costs are reduced by requiring registration and
first possession and use of the mark in commerce.' The use requirement
also puts potential users on "notice not to invest resources in developing a
mark similar or identical to one already in use."'" Moreover, by clearly
defining that the property right is conditioned on use, the Lanham Act
squarely addresses the "source identification" benefit, a valuable social
function for both distinguishing goods and ensuring quality.' 8
Second, the "distinctiveness" requirement defines trademark property as
signifying and identifying the underlying good and distinguishing it from
other producers. 159 This specifically addresses the social cost of using words
and symbols in the public domain by narrowing the property right in these
words to their use as distinctive "source identifiers."'' 6 Furthermore, if a
between the 1986 Wall Street-estimated value of the Coca-Cola Company, $14 billion, and the
company's hard assets of $7 billion, would place the value of the COCA-COLA trademark at
$7 billion, roughly 50% of the value of its total assets (machinery, buildings etc.)). In 1988,
brand-driven deals included the $25 billion buy-out of RJR Nabisco and with it the trademarks
CAMEL, RITZ, BENSON & HEDGES, WINSTON and NABISCO, and the $12.9 billion
buyout of Kraft, which was four times its tangible asset value, with the extra value being
attributed to the trademarks KRAFT cheese, MIRACLE WHIP, and BREYER'S ice cream. Id.
at 302 (quoting The Year of the Brand, ECONOMIsT, Dec. 24, 1988, at 95-100: "The real
explanation why the prices [for these acquisitions] are so high is that businessmen think that,
in the overcrowded consumer-good market, at least, it is almost impossible to create a new
'megabrand' like KIT KAT from scratch.").
154. For a discussion of Posner's fourfold costs of property rights, see supra note 144.
Briefly, they are as follows: (1) transfer costs, (2) rent seeking, (3) protection and enforcement,
and (4) social costs of restricting the use of property when it has a public good character. Landes
& Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 268.
155. Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 266-68.
156. Id. at 281 ("A firm allowed to register trademarks without using them might invest
substantial resources in thinking up plausible new brand names."). Although the Lanham Act
presently allows for the filing of a trademark application with a bona-fide intent to use the mark
in commerce, the mark cannot go to publication and registration until an affidavit of actual use
is filed with the Patent and Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), (d)(1996 Supp.).
157. Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 282.
158. Id. The use function also addresses the "enforcement" cost, since conditioning
trademark property rights on use "is a way of limiting the use of scarce enforcement resources
to situations in which the rights in question are likely to yield net social benefits." Id.
159. Id. at 287-88.
160. Id. Posner and Landes note that trademarks do not "deplete" a finite universe of words
and symbols available to the public, noting that: "The distinctive yet pronounceable combinations of letters to form words that will serve as a suitable trademark are as a practical matter
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distinctive trademark ultimately becomes the generic definition for the good
or service, it can no longer serve as a trademark and the public receives the
benefit of this new word or symbol or (less clearly) design features used such
as the Perrier bottle. 6 '
Finally, requiring a likelihood-of-confusion standard as a basis to enforce
this property right "is a sensible restriction on the scope of the property right
if the function of a trademark is, as we have been assuming, to name a

infinite, implying a high degree of substitutability and hence a slight value in exchange." Id. at
274. Moreover, even when descriptive words are selected as trademarks and acquire the level
of distinctiveness required to be a source identifier, the trademark owner's property is limited
to the word's use in the trademark sense. Id. at 289-90. Others remain free to generically use
the word in a manner which does not create a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the
particular goods or services. See id. at 294.
The authors do distinguish, however, that without the limitation of "distinctiveness," a
trademark owner could in effect obtain exclusive rights in descriptive words which would then
raise the search costs for consumers of those producers who are no longer permitted to use the
descriptive words. Id. at 288. "Ultimately, this would reduce the prices of their brands and lower
the amount of x they produced," in effect destroying the social benefit of the mark to the
consumer. Id.
161. Id. at 271. Landes and Posner find that:
Trademarks improve the language in three ways. They increase the stock of names
of things, thus economizing on communication and information costs in the ways
just suggested. They create new generic words-words that denote entire products,
not just individual brands.... And they enrich the language, by creating words or
phrases that people value for their intrinsic pleasingness as well as their information value ("pheremon" perfume, "Swan's Down" cake mix).
Id.
In sharp contrast, other scholars argue that trademarks create monopolies of a finite number
of words in the English language. Timberg, supra note 34, at 330-33. This view has been
sufficiently rebutted by both Landes and Posner, see supra note 160, and Beverly Pattishall.
Pattishall notes Harry Nims reaction:
"Applied to trade-marks, it [monopoly] means rights in a word, in a particular
connection which are exclusive to the owner. The word 'blue-bird' is in the public
domain. No one can monopolize it, as applied to birds; but exclusive-monopolistic if you please-rights may exist in it as a trade-mark. Hence to
say that a trade-mark is a monopoly often creates an erroneous impression as
something contrary to public interest. A trade-mark consists of an exclusive right
to use a name to indicate source in a particular field of industry. It may serve in
addition, as the name of the goods of a particular concern. Both uses are exclusive
privileges-monopolies if you will-but not illegal ones; nor are they against
public policy, unless it is no longer of benefit to merchants or to consumers for
goods to be so marked that their maker or seller may be identified."
Pattishall, supra note 17, at 593 n.12 (quoting Nims, supra note 40, at 525).
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brand" and to protect the public's right to rely on the features and qualities
of goods or services offered under a particular mark.'6
The Posnerian paradigm, which narrowly protects trademark property
against uses which are likely to confuse or deceive,163 neatly defines
traditional trademark protection grounded in the tort of deceit"6 and clearly
protects the source identification and, to some extent, the quality assurance/guarantee functions of infringed marks.I The inherent deficiency in
this paradigm, however, is its failure to account for the advertising and
"persona!' functions of trademarks as separate protectable property interests.
Under the Posnerian view, the advertising value and persona of a trademark
are apparently indistinguishable from the source identification and quality,
which may explain Posner's difficulty in accepting the dilution doctrine as
evincing a protectable property right in a mark."
As will be explored in the next section, the quality assurance and
commercial magnetism inherent in the "persona!' of famous and highly
distinctive marks is probably the strongest economic argument for recognizing
dilution property rights.
162. Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 300. The authors do
address the virtually unlimited term of trademark protection available, as long as the mark
remains in use:
The lack of a fixed term for trademarks is one of the striking differences between
trademarks, on the one hand, and .copyrights and patents, on the other. The
difference, however, makes economic sense. If a given name has no scarcity value,
so that it yields zero rents, perpetual compared to limited duration cannot create
rent-seeking problems even if discount rates are very low.... And identification
costs, which would plague perpetual patents, are not a serious problem either. The
trademark is tied to physical property-the good that it names.... Moreover, to
make the producer of a good give up the name before he ceased selling the good
would impose search costs on consumers....
Id. at 287.
163. Id. at 300-03 (describing the likelihood of confusion standard).
164. Id. at 265-66; see Schechter, supra note 19, at 819 (noting that the original common
law action for trademark infringement was in "deceit").
165. See Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 268-70, 300-01.
166. See id. at 307-08. Landes and Posner clearly straddle the fence with their lukewarm
response to trademark dilution. They offer three possible economic grounds for the extension
of property rights in trademarks beyond its use to identify a brand: (1) the potential for
confusion; (2) external benefits of prestige, and other investments appropriated without
compensating the trademark owner [investor]; and (3) investment in reputation capital. Id. They
neglect to include what I assert is the fourth economic ground for dilution property rights,
namely, the removal of the incentive to "create" the "persona" of the mark which inherently
reduces search costs and provides additional quality assurance to consumers. For example, once
a mark like TIFFANY becomes a polished and classy "persona" which extends beyond the mark
as used on the goods, any dilution of this "persona" detracts from the consumer's ability to rely
on this "quality image" associated with the mark. This will be more extensively developed in
the next section of this Article.
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C. Dilution Rights-Protectingthe Source
Identification, Persona,and Quality
Assurance Property of Famous Trademarks
Dilution presages a process of attrition that slowly but surely
destroys the uniqueness or singularity of a trade-mark. Imitation may be the sincerestform offiattery, but with respect to a
trade-mark,constant imitations in any field of commerce, will,
of necessity, debilitate the advertising power of the original
mark Should the trade-mark owner sanction or allow the
continued use of marks similarto his, he assumes the risk that
the resultingdilution will render the mark generic or available
to common use. That, of course, writesfinis to the distinctiveness of a mark.167
Where there is no relationshipbut an exclusive [property]
right, the rights and duties are determined by the exclusive
right itsel[
6 according to the scope of protection afforded it by
the law.'Y
1. Introduction
The typical state dilution statute protects against the "dilution of the
distinctive quality of a mark... notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of the goods
or services."'" In sharp contrast, both the Lanham Trademark Act and
traditional state trademark law protect against trademark uses which are
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" as to the
source or origin of the goods, services or commercial activities. 7 ° Courts
interpret "dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark" to include the harms
of (1) blurring or "whittling away" the distinctiveness or commercial
magnetism of a mark.' and (2) tarnishing the affirmative associations a

167. Callmann, supra note 31, at 448.
168. Id. at 451.
169. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1992) (emphasis added). At least one state
also has a common law dilution right. See Cloverleaf Restaurants, Inc. v. Lenihan, 72 N.E.2d
761, 765 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) (noting that the palming-off doctrine and "similar doctrines have
their foundation in principles of natural law, justice, business morality and integrity").
170. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (1994); FLA. STAT. § 495.131 (1995) (stating that a
person shall be liable in a civil action for use of a mark that "is likely to cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive as to the source or origin of such goods or services").
171. Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983) ("dilution is
characterized as a 'whittling down' of the identity or reputation of a trade name or mark").
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855
F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988) illustrates a classic case of blurring. Here, the court held that the
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mark has come to convey."r Dilution also includes the genericization of a

defendant's "use of the slogan 'The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth' would blur the strong
association the public now has between Ringling Bros.' mark [Greatest Show on Earth] and its
circus and thus inflict irreparable harm." Id. at 485.
172. See Sally Gee, 699 F.2d at 625 (quoting Callman's definition of dilution finding that
"'[llunior uses may blur a mark's product identification or they may tarnish the affirmative
associations a mark has come to convey' ") (quoting CALLMANN, supra note 21, at 954-55). Use
of the famous mark TIFFANY'S for toilet paper, or ROLLS ROYCE for garbage disposal
services are classic examples of trademark junior uses which would "tarnish" the distinctiveness
of these famous marks. In American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the court held that the defendant's American Express-styled
greeting card, which contained a condom and the slogan "never leave home without it,"
tarnished the distinctive value of American Express's distinctive tradedress and slogan and was
therefore barred under New York's dilution statute. Id. at 2012-13; see also Grey v. Campbell
Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that defendant's DOGIVA dog
biscuits tarnished plaintiff's famous GODIVA mark for chocolates in violation of California's
dilution statute), affd, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987).
As will be discussed in the final section of this Article, not all "tarnishing" uses of a
trademark should be actionable under state or federal dilution statutes. The doctrine of "fair use"
allows the parody of famous trademarks for socio/political commentary or comparative
advertising as codified in § 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C)
(1994). Courts have already distinguished the pure parody type of tarnishment and held that it
constitutes fair use. See, e.g., Lucas Film, Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934-35 (D.C.
1985) (allowing public interest group to use term "Star Wars" to describe President Reagan's
strategic defense initiative); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Pub., Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir.)
(holding that magazine's parody of L.L. Bean "preppie" style characters was non-diluting "fair
use"), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987); Everready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F.
1991) (denying preliminary injunction under Lanham Act and
Supp. 440, 451-52 (N.D. I11.
Illinois dilution statute against beer manufacturer that spoofed Energizer Bunny trademark).
Regarding comparative advertising, however, the drawing of the "fair use" line is presently
unclear. Initially, scholars had conflicting views concerning whether junior uses of a trademark
for comparative advertising purposes only constituted "fair use." Compare Nancy S. Greiwe,
Antidilution Statutes:A New Attack on ComparativeAdvertising, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 178, 187
(1982) (arguing that the plain language of dilution statutes does not expressly preclude their use
to prevent comparative advertising) with Brownlee, supra note 15, at 479 n.45 (arguing that
"[g]enericization of a mark... [via dilution] is distinct from comparative advertising," which
falls outside the scope of dilution protection). Ms. Brownlee notes Ms. Griewe's quote, but cites
Diversified Mktg. Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), decided after
Ms. Griewe's article, wherein the court held that defendant's use of the slogan," 'If You Like
ESTEE LAUDER... You'll Love BEAUTY USA,' did not infringe Estee Lauder's trademark"
nor did it dilute its distinctiveness under New York's dilution statute. Id. at 480 n.45 (citing
Diversified Mktg. Inc., 705 F. Supp. at 134).
Unfortunately, today we have Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994),
wherein the Second Circuit held that the defendant's parody of the John Deere "deer" in a
comparative advertising context constituted tarnishment and is actionable dilution under New
York's dilution statute. Id. at 45. I posit that this case inappropriately broadened the scope of
the New York statute. Results like this can be avoided by amending dilution statutes to include
a clear definition of what constitutes actionable "tarnishment" and what is excluded and best left
to state tort actions.
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famous mark by continued junior uses on competing products."
Today, progressive states such as Washington and Connecticut have
amended their dilution statutes to expressly limit this protection to famous
marks, as well as to list a series of factors to be evaluated in determining
whether or not a mark is "famous."' 74 For example, the Washington state
statute clarifies what constitutes protectable dilution by providing:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to
the principles of equity, to an injunction against another
person's use in this state of a mark, commencing after the mark
becomes famous, which causes dilution of the distinctive quality
of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this section. In determining whether a mark is famous and has
distinctive quality, a court shall consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to the following:
(1) Whether the mark is inherently distinctive or has
become distinctive through substantially exclusive and continuous use;
(2) Whether the duration and extent of use of the mark are
substantial;
(3) Whether the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the mark are substantial;
(4) Whether the geographical extent of the trading area in
which the mark is used is substantial;

173. See, e.g., Brownlee, supra note 15, at 480 ("[G]enericization is a type of dilution
because a junior use on a same [or substantially similar] product not only causes a likelihood
of confusion, but also weakens the automatic association of a trademark with goods produced
from a single source"). Brownlee further notes that dilution protection is an effective tool in
preventing "constructive abandonment" under § 45 of the Lanham Act. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1127). Of course, dilution protection cannot tdtally prevent genericization of a trademark. In fact,
for highly famous trademarks, their use by the general public in a non-trademark descriptive
sense may ultimately lead to the genericization of the mark. See Landes & Posner, Economic
Perspective, supra note 18, at 291-96. Landes and Posner indicate that this can be viewed as a
small economic benefit of trademark protection because these marks ultimately enhance the
English language. Id. at 293.
See also Cyd B. Wolf, TrademarkDilution: The Needfor Reform, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 311,
316, 319 (1984) (explaining the definition of genericization and also noting that the term "injury
to business reputation" found in many dilution statutes should refer only to "injury which results
from the dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark").
174. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (1996) (enacted by laws 1989, ch. 72, § 10);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11(i)(l/c) (West Supp. 1996); see also Lamb-Weston, Inc. v.
McCain Foods, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1376, 1398 (E.D. Wash. 1993). These statutes, and the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, are patterned after the dilution statute of the New Model State
Trademark Bill proposed as a model state statute by the International Trademark Association in
1989. As will be discussed shortly, these statutes are indeed a step in the right direction in that
they more clearly define the dilution "earned property right." However, these statutes still have
shortcomings in the areas of defining dilution and tarnishment.
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(5) Whether the mark has substantial renown in its and in
the other person's trading areas and channels of trade; and
(6) Whether substantial use of the same or similar marks
is being made by third parties.
The owner shall be entitled only to injunctive relief in an
action brought under this section, unless the subsequent user
willfully intended to trade on the registrant's reputation or to
cause dilution of the owner's mark. If such willful intent is
proven, the owner shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth
in this chapter, subject to the discretion of the court and the
principles of equityt
By creating trademark rights which are grounded more on "subliminal
confusion/association '176
' than likelihood of confusion or deceit, anti-dilution

175. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.77.160; accord CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-1 l(i)(c). Both
Washington and Connecticut define "dilution" as follows: " 'dilution' means the material
reduction of the distinctive quality of a famous mark through use of a mark by another person,
regardless of the presence or absence of (a) competition between the users of the mark, or (b)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception arising from that use." WASH. REv. CODE §
19.77.010(6); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11(a)(11). Connecticut's statute mirrors the
Washington statute, except that Connecticut adopted the identical language from § 13 of the
New MSTB (dilution provision).
Although the new statutes attempt to clarify what constitutes dilution, when compared to the
early dilution statutes, they arguably do no more than define "dilution" as "dilution." This point
was raised by scholar/practitioners in the recent hearings on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(H.R. 1295). 1 posit that we can more effectively define dilution in a manner which clearly
delineates this property right as protecting the "persona" of famous trademarks. I will elaborate
on this in the final section of this Article.
176. See Hartman, supra note 23, in which Hartman defines subliminal confusion as "the
mechanism through which the misappropriation of advertising value occurs without source
confusion." Id. at 508. He cites the "paradigmatic subliminal confusion case" as having the
following elements:
(1) a new entrant who adopts a mark similar to that of an established competitor,
(2) source confusion at the point of sale is unlikely bedause of the nature of the
buying process or other attendant circumstances, but (3) because of the mark
chosen, the new entrant obtains an unearned market acceptability for his product,
(4) at the cost of diluting the selling power of the established mark.
Id. at 522.
To be capable of subliminal confusion, a mark has to have reached a level of fame in its
market such that it "functions as a symbol of product desirability and consumer satisfaction,
apart from its source identifying function." Id. at 508. Hartman analogizes subliminal confusion
to misappropriation and cites a line of cases beginning with International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) to support his view. Id. at 508 & n.14. He does
acknowledge, however, that courts often address the issue of subliminal confusion outside of the
misappropriation context that is frequently raised in trademark infringement actions. Id. at 522.
See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,205 (1942)
(Justice Frankfurter expressly protecting the "commercial magnetism" of the mark); Grotrian,
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statutes are clearly protecting the "quality persona and advertising value" of
a trademark and preventing the "palming-off' or misappropriation of this
value."7 Although numerous court scholars acknowledge that dilution
Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir.
1975) (finding the injury to Steinway did not arise from actual confusion between the marks,
but rather from a customer hearing the name "Grotrian-Steinweg" and associating that piano
with the famous Steinway piano); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. American Cyanamid Co., 361
F. Supp. 1032 (D. N.J. 1973). In Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp., the court held that absent a
likelihood of product or source confusion, defendant's use of the mark RHO-IMMUNE was
infringing under a subliminal confusion analysis. The court found that doctors and nurses would
be likely to attribute to defendant's product "the qualities and reputation that has come to be
associated with [the plaintiff's mark] Rhogam, thereby giving Lederle [defendant] an advantage
in the utilization of its product ....
Id. at 1039. The court further noted:
[Tihis is a case in which confusion or deception occurs on a subliminal or
subconscious level, causing the consumer to identify the properties and reputation
of one product with those of another, although he can identify the particular
manufacturer of each. The trade-mark laws protect against this kind of psychological confusion implanted by similar trade-marks in the mind of a consumer.
Id. at 1044.
Hartman properly posits that although numerous courts have granted relief against subliminal
confusion by stretching the traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, subliminal association
or confusion protection falls outside of the scope of traditional trademark infringement § 32 of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114. See Hartman, supra, at 522. Where we disagree however,
is whether subliminal confusion is protected under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125. Hartman posits that liability for subliminal confusion falls "under the false description or
representation branch of section 43(a)" which "proscribes use of a false designation of origin,
or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, in connection with any goods or services." See Hartman, supra,
at 512-13 & n.27 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). He cites numerous Second Circuit cases to
support his position: e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160,
168 (2d Cir. 1978); Grotrian,523 F.2d at 1331; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g,
Inc., 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982). See Hartman, supra, at 513 nn.28-29, 516-19.
I posit that it would be dangerous to simply rely on the Lanham Act to protect against
subliminal confusion, since the majority view is that § 43(a) exists to provide federal trademark
protection for marks, designs, symbols, etc. which were not registered on the Federal Register.
The language of § 43(a) parallels § 32 to the extent that it also requires a likelihood of
confusion, mistake or deceit, thus leaving a plaintiff open to the possibility that a court may hold
that subliminal confusion alone is insufficient to establish liability under the Lanham Act. Thus,
it is best to protect subliminal confusion by a separate dilution section in the Lanham Act added
to § 43 or state dilution statutes.
Indeed, at least one district court in the Second Circuit covered all bases by finding liability
for likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act and separately finding liability for subliminal
confusion in New York's anti-dilution statute. See Dreyfus Fund Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada,
525 F. Supp. 1108, 1125-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that bank's ad campaign featuring a
realistically portrayed lion was likely to substantially dilute the Dreyfus lion, due to initial
"subliminal confusion," which would result in the mark losing its identifying value and ability
to evoke positive association).
177. See Dreyfus Fund, 525 F. Supp. at 1125-26; Mead Data Cent. v. Toyota Motor Sales,
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protects the advertising value or "commercial magnetism" of a mark, 73 few
are ready to take the bold step of identifying dilution rights as protecting this
earned property against subliminal association/confusion, which would
ultimately dilute the
value of the quality image/persona of famous and highly
719
distinctive marks
The primary contention of dilution critics is that dilution statutes confer
upon trademark holders a traditional anti-competitive monopoly. Historically,
courts have followed a policy of encouraging free competition, unencumbered
by restrictions and barriers imposed as a result of unfair and fraudulent
marketing practices." Moreover, imitation, unless deceptive or confusing,
has always been held to be within the parameters of fair competition.'
With these assumptions, many courts have held that dilution protection
contravenes principles of free competition and encourages monopolies. An
Oregon appellate court, although declaring it was constrained to follow the
U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1989); Bannon, supra note 23, at 90; see also
Hartman, supra note 23, at 508-10 (analogizing subliminal confusion protection to protection
of the "commercial magnetism" and "advertising value" of a trademark).
178. See Pattishall, supra note 15, at 621-22 (noting that trademark dilution is "needed to
protect the immense values inherent in the 'commercial magnetism' of certain trademarks,"
which values are "peculiarly vulnerable to damage and destruction."); Del Valle, supra note 19,
at 244, 249 (noting that commercial magnetism of the senior mark is necessary before a junior
mark can "whittle away" its value); Handler, supra note 24, at 271 (noting that the injury of
trademark dilution is in the fact of misrepresentation so that business is diverted from the
plaintiff to the defendant).
179. See, e.g., Jerome Gilson, A FederalDilution Statute, Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP.
108, 108-09 (1993) (Leading trademark scholar Jerome Gilson acknowledges that although he
was an early skeptic, "the time has finally arrived for nationally uniform, enhanced trademark[dilution] protection. It should be narrow in scope, protecting only truly famous
trademarks."). Rebutting the Handler view, Gilson acknowledges that "[t]here is no 'monopoly'
problem" with dilution protection, since such protection 'will apply only to trade-mark like
uses"; however, he does not go so far as to refer to dilution as protecting an "earned property
right." Id. at 117.
As previously noted, Bannon has acknowledged that Landes and Posner correctly view the
property right in a trademark as the right to prevent confusion. Additionally, she posits that in
a dilution case the property right is the right to maintain the trademark's integrity and
uniqueness. See Bannon, supra note 23, at 71-72. I posit that Ms. Bannon is definitely on the
right track for the dilution analogy, but dilution protection is more clearly defined as protecting
the earned "persona," quality image and advertising value or property of famous trademarks.
This arguably parallels protecting "integrity and uniqueness," but utilizing the term "persona"
and evaluating it in terms of quality image and advertising value makes it easier for a court to
positively view this property right as an additional "earned" right reserved for famous and highly
distinctive marks. This, I posit, is based upon the capability of these marks to have a separable
"persona" or quality image, which allows for subliminal confusion and a "palming off' of this
quality image by others.
180. Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 340
N.Y.S.2d 532, 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
181. Id. at 542.
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plain language of the state's anti-dilution statute, declared such statutes to be
anti-competitive protections "drastically" interfering with free competition in
a manner that grants a monopoly to the trademark holder." Other courts
have responded similarly, reluctant to construe dilution statutes too broadly
and fearing that the doctrine will swallow all competition in the name of
trademark protection.'83 Numerous commentators have echoed this sentiment, arguing dilution protection undermines free market competition by
fostering inimical monopolies.' 4
182. Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 648 P.2d 393, 398-99 (App. 1982), affd, 659 P.2d
377 (Or. 1983).
183. See Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981); Coffee
Dan's,305 F. Supp. at 1217 n.13; see also Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the
Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 295
(1984) (quoting Coffee Dan's).
184. See Port, supra note 14, at 435-36; Handler, supra note 24, at 287; Paul Heald, Unfair
Competition and FederalLaw: ConstitutionalRestraintson the Scope of State Law, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1411, 1425-26 (1987). Port contends that dilution rights give "the trademark holder a
monopoly on the mark as used in any context," Port, supra note 14, at 463, such that after
dilution protection is adopted, trademarks will be a vehicle by which holders will wield
monopolistic power over markets. Id. at 467, 485, 488. Heald argues that the Lanham Act
adopted the "likelihood-of-confusion" language to abate fears that the protection afforded by the
statute would produce monopolies. Heald, supra, at 1436. State anti-dilution statutes contain no
such language to restrain the holder of a distinctive mark and thus grant "monopolistic trademark
rights," frustrating the goal of the Lanham Act. Id. Implicit in this is the notion that state antidilution statutes should be consistent with the Lanham Act. Id. Finally, Welkowitz argues that
proponents of the dilution doctrine have made trademark protection the paramount concern at
the expense of competitive interests. Welkowitz, supra note 24, at 566-67. He encourages the
generic use of terms in order to foster competition, which has historically been the chief policy
objective of courts in developing the common law of unfair competition. Id.
While most courts and scholars are content to confine their attacks on dilution protection
to somewhat vague anti-competitive epithets, others have contended that dilution protection
would create genuine barriers to entering a market occupied by the holder of a famous or
distinctive mark. Quoting arguments made by Landes and Posner, Heald intimates that dilution
protection, like trademark safeguards, may:
[I]nduc[e] the owner to spend money on creating, through advertising and
promotion, a spurious image of high quality that enables monopoly rents to be
obtained by deflecting consumers from lower-price substitutes of equal or even
higher quality .... [This] has seemed to some economists and more lawyers an
example of the power of brand advertising to bamboozle the public and thereby
promote monopoly .... Besides the possibility of creating monopoly rents,
trademarks may transform rents into costs, as one firm's expenditure on promoting
its mark cancels out that of another firm. Although no monopoly profits are
created, consumers may pay higher prices, and resources may be wasted in sterile
competition.
Heald, supra note 25, at 1004 (quoting from Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra
note 18, at 274). Although one could conclude that Heald's view is that trademark protection
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A final economic argument advanced by opponents of dilution
protection is that monopolization of language results in monopolization of
trade. Handler contends that the Lanham Act would not have survived
congressional debate with dilution as its basis, given the strong anti-monopoly
mood of the 1950s.'" This pessimistic assessment is founded on the fear
that monopolies of language, which Handler argues result from liberal
dilution protection,'" would lead to monopolies of product."

engenders an irrational brand loyalty which prevents competitors from entering the market and
successfully competing, Heald does acknowledge that trademark protection may encourage
competition by providing consumers with a choice between competing articles via distinguishing
marks. Heald, supra note 25, at 1004. However, compare Bannon, supra note 23.
Nonetheless, Welkowitz contends that the problems of trademark loyalty and barriers to
market entry are exacerbated by dilution protection. Welkowitz, supra note 24, at 563-64, 584.
The threat of suit under a dilution statute can act as a strong deterrent, preventing small
companies from entering the market and thus potentially posing a large threat to free competition
which is not offset by a corresponding societal benefit flowing from dilution protection. Id. at
584. Further, the statutory protections of the dilution doctrine may be used to delay the entry
of a competitor into a relevant market until the trademark holder has developed a product similar
to that of its adversary. Id. at 563. Thus, anti-dilution statutes are not designed to protect the
interest of the consumer, but rather are anti-competitive in that they favor established business
at the expense of potential competitors. Id. at 584, 563-64; see also Heald, supra, at 1425-26.
185. Handler, supra note 24, at 273.
186. Welkowitz, supra note 24, at 535-36.
187. Handler, supra note 24, at 273. This variant of monopolyphobia permeates the judicial
approach to the dilution doctrine even today, as Pattishall has lamented:
Apparent in many opinions and discussions of the anti-dilution concept is a
reluctance to apply the concept freely to protecting all such names and marks as
would be entitled to the traditional type of protection against confusion. This
reflects a judicial concern with inhibiting free commercial use of the language, and
fear of fostering monopolies were mere ordinary marks and names afforded
protection against dilution. Relief against traditional infringement or unfair
competition requires a showing of likelihood of confusion which itself provides a
pragmatic screen against excessive application. The nebulous, previously unfamiliar
nature of the dilution tort, and the lack of any such screen perhaps engender
excessive judicial restraint in dilution cases.
Pattishall, supra note 183, at 301-02 (citations omitted). At least one commentator has even gone
so far as to argue that the monopoly of language granted by dilution protection hampers the free
flow of information intended under the Constitution. See Bannon, supra note 23, at 114
(charging that Handler's argument claims that "antidilution laws will block a wide range of
speech and result in an abridgement of first amendment rights"). These arguments, however,
extend little deeper than their own rhetoric. They fail to provide any explanation as to how
dilution protection, even where it does grant exclusive rights in a trademark, impoverishes the
English language to the extent that no other commercially viable name might-be developed.
Landes and Posner adequately refute such assertions by focusing on the "limited" scope of
protection offered by both traditional trademark and dilution when compared to the universe of
complete "usage" of the English language. Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective,supra note
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and

A further and equally groundless obstacle to so broad a
protection of marks is that historical fear of monopoly which
has possessed the courts ever since in the first trademark case
in equity Lord Hardwicke refused injunctive relief on that
account. But, as was pointed out over forty years ago by a
Scotch court, "monopoly is not the thing for which the complainers contend, and which the respondents resist. On the
contrary, fair trading is all for the protection of which the law
is invoked." The owner of a distinctive mark or name invoking
the protection of equity for it, obtains thereby no monopoly of
goods or services; these may be freely sold on their own merits
and under their own trade symbols. All that the plaintiff in such
cases asks is the preservation of a valuable, though possibly
anonymous link between him and his consumer, that has been
created by his ingenuity and the merit of his wares or services.
"All the rest of infinity is open to defendant." So limited a
"monopoly" as that cannot affect legitimate competition, and is
of the very essence of any rational system of individual and
exclusive trade symbols. 9

18, at 287-89. Dilution protection is limited to those uses of a famous mark which dilute or
whittle away at the commercial magnetism of persona of the mark. Thus, the diluting use must
be in the "trademark" sense, e.g., to identify or distinguish the goods or services of the second
user. Id. at 287-88. The rest of the world is free to use the same word in every other sense, e.g.,
for comparative advertising or parody. See Gilson, supra note 179, at 117. Unfortunately, most
dilution statutes fail to make this clarification, which leads to aberrations like Deere & Co. v.
MTD Products, 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994), wherein the court found that under New York's
dilution statute the defendant's spoof of the John Deere "deer" in a comparative advertising
context qualified as dilution. As will be discussed in the next section, this case goes too far, and
a well-drafted dilution statute such as the Federal Trademark Dilution Act may avoid such
aberrations.
Finally, as previously noted, Posner and Landes established that trademarks do not "deplete"
a finite universe of words and symbols available to the public. See Landes & Posner, Economics
of Trademark Law, supra note 18, at 275, 288.
188. Schechter, supra note 19.
189. Id. at 833 (citations omitted). Modem scholars have similarly rebutted the monopoly
arguments of dilution opponents. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 179, at 117 (noting that Handler
incorrectly asserted that dilution protection was "monopolistic": "There is no 'monopoly'
problem. The [proposed federal dilution statute] will apply only to trademark-like uses, not
parodies or other nondenominative uses, and the 'fair use' defense of Section 33(b) will continue
to apply."); Bannon, supra note 23, at 92-99, 113-14 (referring to dilution as "a subtle, infectious
injury to a trademark" and refuting Handler and others by asserting that dilution protection does
not create a monopoly of language nor does it infringe first amendment rights since Schechter
never intended dilution protection to "encompass parody and comparison advertising" and there
is still the " 'rest of infinity [ I open to the defendant' ") (quoting Schechter, supra note 19, at
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A handful of courts also have been active in dispelling the entrenched belief
among many jurists that dilution protection is inherently monopolistic. A New
York trial court held in B'Nai B'Rith that the two public policies of
protecting a vital public domain through both the preservation and availability
of natural and literary resources and of providing a fair marketplace free of
unfair trade practices were in no way inconsistent." The court also found
that granting the plaintiff relief did not confer monopoly rights on the
trademark holder. 9' Moreover, many scholars have argued convincingly
that dilution protection would contribute to a vigorous and competitive
economic environment.' Rather than promoting anti-competitive monopo-

833 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 F. 600, 604 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 256 U.S. 703 (1921)). Bannon also notes that following the Schechterian view of
reserving dilution protection for coined, famous, arbitrary, or fanciful marks results in
"protecting words which have been: '[a]dded to rather than withdrawn from the human
vocabulary by their owners, and have, from the very beginning, been associated in the public
mind with a particular product. ... ' "Bannon, supra note 23, at 114 (quoting Schechter, supra
note 19, at 829).
190. Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 547-48.
191. Id. at 548.
192. See Brownlee, supra note 15, at 473 (quoting a Review Commission's report to the
USTA President contending that the commercial magnetism of distinctive marks fosters
competition) (The United States TrademarkReview Commission Report and Recommendations
to USTA President and Board of Directors,77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 455 (1987); Bannon,
supra note 23, at 75 (quoting 134 Cong. Rec. S16,973 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement by
Sen. DeConcini referring to S. 1883) (arguing that enhanced trademark protection encourages
competition and " 'economic growth and raise[s] the standard of living for all of our
citizens' ")). Bodenhausen declares that the presence of a fear of monopolies, even if
occasionally artificial, should not overwhelm the competitive advantages of the "monopolistic"
(using the term in its economically-neutral, rather than anti-competitive, sense) nature of
trademarks. Bodenhausen, supra note 111, at 725.
Furthermore, proponents of dilution protection have marshalled several compelling
arguments in response to the charge that the statutes promote a monopoly of language which
results in a monopoly of trade. First, a fair reading of Schechter's thesis illustrates that the scope
of the dilution doctrine is limited to rational parameters. Bannon elucidates:
[Schechter] minimized the complained of dangers by confining dilution protection
to coined, arbitrary, or fanciful marks.
By focusing on... [such] words ... we will be protecting words which have
been:
"[A]dded to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary by their owners,
and have from the very beginning been associated in the public mind with a
particular product, not with a variety of products, and have created in the public
consciousness an impression or symbol of excellence of the particular product in
question."
Bannon, supra note 23, at 114 (quoting Schechter, supra note 19, at 829). Second, as noted in
the previous section, the requirement of distinctiveness in the contemporary incarnation of the
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lies, then, dilution protection serves "a broad public, as well as a narrow
private, interest [ ] in maintaining... commercial identity.""
Although dilution protection has been valiantly defended under
numerous theories, the inherent weakness in each rebuttal"9 is a failure to
boldly assert that these rights are indeed protectable property under a
Bentham/Posnerian "utilitarian property" paradigm. 9 ' Indeed, as established

doctrine guards against the monopolization of common words. Mead Data,702 F. Supp. at 1031.
Moreover, even where the dilution doctrine does protect a mark in familiar parlance, antidilution statutes do not grant monopolies in "other common laudatory phrases." Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey, 855 F.2d at 482-83.
Finally, the prominent anti-dilution case, Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th
Cir. 1963), demonstrates the ability of jurists to carefully mold a decision to protect the interests
of trademark holders without applying the relevant statute in a way that "would shackle the
courts and result in obnoxious monopolies of language." Pattishall, supra note 15, at 618-19.
193. Pattishall, supra note 97, at 893. As the court astutely observed in Philadelphia
Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin:
The fear is sometimes expressed that the extension of [dilution] protection may
foster monopoly, not merely of language but of trade. The fear is groundless. He
who coins a trade symbol adds rather than detracts from the language. Even when
a term in a dictionary is used in an arbitrary manner, the language is not
impoverished. The term may still be used in its accepted sense; what equity
prevents is the appropriation of the new layers of meaning that have been added
by the plaintiff. The rights of the first user can be sustained to the extent that they
do not unduly handicap others in the honest conduct of their business. New
competition and enterprise "must not be throttled, but the late comer should be
compelled to rely upon his own ingenuity, rather than misrepresentation and
misappropriation for the creation of his market. This much at least is demanded by
the most elementary notions of honesty." Blatant imitation should not be
recognized by the judicial condonation of practices which violate the fundamental
precepts of fair business dealing.
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 296 N.Y.S. 176, 181-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937)
(citation omitted) (quoting Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REv. 175, 186
(1936)).
194. With the exception of scholars following Rudolf Callmann, supra note 31, at 466-67
(concluding that trademarks are property).
195. Some scholars, however, are willing to loosely use the term "property right" when
referring to dilution, while hesitating to broadly refer to trademarks as "property." See, e.g.,
Bannon, supra note 23, at 90-91 (quoting Pattishall while referring to dilution as a trespass
which diminishes the distinguishing quality of a mark or name, identifying a property of
trademark as its "goodwill," and noting that anyone who uses that goodwill without permission
is committing a trespass). Bannon further quotes a passage from 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 6,
§ 24:13 (cited in Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1024 n. 11
(11 th Cir. 1989) and Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions,
Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1442 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir.
1991).
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in the previous section, the most effective means to quantify trademarks as
property is to substantiate an economic basis for their existence which factors
in the societal cost. Posner has successfully done this for traditional trademark
protection 1 and Iwill draw a similar analogy for dilution "property" rights
for famous and distinctive marks. This will include tracing the evolution and
transformation of the advertising value and "persona!' of famous marks,
which is the strongest economic basis for dilution property rights. I will then
apply a cost benefit analysis to establish that dilution protection is economically viable, since the societal benefits far outweigh the cost. Moreover, state
dilution laws treating trademarks as property complement rather than conflict
with traditional trademark protection, thus eliminating any preemption
concerns for state dilution statutes and making the recently enacted Federal
Trademark Dilution Bill of 1995 an ideal enhancement of the Lanham Act.
Finally, this section concludes that the New Model State Trademark Bill and
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 are truly steps in the right direction
but need further amending to include clear definitions of dilution and
tamishment.
2. The 'Transformation and Evolution!' of the
Advertising Value and "Tersona'
of Famous Trademarks 1"
According to semiologists, the English language is a complex system of
'
signs, with the signs "consisting of both a signifier and a signified."198
As previously noted, Ms. Bannon has acknowledged that Landes and Posner correctly view
one property right in a trademark as the right to prevent confusion. Bannon, supra note 23, at
71. She posits that in a dilution case, a second right is the right to maintain the trademark's
"integrity and uniqueness." Id. Ms. Bannon is definitely on the right track for the dilution
analogy, yet dilution protection is more clearly defined as protecting the earned "persona,"
quality image and advertising value of famous trademarks. See generally Winner, supra note 28
(arguing that trademarks protect "persona"). This parallels protecting "integrity and uniqueness,"
but utilizing the term "persona" and evaluating it in terms of quality image and advertising value
makes it easier for a court to positively view this property right as an additional "earned" right
reserved for famous and highly distinctive marks based on the capability of these marks to have
a separable "persona" or quality image, which may lead to subliminal confusion.
196. See Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18; supra notes 142-66 and
accompanying text.
197. This phrasing is borrowed from an excellent article which traces the transformation
and evolution of trademarks in general. See Drescher, supra note 18, at 301.
198. Id. at 303. Drescher explains:
For instance, the word "tree" is a sign composed of the concept of an actual tree,
which is the signified, and the word-form "t-r-e-e," which is the signifier. Signifier
and signified come together in the sign "tree" which we can manipulate in our
language together with millions of other signs.
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Symbols are a form of sign which "evoke a wealth of associations and
meanings.""9 Because trademarks serve quality assurance, source identification and advertising functions, they are best categorized as "symbols."'
From this we can discern that whether one selects a word, design, color or
trade dress to serve as a trademark, "the meaning [of these symbols] can be
created and manipulated by context" and once distinctive, "can evoke
associations perceived as attributes of a product." ' As Ms. Winner noted
Justice Frankfnter's recognition of "commercial magnetism":
"If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we
purchase goods by them.... The owner of a mark exploits this
human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the
same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of the
potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner
has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial
magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain
legal redress."

Id.
199. Id. at 304. The author distinguishes that his use of the term "symbol" connotes "that
sort of language favored by poets for its complex evocation of shades and levels of meaning,
while 'signals' refers to language which seeks definiteness in meaning." Id. at 304 n.8
200. See id. at 338.
201. Id. at 305; see also Winner, supra note 28, at 193 (noting that a "trademark's
'persona' has only a tenuous connection with the goods and services upon which [it] was
originally used"); Pattishall, supra note 15, at 621 (acknowledging that dilution may tarnish the
affirmative associations a trademark, through commercial use, has come to convey). Drescher
points out that although the original use of trademarks was merely to identify certain guilds or
artisans, the modem use heavily relies on the myth of symbols to evoke an association between
the symbol, myth and "features" associated with the products or services being marketed under
a particular trademark. Drescher, supra note 18, at 303-05, 311-13. Further, Drescher finds:
The critical difference between medieval and modem marks lay in the function of
the personal or production mark, the mark which we would most clearly recognize
today as a "trademark."... Thus, although the medieval mark, like its modem
counterpart, served as an indicator of source, the medieval craftsman's mark was
a "liability mark" which only later evolved into an "asset mark" as a valuable
symbol of individual good will. Just as the individual master could not compete
through advertising, neither was it intended that he accumulate individual good will
through his mark.
Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted).
202. Winner, supra note 28, at 194 (quoting Justice Frankfurter in Mishawaka Rubber &
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)).
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Thus, it is in the seller's best interest to select a trademark which will
''
evoke the most desirable "cultural associations or mythical attachments. "
For example, the use of the COCA COLA trademark on sportswear may
evoke the myth of the free-spirited, cola-drinking, diversity-driven person who
is "young at heart." Similarly, use of the WIMBLEDON mark on sportswear
evokes the myth of "tennis" and its cultural association of wealth, status and
clout.' Advertisers often spare no expense on research and advertising to
ensure that a product name, its trademark, is "highly charged with the desired
associations." For example, advertising agencies planning a baby products

203. Drescher, supra note 18, at 306. The author explains that every material object has an
associated cultural context and reflects in itself a set of cultural relationships which explain it
or give it purpose. Id. at 305. For example:
A tennis racket.., has a purposeful relationship to not only the tennis ball, but
also to the court, and to all tennis-related objects and accessories. At the same
time, the tennis racket implies the set of abstract rules of the game of tennis. The
abstract game of tennis expresses itself through these material objects. These
objects form the "material culture" or object-language of tennis.
Id. Furthermore, an "integrated complex of cultural relationships may be said to form a myth."
Id. at 306. The myth of tennis includes "the glamour surrounding its stars, the romance of its
tournaments, the aura of wealth belonging to its clubs... ." Id. Other myths cited include prunes
belonging to old maids at a boardinghouse, tea being a "sickly brew," and instant coffee being
rejected because a wife who resorts to this product is "lazy." Id. at 306 n.13.
204. See id. at 306-08.
205. Id. at 307 n.15. The author coins the term "obsessing-technique" to describe the "range
of advertising techniques applied to the marketing of a trademarked product." Id. He credits the
origin of the term to a Levi-Strauss account that described a shaman guiding a woman through
a labor:
The shaman's use of the chanted song, the manner in which he creates through
symbols a unity of the mythical and the physiological .... "And the myth being
enacted in the internal body must retain through the vividness and the character of
lived experience prescribed by the shaman in the light of the pathological state and
through an appropriate obsessing technique."

Id. (quoting LEVI-STRAUSS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SYMBOLS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
193 (1963)).
Some scholars negatively view the use of symbols in advertising and argue that granting any
exclusive rights in trademarks results in a "monopoly" by famous brands, based on their ability
to expend large amounts of money to dupe the public into believing the "myth" surrounding the
trademark (symbol), thereby inflating the true characteristics of the goods. See, e.g., Backman,
supra note 18, at 223-24 (explaining the anti-competitive effects of trademarks on small
businesses). According to Backman:
anticompetitive effects of advertising are alleged to stem from (a) the power of the
purse and (b) the accompanying build up of brand loyalty. As a result, it is claimed
that the volume of resources required to compete is so great that small companies
cannot enter a market while the difficulty of overcoming brand loyalty acts as a
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campaign would seek to establish a "trusting" relationship with mothers, their
prospective consumers. They would therefore target product names evoking
the "myth" of expertise, knowledge, reassurance and confidence.2 Thus,
trademarks such as FIRST STEP and PAMPERS become highly popular for
invoking the nurturing, reassuring relationship that a mother (or father) has
with a child. Major advertising campaigns are used to promote the perpetuation of the quality myth or image surrounding a trademark.' Advertising
reduces the time it takes for parents to make the goods/mark association with
the myth, since the consumer is motivated or "enticed" to purchase the
particular goods/services to determine whether they do indeed possess the
qualities invoked by the myth. Ultimately, if the goods or services advertised
possess features which to some extent "parallel" the myth, the mark will
become successful and generate its own advertising value? and "commercial magnetism," which also results in lowering consumer search cost in the
future. 9 "The advertising copy creates a context which informs and begins
deterrent to entry by other large firms.
Id.
The author goes on to distinguish, however, that although "[piractically every market
situation combines elements of monopoly and of competition," in reality, "competitive pressures
exerted by the alternative products available" prevent a single brand from using its "market
power" to completely dominate a market for an extended period of time. Id. at 226-27. He cites
as evidence the fact that "[c]ompanies recognize their inability to develop complete brand loyalty
when they offer a diversity of brands for similar products in order to appeal to different groups
and to attract the patronage of those who are constantly experimenting or who are dissatisfied
with other brands." Id. at 226. For example, TIDE's market share, 13% in 1948, increased in
1952 to 35%, then declined in 1967 to 15%, in light of additional competition in the detergent
market. Id. at 227. Moreover, Landes and Posner also distinguish that advertising is only
profitable if the consumer has ultimately purchased the product and can in fact rely on the
quality and features which are advertised under the trademark. See Landes & Posner, Economic
Perspective, supra note 18, at 280. Otherwise, there is no reduction in consumer search-cost and
the producer is unable to obtain a price premium based on the advertising strength of the mark.
Id. at 277-80.
206. Drescher, supra note 18, at 307 n.15 ("They are essential to the establishment of trust
with the mother regarding a subject which is extremely sensitive and important to her.") (quoting
VARDA L. LEYMORE, HIDDEN MYTH: STRUCTURE AND SYMBOLISM IN ADVERTISING (1975)).

207. See Drescher, supra note 18, at 307 n.15.
208. See, e.g., id. at 321-28 (providing the historical context for the advertising value of
trademarks). Drescher notes that pre-Civil War, trademark use was at a minimum since grocers
sold their goods as bulk commodities. The post-Civil War era ushered in the advent of utilizing
"advertising" to distinguish one's goods from another's with one of the earlier trademarks being
QUAKER oats, which took the trademark out of the realm of simply serving as a source
identifier for policing functions and allowed it to acquire an advertising "function" or value. Id.
at 321-24. "Early Quaker Oats packaging and advertising copy exploited the Quaker symbol with
its connotations of moral and physical strength in order to lend those attributes to the oats
themselves." Id. at 324. Drescher also quotes from a 1916 Quaker advertising campaign:
'Women who exercise, men who walk-are the Quaker Oats enthusiasts.' " Id. at 324-25.
209. For example, parents who initially responded to the PAMPERS advertising campaigns
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to obsess the mark. Thus, the trademark becomes an integral part of the
advertising function because of its inherent power and range of meaning as
a symbol, and because the advertisement itself creates a context which
informs the mark. 210°
Once a trademark "symbol" has fully evolved such that it has drawing
power and effectively distinguishes a source of goods/services which possess
these "mythical" qualities, it can then be "stretched" to extend to related
products or services produced by the trademark owner. Drescher identifies
this phenomenon as "brand extension" and notes that one can stretch a brand
"only so far as its reservoir of good will, its 'brand equity' will allow."'
Thus, for example, Procter and Gamble, owners of the PAMPERS mark for
baby diapers, would not attempt to use this brand name on a new line of
cereal for adults, or a new alcoholic beverage, if it were to enter these
markets. On the other hand, the PAMPERS name may be placed on a new

of the late 60's and 70's were motivated to try the product and determine if this brand of
disposable diapers did indeed possess the quality of being soft enough to "pamper" the baby's
bottom the way cloth diapers did while possessing the ease and efficiency of being disposable.
Obviously, parents were convinced, because today PAMPERS is one leading brand of disposable
diapers, and other corporations have created brands which mirror the same myth, such as
HUGGIES (comforts and hugs the baby, thereby reassuring the parents) and LUVS (what more
can I say?).
Drescher points out that
[o]nce trademarks become symbols, we begin to have an overlap in trademark
function. At one level, the mark signals the product; at another level, it symbolically advertises the product. The signal function is denotative; the symbolic function
connotative.... Through the use of such obsessing techniques, advertising creates
the "drawing power" of the trademark symbol. The symbol becomes "congenial".., to the targeted consumers and does so by placing the mark within the
context of whatever mythical unit has been chosen for it.
The trademark's denotative and connotative functions come together in such
a way that the myth which obsesses the mark on the symbolic level insinuates itself
into the product denoted by the mark at the material level. The result is a mythical
attachment, a transference by which the symbolic attributes of the mark are fused
with the objective attributes of the product.
Drescher, supra note 18, at 328-29 (citing VANDRA L. LEYMORE, HIDDEN MYTH: STRUCTURE
AND SYMBOLISM IN ADVERTISING

(1975); R.

CowARD

& J. ELLIS,

LANGUAGE AND MATERIAL-

ISM (1977)).
Drescher further explains that the fusing of the myth with objective features which parallel
the myth possibly explains why consumers are willing to pay a premium for a preferred product
even if "the preferred product may be indistinguishable from a less expensive rival." Id. at 329
(citing VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1980)).
210. Drescher, supra note 18, at 325.
211. Id. at 330.
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line of baby detergent, or soap, since these products clearly fit within the
myth of pampering a baby and reassuring the parent."'
The next evolutionary step beyond "brand extension" was the recognition that trademark owners could create a myth which would allow a mark
to evoke a certain quality image which would help consumers buy a
projection of themselves.213 Under this scenario, a single mark is consciously placed on a wide variety of products to encompass a broader range of
experience through our object-language. 4 '"The good will of the mark is
brought to bear on an entire pattern of experience, an entire environment,
rather than on one product or a narrow group of products within one myth
unit," thus "giv[ing] rise to the branded experience."2 5 I posit that the
"branded experience" is possible only if famous and highly-distinctive
trademarks possess a separable "image" or "persona" which allows the myth
or association to extend beyond the brand name.
For example, famous and highly distinctive trademarks such as
WIMBLEDON or ROLLS ROYCE evoke the myth of elitism, high quality,
class, and wealth, which extends beyond the products or services offered by
the owner of the mark, taking on their own separable "persona" or "commercial magnetism."2 16 It is this commercial magnetism or persona property
which is most effectively protected under the dilution doctrine.2 17

212. Drescher notes that marketers take each opportunity to practice "brand extension" to
get the most out of the money invested in creating and substantiating the myth. Id. at 330-31
n.101. "Because companies want to produce a steady stream of new products to fill shelves and
fuel sales growth, many are slapping their established brand names on a broad range of new
products." Id. at 330-31 n.101 (quoting "Brand-Stretching can be fun--and dangerous,"
ECONOMIST, May 5, 1990, at 77-79). He further notes that some brand stretching is highly
successful, such as TIDE with Bleach and JACK DANIEL'S charcoal (which was "packaged
in the same black and white trade dress as its famous whiskey"): "it was the preeminence of the
JACK DANIEL'S mark on one product within a certain myth-unit which allowed the corporation
to instantly achieve consumer recognition on an entirely different but mythically-related
product." Id. at 331 (citing Brand Stretching Can Be Fun--and Dangerous,supra, at 66-67).
213. Id. at 332-34.
214. Id. at 333.
215. Id. The author cites BMW's conscious advertising effort to extend its house and brand
name beyond luxury cars to expensive leather jackets, briefcases, etc.: "[n]one of this means that
a BMW is any better than its rivals, but proud owners are left with a feeling that they have
joined some sort of elite." Id. at 333-34 (quoting The Year of the Brand, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24,
1988, at 100). "It becomes possible then, for the consumer to step into 'the BMW
experience' . . . ; when the consumer wears a BMW jacket, carries a BMW briefcase, and drives
his BMW car, he has entered a BMW branded experience and purchased a BMW engineered
identity." Id. at 334.
This might seem like a conscious manipulation of the public, but for the "experience" to be
successful and profitable, the BMW car and service centers must indeed provide elite quality and
service.
216. Winner, supra note 28, at 193-94.
217. Id. at 195.
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3. Dilution Rights--Protecting the Persona,
Quality Assurance, and Source Identification
Property of Famous Trademarks Without
Conflicting with Traditional Trademark Rights
"Persona" has been defined as the "quality of distinctiveness and
uniqueness, quite apart from its [the trademark's] function of identifying the
source of goods and services." 8 In layman's terms, the "persona" of a
trademark is simply the mark's "quality image" or "commercial magnetism."
For a mark to possess its own separable "persona!' it has to reach the level
of fame and distinctiveness (either nationally or within its market) such that
the myth surrounding the mark's "quality image" extends beyond its related
goods or services.
For example, the ROLLS ROYCE trademark has reached such a level
of fame world-wide that it evokes the mythical "quality image" of wealth,
class, and elitism that extends far beyond its automobile products and related
services.2 9 Thus, individuals seeking to evoke the ROLLS ROYCE
"persona!' and transfer this quality image to themselves may wear T-shirts,
watches or other paraphernalia that include the name ROLLS ROYCE?2
Similarly, if one wanted to evoke the ROLLS ROYCE "persona" and transfer
its quality image to restaurant services, one might name a new restaurant
ROLLS ROYCE. Such famous and highly distinctive terms often become
part of our general usage in a non-trademark sense, so that we describe an
expensive table as the 'ROLLS ROYCE" or "CADILLAC" of tables
and an
2
inexpensive but sturdy table as the "MCDONALD'S" of tables? '
When a trademark becomes famous and highly distinctive, both
competing and non-competing trademark uses of the mark subliminally evoke
the "persona" or "quality image" surrounding the mark, thereby diluting its
"persona!' and quality image as it relates to the goods and services offered by
the original trademark owner. Certainly, one might name a new line of high
fashion dresses the TIFFANY line to evoke the "persona!' of class and
sophistication surrounding the mark TIFFANY'S of New York, or name a
family restaurant "KODAK' (along with having a gold/red and black
tradedress) to evoke Eastman's Kodak's "persona' of warmth, family, and
superior quality. In both cases, the subliminal association and confusion with
the actual quality of goods/services sold under the famous mark constitute a
trespass against the persona, quality assurance and source identification
property of these marks? 2

218. Id. at 193. The author further notes that "[tlhe 'persona' is the essence of the trade-

mark-that quality... with which a consumer wishes to identify himself." Id. at 194.
219. See id.

220. See id.
221. Id. at 193.
222. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey, 855 F.2d at 485 (enjoining use of slogan "Greatest
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Traditional trademark law cannot adequately protect against such
trespass and deceit because it merely protects against uses which are "likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to" source of origin,
thereby excluding junior uses of the trademark on wholly unrelated products
or services. m The dilution doctrine, which is grounded in both deceit and

Show on Earth" and Ringling Circus theme as trademark for used car sales); American Express
Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006, 2013-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding use of greeting card shaped like American Express card and utilizing its distinctive
trade dress and slogan to sell condoms "diluted" and "tarnished" the famous American Express
marks); see also Bannon, supra note 23, at 90-91 (noting that dilution constitutes a trespass
against the integrity and uniqueness of famous marks).
223. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 & 1125(a) (sections covering traditional trademark
infringement for federally registered and unregistered trademarks). Note that certain noncompeting uses may be protected under a traditional trademark infringement analysis, particularly in the case of famous or highly distinctive marks.
Under the Lanham Act and most state common law actions, trademark infringement is
legally determined by evaluating a series of factors to determine whether there is a likelihood
of confusion. These factors include:
[(1)] [T]he strength of his [plaintiffs] mark, [(2)] the degree of similarity between
the two [plaintiffs and defendant's] marks, [(3)] the proximity of the products [or
services], [(4)] the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, [(5) evidence
of] actual confusion, [(6)] and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting
its own mark, [(7)] the quality of defendant's product [or service], and [(8)] the
sophistication of the buyers.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820
(1961). According to the majority view, no one factor is determinative; each court is free to
conduct its own balancing test utilizing its own set of facts and equities. Id. Thus, it is not
uncommon that once a court finds that plaintiffs mark possesses the degree of strength to be
considered "famous" or "highly distinctive," it broadly applies factors 3 and 4, which increases
the likelihood of confusion. In fact, many cases hold outright that highly famous and distinctive
marks are entitled to a broader zone of expansion. This increases the likelihood that the plaintiff
may in fact bridge the gap and justifies extending protection to non-competing, but related
goods. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp 198, 221 (D. Md.
1988) (finding likelihood of confusion where junior user sought to use MCSLEEP mark on line
of budget hotels and McDonald's not in hotel business; case turned on strength of mark, intent
of defendant and "relatedness" of products [FAST FOOD AND MOTELS?]); Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1962) (finding that the strength of
the name "Safeway" in retail grocery business gave rise to a likelihood of confusion in a noncompeting use of the name in real estate); Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Fredrick Ungar Publ'g Co.,
197 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (noting that the long use of the word "Atlantic" by plaintiff
established a right to protect the use of the word, even when used in novel combinations when
associated with the publication of any printed material).
As early as 1947, Callmann noted that it would not be necessary to manipulate traditional
trademark law to extend to non-competing uses if courts would recognize trademarks as
"property" entitled to protection under both traditional unfair competition (tort) and property
(trespass) theories. Callmann, supra note 31, at 465-67. To the extent that dilution protects more
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trespass, thus becomes the most viable means of protecting this "persona"

property. Protecting against junior uses which dilute the persona, "commercial
magnetism" and advertising property of a famous mark encompasses both
competing and non-competing junior uses of the mark, while simultaneously
protecting the famous mark's quality assurance and source identification

property2
Under the Posnerian property paradigm, as long as the protection of the
"persona" of a trademark includes the static benefit of preventing "overuse"
of the resource and the dynamic benefit of providing an incentive to "create"
than source identification and quality assurance, this protection is indeed applicable to both
competing and non-competing junior uses which dilute the persona.or "commercial magnetism"
of the mark. Indeed, every state dilution statute clarifies that this protection is available for
famous marks "in the presence or absence of confusion." See supra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text. Unfortunately, courts frequently ignore this distinction and erroneously
require a"likelihood of confusion" or hold that dilution protection is unavailable when the goods
are competing and there is a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc.
v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1984) C"'where the parties are in competition
and the plaintiff could not obtain relief under the traditional laws of infringement and unfair
competition, he will not be able to obtain relief under the Anti-Dilution Statute") (quoting Filter
Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 311 N.E.2d 386, 398-99 (Il1.App. Ct. 1974)).
224. Although I agree with Winner that the persona of a trademark is indeed a protectable
property right, I disagree as to the most effective means of protecting this right. Winner argues
that the "persona" of a mark is most effectively protected under a right of publicity theory. See
Winner, supra note 28, at 204. She briefly addresses the elements of "dilution" as it relates to
protecting the "persona!' of a mark and notes that "[p]rotection of trademarks against dilution
comes very close to recognition of an 'in gross' property right in the mark, a concept the courts
have, forhistorical reason, been reluctant to endorse." Id. at 206. Winner asserts that since courts
have been (and continue to be) reluctant to view any function of trademarks as property, one is
better off seeking protection of the persona of a mark under the right of publicity, where "courts
have had no such problem... in applying the elements of dilution, including the in-gross
property concept." Id. Because the right of publicity is often more controversial than the dilution
doctrine, dilution remains a more viable protectable right for the persona of a mark, particularly
if we can successfully argue that this right complements, rather than conflicts with, the readily
acceptable traditional trademark protection. It is far easier to align dilution with traditional
trademark protection than to align the right of publicity with the same.
See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 839 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that:
The right of publicity, whether tied to name, likeness, achievements, identifying
characteristics or actual performances, etc. conflicts with the economic and
expressive interests of others. Society's interests in free enterprise and free expression must be balanced against the interests of an individual seeking protection in
the right of publicity where the right is being expanded beyond established limits.
Id. Under this view, consider whether protecting the persona of a mark under the right of
publicity could survive any better than protecting the persona under a dilution theory. Both
would apparently be subjected to the same negative presumption that surrounds the expansion
of any intellectual property right.
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or improve upon existing resources, it qualifies as a valid property right.'
Dilution protection of the persona, quality assurance and source identification
"property" of famous trademarks meets both thresholds, particularly when the
statute articulates clear limits and boundaries which evidence a balancing
between providing an incentive to create famous marks and their related
"quality image" and promoting the free dissemination of ideas and free
market competition.
First, like traditional trademark protection, "rent seeking" costs are
reduced by requiring possession and use of the famous mark by the
owner/registrant.' Like the Lanham Act, state dilution statutes put wouldbe copiers of famous marks on notice not to copy such marks for use on
competing or non-competing goods if such use would in fact dilute the
& ' Moreover, by limiting dilution
commercial magnetism of the mark
protection to marks that have earned the additional property value of fame
and a high level of distinctiveness, state dilution statutes squarely address the
benefit of protecting the "persona" of famous marks.'
Second, the "fame" and distinctiveness limitation is aligned with the
Schechterian view and clearly defines the trademark property as going
beyond "source identification" by achieving a separable quality image or
"persona" that transcends the product itself. 9 Indeed, famous marks such
225. See Landes & Posner, Economic Perspective, supra note 18, at 266.
226. Id. at 281 (noting "[a] firm allowed to register trademarks without using them might
invest substantial resources in thinking up plausible new brand names").
227. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
228. As noted at the beginning of this section, the typical dilution statute adopted by the
majority of states fails to expressly limit dilution protection to "famous" marks and allows
protection to any mark possessing a "distinctive quality" capable of being diluted. See supra
notes 169-79 and accompanying text. When applying such statutes, some courts have limited
dilution protection to famous and celebrated marks. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at
1031 (finding that the notiriety of a mark is the proper measure for judging the mental
association presumed by dilution theory); see also P.F. Cosmetique, S.A. v. Minnetonka Inc.,
605 F. Supp. 662, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (measuring the strength of a mark as conceptual rather
than market strength and dependent upon the public's perception). Other courts have held that
the level of distinctiveness required for dilution is equivalent to that required for infringement.
See, e.g., Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 483 (acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit established
that its standard for evaluating distinctiveness for state dilution purposes included factors which
parallel those used in a Lanham Act analysis) (citing Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Serv., 736 F.2d
1153, 1157 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984)); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc.,
41 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1994) (Second Circuit appearing to modify its Mead Data requirement
of "fame" by returning to the earlier standard that the mark "is of truly distinctive quality or has
acquired secondary meaning") (citing Sally Gee Inc., 699 F.2d at 625). Today, both the model
dilution statute proposed by the INTA (adopted by Connecticut and Kentucky) and the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act list factors which a court may use to evaluate whether a mark is
"famous" enough to be entitled to dilution protection. For a listing of these factors, see supra
note 20.
229. Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 548 n.7.
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as WIMBLEDON or TIFFANY have been successfully marketed and
advertised such that they are purchased" 'not only for their quality, but also
because they are instantly recognized for their costliness and presumed to be
tasteful and stylish.' " These marks evoke a quality image which helps
consumers buy a projection of themselves as possessing the above-noted
qualities. Thus, although I may not expect the WIMBLEDON tennis
organization to manufacture a new line of sports cars, I would still purchase
a sports car bearing this trademark because in driving this car I now become
part of the myth or quality image of "the elite," and, more importantly, I
convey this quality image to the general public who will recognize and
similarly become taken by my new "image." 1 As will be explored in the
final section of this Article, because the majority of state dilution statutes
presently fail to define what constitutes a "famous" mark, this leaves the door
open for courts to misapply this limitation and for scholars to inappropriately
challenge whether such rights lead to monopolies in trademarks?"

Though attention appears to be focused upon the word "dilution" (Gen. Bus. Law
§ 368-d), it may be the effect of simulation of a mark or name with "distinctive"
quality which is the true right of action. Thus, a new category of business
identification like celebrated marks may have been recognized where the quality
of the mark transcends that of the product in its advertising and demand appeal to
the public.
Id.
230. Winner, supra note 28, at 194 (quoting Tod A. Roberts, The Status Trademark,USTA
ExEcuTivE NEWSLMEnrR 27 (1978)).
231. Drescher, supra note 18, at 328-32; see also Winner, supra note 28, at 193-94
(explaining that consumers are often more "concerned with the status value" than the "intrinsic
utility" of an item). Why else would a manufacturer seek to sell kits converting Volkswagen
grills to Rolls Royce grills, but to palm-off the persona and quality image of Rolls Royce? Why
would a consumer purchase such kits, but to attempt to evoke the Rolls Royce "persona" of
class and status onto himself and his formerly commonplace car, the Volkswagen? Without
recognition and protection of such "persona" property, Rolls Royce would not have a viable
cause of action against the manufacturers of the conversion kit. See Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd.,
428 F. Supp. at 698 (noting that the infringing goods do indeed identify Rolls-Royce and thus
liability has been established).
232. New York's anti-dilution statute, like the majority of state statutes patterned after the
first Model Trademark Act, fails to expressly reserve dilution protection for "famous" marks.
Instead, the language of such statutes refers to protecting the "distinctive" quality of the mark
from dilution. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996). The statute authorized
injunctions
if there exists a likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, trade name, label, or form of advertisement of the
prior user, notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of
confusion as to the source of goods or services.
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Third, limiting dilution protection to injunctive relief irrefutably sets
reasonable boundaries for protecting this "persona' property. Under the
majority of state statutes and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, the
owner of a famous mark's recovery is limited to injunctive relief. Monetary
damages are recoverable only if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant's
diluting acts were "willful. ' 3 As a result, the junior user of a famous mark
does not incur a monetary penalty unless its predatory intent reaches a level
of willfulness which is punitive in nature. This is consistent with traditional
trademark law.'
Fourth, by protecting against subliminal confusion, dilution relief also
provides the economic benefit of lowering consumer search costs, thereby
benefitting both the consumer and owner of famous marks. For example, if
a restaurant not sponsored by Eastman Kodak were to be called "KODAK,"
the average consumer would confer upon the restaurant the warm, family
oriented, Cosby-like quality image enjoyed by the original trademark owner.
If this consumer is simultaneously faced with KODAK clothes, KODAK
bicycles, KODAK toothbrushes, etc., all from different sources and all
manufactured to different quality standards, the consumer feels less comfortable that the mark KODAK conveys a consistent "quality image." This in
turn "dilutes" or lessens the strong quality image of Eastman Kodak.
Certainly, by the time the consumer gets around to purchasing film, a

Id. Nonetheless, most courts read into state dilution statutes the Schechterian requirement of
fame and a high level of distinctiveness. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1030-31
(holding that LEXIS lacked the requisite fame to be capable of dilution since only one percent
of the general public associated LEXIS with Mead Data, despite acknowledging that LEXIS was
strong in its own market of accountants and attorneys).
233. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1996)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-1 l(i)(c) (West
Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (1996).
234. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (authorizing a court to award compensatory damages for
traditional trademark infringement "subject to the principles of equity," such sums "shall
constitute compensation and not a penalty"); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 30.24[2].
McCarthy notes that
injunctive relief is generally granted upon a strong showing of "likelihood of
confusion" and neither proof of actual confusion nor proof of intent or willfulness
is required. But when it comes to making an award of monetary relief for past acts
of infringement, judges are hesitant to do so, whether it is labeled "damages,"
"profits" or "attorney fees," without that indefinable "something more." ... Jurors,
as much as judges, often look for clearly intentional, culpable or reckless conduct
before awarding damages in trademark cases.
Id. (citing Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D.C.
Colo. 1976), damages modified, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052
(1978)).
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legitimate product of Eastman Kodak, the "quality image" of KODAK has
been blurred or diluted and the reliance level reduced, thereby increasing the
consumer's search cost. Because she has been inundated with KODAK marks
on goods having varying levels of quality, she may then seek to try FUJI or
another brand because her reliance on Eastman's Kodak's "quality image"
has lessened. 5 Consequently, without dilution protection to preserve
KODAK's quality image and enhance traditional trademark protection against
likelihood of confusion, we would ultimately obliterate the quality assurance
benefit of trademarks, which is the basis for lowering consumer search costs
and increasing profitability.
Fifth, dilution protection provides an economic incentive for owners of
trademarks to invest the additional resources necessary to take their mark to
a level of distinctiveness where it will qualify as "famous" under the statute.
As noted earlier, once the goods or services offered under a trademark have
been established to actually parallel the "quality myth" or image surrounding
the mark, consumer search costs are significantly lowered, based on a reliance
on this quality, while the profitability for the trademark owner is simultaneously increasedV 7 Thus, a trademark owner has a financial incentive to
advertise and to take additional steps to make its mark "famous" because the
235. See, e.g., Laura M. Slenzak, Dilution Law in the UnitedStates and Canada:A Review
of the State of the Law and a Proposalfor United States Federal Dilution Protection, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 205, 206 (1993). Slenzak notes that,
while having built up a reputation related to a particular offering does not per se
grant the trademark owner the right to exclude any and all other uses of his
trademark regardless of the context or offering, the trademark owner and public
alike have a vested interest in seeing that the trademark's market value is not
unfairly diminished. Specifically, dilution involves a subtle harm to the trademark
owner in that consumers may no longerassociatethe mark solely with the owner's
offering.
Id. (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 209 (arguing that the true value of a trademark is through assurance that quality
remain consistent throughout a line of products, leading to stimulated sales); Landes & Posner,
Economics of TrademarkLaws, supra note 18, at 272 ("The value of a trademark is the saving
in search costs made possible by the information or reputation that the trademark conveys or
embodies about the brand. ..."). The subliminal confusion benefit may be a way to bridge the
gap between dilution opponents and proponents. Since Port and others argue that dilution goes
beyond trademark protection as it is grounded in trespass, this benefit establishes that dilution
is grounded in both deceit and trespass, and avoids cases where courts attempt to misapply the
Lanham Act and protect against subliminal confusion under a § 43(a) Lanham Act analysis.
237. See Landes & Posner, Economics of Trademark Law, supra note 18, at 277 (noting
that the more a product is advertised under its trademark or brand name, the broader the
consumer base becomes, lowering consumer search costs which leads to a possibility of increasing profitability because the seller can now charge a premium for its goods or services being
offered under the mark).
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resulting lowering of consumer search costs will enable the owner to increase
the price' of the goods and to collect a premium based on the mark's "quality
image. 238 Moreover,once a mark reaches the level of fame and distinctiveness that it has its own separable "quality image" or "persona," the owner can
then "brand-stretch" and use this mark on other related goods, thereby
reaping the economic benefit of immediately lowering the search costs
without any additional advertising expenditure. 239 Indeed, for globally
famous marks such as McDONALD'S, COCA-COLA, and PEPSI this
"persona" or quality image is a separable commodity which can be "applied"
to wholly unrelated goods, which then take on the famed mark's quality
persona. This results in premium prices being charged for MCKIDS clothing,
COCA-COLA t-shirts and PEPSI watches, because these goods are perceived
to possess the quality image of the goods or services traditionally offered
under these famous marks.' Although the financial incentive alone is
arguably enough to encourage the "merchandising" of famous marks,

238. As noted by numerous scholars, a manufacturer will only reap the price premium if
the resulting goods do in fact, to some degree, parallel the quality myth. Drescher, supra note
18, at 330-31 (arguing that "brand extension" or brand stretching-using the recognition value
and reputation of a brand name in a new product area-is an effective way of invading a new
market, as long as the new product lives up to the original quality myth; otherwise, the original
brand may be undermined). For example, GODIVA chocolates do indeed have to possess that
super rich "chocolate" flavor such that one perceives that by eating these chocolates, she too
becomes one of the "elite" and is willing to therefore pay a price premium for this product.
Similarly, a Rolls Royce car must be of such premium mechanical construction and contain
certain structural luxuries so that the "wealthy" consumer is willing to pay a considerable price
premium for this car.
239. For example, in the PAMPERS brand-stretching example previously cited in this
Article, Procter and Gamble (P&G) could introduce a new PAMPERS line of baby detergent
designed with a mild formula particularly suited to laundering infant clothing. See supra text
accompanying note 212. P&G could immediately charge a price premium for this product
because the quality image of PAMPERS as nurturing the baby would immediately extend to this
detergent. The fact that the diaper did indeed possess these somewhat "mythical" qualities in the
eyes of consumers would lead to their automatic reliance on this quality image in purchasing
PAMPERS detergent, thereby lowering search costs and increasing profitability.
240. In fact, owners of such famous marks take advantage of this persona phenomenon by
either marketing or licensing the production of such unrelated goods. Coca-Cola and Pepsi have
their own line of clothing, and as noted by Drescher, supra note 18, at 334, even car
manufacturers have gotten into the game with Jaguar and BMW putting out lines of T-shirts,
watches, etc. to create the "Jaguar" or "BMW" image of the cool, sophisticated person whose
fine taste extends beyond the car that he or she drives.
For an interesting criticism of how such advertising and brand-stretching/licensing affects
public perception and raises First Amendment issues, see Schiller, supra note 22, at 340-41
(defining the third class of "subliminals" as Lanham Act subliminals which "involve the
conversion of psychological associations produced by one advertiser to another advertiser's use"
and acknowledging that subliminal confusion does in fact occur because the second user is
subliminally associated with the senior user or advertiser of the mark).
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providing dilution protection for. the "persona!' or "quality image" of such
marks encourages manufacturers to not only "brand-stretch" but to ensure that
the goods or services offered under the "quality myth" do in fact parallel the
myth. 4' Protecting this persona also ensures that the public can effectively
rely on the "quality image' which surrounds related or unrelated goods sold
under "famous marks."
The strongest economic and policy argument against categorizing
dilution rights as protecting earned trademark property is the public's
contribution to making qualifying marks "famous" and highly distinctive,
which arguably renders the societal cost for dilution protection too high.
Although a trademark owner creates the mark and utilizes commercial
advertising to gain recognition and fame for his mark, it is the public's
positive response and reaction to the mark that ultimately contributes to the
mark's becoming highly recognizable as a source identifier and "famous."242
For example, one could argue that parents and young children played a
significant role in making the trademark MCDONALD'S a household word
to identify the chain of restaurants supplying hamburgers and other fast food,
notwithstanding the billions of advertising dollars spent by the McDonald's
corporation to promote its mark and associated personalities, such as Ronald
McDonald!4 3
By viewing the public's role in advertising and promotion as crucial to
the fame and distinctiveness of a mark, one could argue that the quidpro quo
for the public's role in this earned right is the right for a junior user to subtly
"palm off' of the fame of such marks and to use the "positive association"
to help develop a similar positive association for his or her new product or
241. If the owner of a famous mark such as KODAK seeks to enjoin junior diluting uses,
its case is certainly strengthened if it establishes a set of quality features which parallel the
quality image or myth which extends to all goods or services performed by Eastman Kodak.
Thus, any junior use on non-licensed services "dilutes" or tarnishes the capability of KODAK

to serve not only as a source identifier but also as an indicator of quality. For an interesting
article which evaluates utilizing a behavioral framework to judge "likelihood of dilution," see
Alexander F. Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks Dilute: A Behavioral Framework to
Judge "Likelihood" of Dilution, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149 (1993).
242. See CALLMANN, supra note 21, § 17.01.
It is erroneous to say that a thing is first a symbol and then later obtains
acceptance. The process of becoming a symbol, and its public acceptance as such
are contemporaneous.... If something becomes a symbol, it is because the
community is ready to recognize and accept it as such. This characteristic lies at
the very foundation of the law of trademarks, for it affects the issues of confusion
and secondary meaning, and explains why the reaction of the public is a decisive
factor.
Id.
243. Moskin, supra note 25.
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service. Indeed, the public already sacrifices its role in making a trademark
distinctive of the owner's goods by granting the owner trademark property
rights which protect against deceptive junior uses and continue in perpetuity
as long as the mark serves as a source identifier and is not abandoned by the
trademark owner.
On the surface, this argument appears plausible, but it is severely
flawed. Although the public's role in making a mark highly distinctive is
unquestionable, the public similarly influences to some degree the creative
expression of copyrightable work and the inventions of patentable works. One
could attempt to superficially distinguish trademarks from patents and
copyrights by the degree of "creative contribution" of the author or inventor.
Nonetheless, in both cases the patentee or author has used pre-existing
material or knowledge to develop her useful invention or creative expression,
yet she still retains an earned property right in her unique invention or
creative expression.
As noted in numerous patent cases, there is "nothing new under the
sun"; every inventor has borrowed from the public domain and added it to
his or her own creativity to derive the claimed useful, novel and non-obvious
invention. 2' There is also a finite number of basic plots for literary works,
yet each author of copyrightable expression has built upon this public domain
material and incorporated enough creative expression to create a separate
intellectual property right.
Similarly, a trademark owner often selects a word or symbol from the
public domain to identify her goods or services, yet it is the creative
marketing, choice, and ultimate quality of the product or service which
ultimately determines the "distinctiveness" and fame of a mark.245 Thus,

244. One could counter that the patent and copyright acts account for the public's
contribution to the earned property rights by limiting the terms of exclusive rights to 17 years
for utility patents, and to the life of the author plus 50 years for copyrights. I assert that
trademark rights, although virtually unlimited in term of protection, are severely limited in
scope. Trademark rights are not, in a word, "exclusive" but are narrowly defined to encompass
the word/symbol/color used to identify the origin/quality of the owner's goods and/or services.
Furthermore, to the extent that the mark becomes highly distinctive and famous, trademark
protection will extend to uses which blur or tarnish the enhanced value of these qualifying
marks. Moreover, since the Lanham Act provides for cancellation of registration should a mark
become the generic name for the goods or service, like aspirin or cellophane, this further
balances the public's right to free dissemination of words and symbols.
245. Of course, the case is strongest for fanciful marks such as KODAK, since the
trademark owner has further incorporated his or her creative expression in the selection of the
trademark. However, in the case where a common word or symbol is used in a trademark, there
is less "creative" contribution and thus a stronger argument against broadly interpreting the
rights of the trademark holder. Indeed, opponents of broadening trademark rights often argue the
word or color "depletion" theory to justify narrowly granting trademark rights, since to do
otherwise would deplete the limited resources available to the public. Some scholars bolster this

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss5/1

72

Rose: Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous" Trademarks: An
DILTON PROTEC77ONFOR 'FAMOUS TRADEMARKS

even if the public's contribution to a trademark's fame and distinctiveness
surpasses the public information utilized by a patentee or copyright holder,
the scale still tips in favor of granting the trademark owner some "reasonable" and well defined property rights in both the basic and enhanced
commercial value of his mark. Trademark property rights are strongly
justified when one acknowledges that the trademark owner is providing a
valuable public service by providing a means of source identification and of
distinguishing similar goods and services. Moreover, the "quality assurance"
function of trademarks particularly strengthens the property view since the
public's strong favorable response is to a great degree driven by the perceived
and actual quality and features of the goods and/or services sold under the
trademark.

view with a constitutional argument. See Pattishall, supra note 15, at 615-16 (noting that
"judicial distrust of the dilution concept could stem from some commentators who have attacked
it as... diminishing the available free use of the language"). Nevertheless, several scholars and
judges have successfully rebutted these arguments by documenting that there is indeed an
"unlimited" supply of words, symbols and colors for manufacturers to select as trademarks and
for the public to simultaneously use in various other ways. See, e.g., Justice Breyer's rebuttal
in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305-06 (1995) (rejecting argument that
colors would soon be depleted if allowed to be registered as trademarks); Landes & Posner,
Economics of Trademark Law, supra note 18, at 272-75.
246. As Justice Breyer recently opined: "The law [trademark law] thereby 'encourage[s]
the production of quality products,' and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell
inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an
item offered for sale." Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303 (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §
2.0112]); see also Backman, supra note 18, at 220 (distinguishing that advertising alone cannot
sell products, consumers must also "desire a product and be convinced of its superior quality
before [they] will make large-scale purchases"). Backman cites the failure of Ford to secure
public acceptance of the EDSEL despite the huge sums of money poured into its advertising
campaign versus the phenomenal commercial success of the MUSTANG, which provided quality
features which paralleled the "quality image" created in the mass advertising campaign. Id.
Conversely, many scholars posit that while informative advertising may assist the consumer
in purchasing decisions, thereby meeting the tri-partite function of trademarks, the persuasive
aspect of advertising is merely a forum for manipulating images and messages, which results in
an overdramatization and perhaps outright deception as to the qualities of a product. As early
as 1948, scholars argued against the promotion of trademarks because advertising was primarily
persuasive instead of informative and as such was anti-competitive and promoted economic
waste. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948). Mr. Brown found that
[m]ost advertising, however, is designed not to inform, but to persuade and
influence. What is the occasion for such tremendous outlays on persuasion and
influence in a well-ordered economic system? If we consider first the total stream
of production and consumption, persuasive advertising seems only to consume
resources that might be put to better use producing more goods and services.
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Finally, a well-crafted dilution statute should prevent an overuse of the
property resource by clarifying that dilution protection is limited to junior
trademark uses which have been shown to dilute the distinctive quality of
"famous" marks. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and statutes
patterned after the New Model State Trademark Bill's dilution statute include
objective criteria for evaluating fame and distinctiveness, thereby reducing the
cost for a trademark owner to enforce its dilution rights in a famous
mark 47 I concede that the problem with enforcing state dilution statutes
Id. (footnote omitted); see also JULES HENRY, CULTURE AGAINST MAN (1963) (arguing that
advertising creates irrational economic impulses which are dependent upon an artificial and
unrealistic standard of living as a moral imperative); VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN
PERSUADERS 3-10 (1957) (arguing that persuasive advertising aims at overwhelming the
consumer's rational impulses by appealing to subconscious motivations).
I posit that the informative and persuasive components of advertising are inextricably linked
and that the informative, source identification and quality control benefits of advertising far
outweigh the alleged "persuasive pitfalls." Moreover, because advertising provides an avenue
for numerous competitors to inform and persuade the public, it arguably fosters rather than
detracts from free market competition. Indeed, Backman argues that persuasive advertising is
a necessary social cost of fostering a competitive marketplace. Backman, supra note 18, at 223.
247. Early critics such as Handler argued that dilution protection was impractical since
there was little or no guidance, absent Schechter's Rational Basis piece, on how to objectively
evaluate when and how a mark was diluted or which marks are entitled to dilution protection.
See Handler, supra note 24, at 279. Many opinions sustain this view. See, e.g., Mead Data
Cent., 875 F.2d at 1028 (expressly noting the ambiguity in the New York statute and that
Schechter intended dilution protection to be limited to junior uses of the identical established
mark). Other courts have gone along with scholars Schechter, Pattishall, and Derenberg in
preserving dilution protection for "celebrated and famous" marks. The problem with these cases
is that it is unclear whether fame is measured nationally or within one's relative market. For
example, in Mead Data, the Second Circuit held that the mark LEXIS, as used by Mead Data,
lacked the requisite level of distinctiveness because only one percent of the general consuming
public (namely, lawyers and accountants) were familiar with this mark as identifying the on-line
computer search services offered by Mead. Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1031. In Midwest
Research Inst. v. S & B Promotions, Inc., the court held that the level of distinctiveness for
dilution is equivalent to that imposed in traditional trademark infringement cases. 677 F. Supp.
1007, 1017 (W.D. Mo. 1988). Such cases failed to provide true clarity. Indeed, we must consider
whether these courts used the proper frame of reference to evaluate distinctiveness. For example,
in Mead Data, the Second Circuit court should have, at a minimum, evaluated distinctiveness
in terms of the market for the Lexus automobile, which, given its price range, would include a
much higher percentage of lawyers and accountants. Moreover, should the relevant market be
"any consumer" or the one likely to purchase the goods of the alleged diluter?
Today, under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and new MSTB, we have a series
of seven "distinctiveness" factors for a court to apply. See supra note 20. A plaintiff can then
present either survey evidence or actual live testimony to establish each of the seven factors to
meet its burden of proof that its mark is distinctive. In fact, prior to the model statutes, certain
courts created their own objective factors to evaluate the distinctiveness or fame of a mark and
whether or not it was capable of being diluted by the junior trademark use. For example, in
Mead Data, the concurring opinion by Judge Sweet provided a series of six factors courts in the
Second Circuit evaluate in determining likelihood of dilution by blurring: "I) similarity of the
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modeled after the original MSTB was a lack of objective criteria upon which
the court could evaluate whether (1) the mark possessed the strength or
distinctiveness to be capable of dilution and (2) what in fact qualified as
diluting the distinctive quality of the mark. Consequently, even the most
recent opinions illustrate how courts and scholars "flounder" when applying
these statutes and impose their own artificial "lowering of societal costs" by
creating such fictions as: (1) reading a likelihood-of-confusion requirement
into dilution statutes or limiting the statute's application to non/competing
goods or services and (2) articulating a negative presumption that dilution
statutes are somehow inherently monopolistic and should therefore be
narrowly applied or even ignored if the plaintiff can simultaneously obtain
protection under traditional trademark statutes.
Of course, a federal dilution statute would ultimately lower state dilution
enforcement costs and protection costs by providing a uniform standard of
dilution and factors to evaluate in determining, whether a mark is 'famous'
marks 2) similarity of products covered by the marks 3) sophistication of consumers 4) predatory
intent 5) renown of the senior mark 6) renown of the junior mark." Mead Data, 875 F.2d at
1035. To the extent that dilution statutes protect against competing and non-competing uses,
Judge Sweet's factors are a step in the right direction. They do not, however, accurately address
protection of the persona of the mark. As will be discussed in the final section, we need clarity
on exactly what constitutes dilution, so that after plaintiffs objectively establish via survey
evidence and testimony that the mark is famous and capable of dilution, they can then clearly
establish that there is indeed a likelihood of dilution if the junior trademark use is allowed.
248. For a discussion of conflicting court decisions regarding the requirement of confusion
in dilution cases, see Brownlee, supra note 15, at 490-96; Pattishall, supra note 15, at 613-17.
As noted by ABA Committee Report No. 204, Pat S. Smart, Chair, courts are still ignoring
the plain language of state dilution statutes and erroneously holding that these statutes are
inapplicable when the parties are competitors. The committee report cited AHP Subsidiary
Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., which held that protection of the Illinois dilution statute was
not available to competitors under Illinois case law. 1 F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 1993). The
following month however, Judge Wood of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation in the
Ninth Circuit, clarified that "Illinois courts [ ]have crafted an exception to the statute: '[W]here
the parties are in competition and the plaintiff could not obtain relief under the traditional laws
of infringement and unfair competition, he will not be able to obtain relief under the AntiDilution Statute.' "International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819, 826-27 (9th Cir.
1993) (quoting EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir.
1984) (quoting Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 311 N.E.2d 386, 398-99 (Ill.
App. 1974))).
Even today, there is still disarray in the Seventh Circuit, with Judge Easterbrook opining in
a recent trademark case that the Illinois dilution statute "applies to products in other lines of
commerce." Sunmark Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 1995).
Scholars like Port, Welkowitz, and Heald argue that such cases illustrate why states should
not be allowed to offer dilution protection since courts are reluctant to and cannot effectively
apply such statutes. I posit that the solution is not to kill dilution protection, but to insist that
both federal and state statutes clearly define the protectable property right and draw clear
limitations which account for a balancing between rewarding the inventor and the public's right
to free market competition and the free dissemination of ideas.
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and entitled to dilution protection. 249 Now that there is a new federal
dilution statute, states should proceed to amend their dilution statutes to
harmonize with the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, thereby
avoiding any preemption problems. In fact, the Federal Act's legislative

249. Congressman Moorehead provided the following report regarding the need for a
federal dilution statute:
A federal dilution statute is necessary because famous marks ordinarily are used
on a nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patchquilt system of protection, in that only approximately 25 states have laws that
prohibit trademark dilution. Further, court decisions have been inconsistent and
some courts are reluctant to grant nationwide injunctions for violation of state law
where half of the states have no dilution law. Protection for famous marks should
not depend on whether the forum where suit is filed has a dilution statute. This
simply encourages forum-shopping and increases the amount of litigation.
H.R. REP. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 103031 (citations omitted).
250. This Article will not cover the preemption issue in any great detail, but for basic
review, state law is preempted where (1) Congress explicitly provided for preemption, see, e.g.,
§ 301 of the Federal Copyright Act, or (2) there is an intent by the federal government to
occupy the field, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), or (3) state law
at issue actually conflicts with federal law, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. Thus far, although
numerous scholars have alleged that the Lanham Act preempts state dilution statutes, see supra
note 184, only a minority of cases have actually so held. See, e.g., Mister Donut of Am., Inc.
v. Mister Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1969) (stating that "[t]he Lanham Act has preemptied the field of trademark law and controls"); United States Jaycees v. Commodities
Magazine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360, 1368 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (acknowledging that jurisdictions
were split on issue of federal preemption of state dilution statutes, yet finding that Iowa's statute
conflicts with the Lanham Act to the extent that the statute regulates interstate commerce). This,
of course, would be inapplicable to courts applying dilution protection to intrastate diluting uses.
See also Brownlee, supra note 15, at 499 n.70 (listing the minority of courts that found the
Lanham Act preempts state antidilution laws).
Scholars who argue that the Lanham Act preempts state dilution statutes do not rely as
heavily on the commerce clause argument as they do the two-pronged intent to occupy the
field/actual conflict analysis. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 24, at 283; Heald, supra note 25, at
1009 (adding Bonito Boats analogy to economic preemption argument); Heald, supra note 184,
at 1432-36; Welkowitz, supra note 25, at 7-16. As aptly noted by Brownlee, supra note 15, at
499-500, both Handler and Heald have been forced to acknowledge that " '[n]othing in the
Lanham Act or its legislative history evinces an express or implied intent to preclude all state
regulation of trademarks."' Id. at 500 (quoting Handler, supra note 24, at 283). She further notes
that Handler "recognized that the Lanham Act and its history expressly and impliedly recognize
the legitimacy of state regulation." Id. at 500. She further indicates that Heald argues that the
"purpose of national uniformity implies intent to preempt state regulation of trade." Id. at 500
n.177.
Like Brownlee, I believe that Heald's argument is misplaced since state trademark and unfair
competition law have effectively co-existed since the passage of the Lanham Act without
preemption problems. Moreover, as noted by Brownlee, the legislative history of the Trademark
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history expressly notes that the Act "would not pre-empt existing state
dilution statutes. State laws could continue to be applied in cases involving
locally famous or distinctive marks."' The final section of this Article
addresses how a clear statutory definition of "dilution" further lowers the
enforcement costs and societal costs of dilution statutes, thereby ensuring that
the public's right to use famous marks in a "fair use" context, such as
comparative advertising, remains intact.

Law Revision Act of 1988 expressly states the express legislative intent that current state laws
remain in effect, notwithstanding Congress's decision not to include the proposed federal dilution
statute in the 1988 revision. See Brownlee, supra note 15, at 500 (citing S 1883, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1987, H. 10421 Cong. Rec. (Oct. 19, 1988)).
In fact, at least one circuit court has expressly refuted the preemption issue. In Mead Data
Cent., the district court expressly rejected the Eighth Circuit's argument that state dilution
statutes conflicted with the goals of the Lanham Act and were preempted: 'To the extent that
the New York statute protects rights not provided for by the federal statute, it does not conflict
with the Lanham Act but rather, it complements and supplements it.... [S]tate law is only
preempted to the extent it permits behavior outlawed by the federal law." 702 F. Supp. at 1041.
The Second Circuit, although reversing the district court's finding that LEXIS was diluted by
LEXUS, did not expressly overrule the lower court's preemption holding. See Mead Data Cent.,
875 F.2d at 1028-32 (general discussion of the law supporting reversal does not include
discussion of preemption).
Because of the legislative history surrounding the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act, there
should be little doubt that even with the enactment of the Federal Dilution Act of 1995, state
dilution protection should be allowed to continue, albeit in limited form. See generallySlenzak,
supra note 235, at 209-10 (although noting that state statutory language created unfortunate
confusion, also finds that state statutes offered broader protection). Nonetheless, to the extent
that state dilution statutes attempt to provide nationwide injunctive relief, the preemption issue
may remain. See generally Heald, supra note 184, at 1413-14 (discussing two cases where
plaintiff based a claim for a nationwide injunction on state law).
The Federal Dilution Act of 1995 includes a partial preemption provision which prevents
the owner of a famous mark from instituting a state common law or statutory dilution action
against a junior user of the mark when the junior user's mark has been registered on the
Principal Register. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, supra note 233. By implication,
other state dilution actions should be allowed to supplement and complement relief available
under the Lanham Act. For example, when the junior user is not registered on the Principal
Register, the senior user can then bring a state dilution action against the junior user without
violating the express preemption provisions of the new federal act.
251. H.R. REP. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1031 (1995) (footnote omitted). The
legislative history further notes:
Unlike patent and copyright laws, federal trademark law presently coexists with
state trademark law, and it is to be expected that a federal dilution statute should
similarly coexist with state dilution law. The ownership of a valid federal
registration would act as a complete bar to a dilution action bought under state law.
Id. at 1031-32.
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D. The Dilution Statute of the New Model
State Trademark Bill and Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.
Steps in the Right Direction
Opponents of the dilution doctrine argue that workable standards have
yet to be developed for determining which marks are distinctive enough to
be capable of dilution, and thus, at present, the threat of monopoly is
particularly acute.' 2 The district court in Mead Data answered this contention handily by declaring that only distinctive marks receive protection. 3
Yet, "distinctive" must include all strong marks, as limiting application of the
dilution doctrine to only the most celebrated marks would, in itself, be anticompetitive and allow the larger entities to drown out holders of less
distinctive marks.'
Nevertheless, dilution critics have a valid point under the property
paradigm. Because property rights are law-granted exclusive rights, to ensure
effective enforcement and ready adoption by courts and society as a whole,
these rights should be clearly defined with limitations that account for a
balance between societal interest in free market competition and the free
dissemination of ideas. State statutes, like New York and Illinois, which
follow the original Model State Trademark Bill, fail to define what constitutes
the "distinctive" quality of a mark or what is "dilution" of this distinctive
quality. 5 Thus, by failing to provide clear property limitations and
boundaries, these statutes fail to sufficiently balance the societal costs at stake.
As will be discussed in this section, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 and the proposed dilution statute of the New Model State Trademark
Bill are steps in the right direction to providing this "balance," but need
reworking, particularly in the areas of actually defining "dilution" and
"tamishment."
Since the language of the dilution statute of the New MSTB and the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 is substantially similar, I will use the
language of the recently enacted Federal Act to illustrate my points and

252. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 24, at 273 (arguing that, if the predicate for the Lanham
Act in 1946 had been dilution and not confusion, "[t]he air would have been filled with cries
that a monopoly of language would result in a monopoly of product"); Port, supra note 14, at
455 (arguing that the gross inconsistency in the application of dilution standards is evidence of
the courts questioning the underlying right); Welkowitz, supra note 24, at 533 (arguing that
dilution theory grants protection to "distinctive" trademarks, but courts are "floundering
hopelessly in their efforts to promulgate a rational structure for analyzing dilution cases").
253. Mead Data, 702 F. Supp. at 1042.
254. Id.
255. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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recommended amendments. The new federal Act amends section 43 of
the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125) by adding as section 43(c):
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject
to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court
deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark... In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection
with the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark;
256. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, supra note 233 (approved by President
Clinton January 16, 1996 and possessing the same effective date as its date of enactment).
The dilution section (13) of the New Model State Trademark Bill was approved by the
USTA's Board of Directors and was the basis for The Federal Dilution Act of 1995. The
dilution provision of the MSTB reads as follows:
The owner of a mark which is famous in this state shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity, to an injunction against another's use of a mark, commencing
after the owner's mark becomes famous, which causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the owner's mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this
section. In determining whether a mark is famous, a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark in this state;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
and services;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark in this
state;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in its and in the other's trading areas
and channels of trade in this state; and
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar mark by third parties.
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief in this state
in an action brought under this section, unless the subsequent user willfully
intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the owner's
mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner shall also be entitled to the
remedies set forth in this chapter, subject to the discretion of the court and the
principles of equity.
Model State Trademark Bill, supra note 19, § 24.14[3]. Unlike the Federal Act, the Model State
Trademark Bill lacks any "fair use" provisions.
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(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which
the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks
by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner
of the famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief
unless the person against whom the injunction is sought
willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause

dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the
owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies
set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this title, subject to the
discretion of the court and the principles of equity.'
Under the new Act, section 45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1127)
is also amended to include the following definition of dilution:

The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,

regardless of the presence or absence of(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark
and other parties, or

257. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, supra note 233, § 1125(c). The new federal
act also includes a very limited preemption clause. The clause preempts the owner of a famous
mark from bringing a common law or a state dilution action against a junior use, where the
junior user possesses a valid federal registration for the mark on the Principal Register, or a
valid registration under the Trademark Acts of 1881 and 1905. Id. § I125(c)(3). More
specifically, subsection (3) of the Act states:
The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register shall be a complete
bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that is brought by
another person under the common law or a statute of a State and that seeks to
prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.
Id. One can then conclude that the Lanham Act will not preclude a state dilution action against
a junior use of a famous mark where the junior user has not secured registration on the principal
register.
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(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.
Unlike the dilution provisions of the Model State Trademark Bill, the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 further includes limitations for fair
use and comparative advertising. 29 Section 4 acknowledges that "(A) Fair
use of a [registrant's] famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services... ; [and] 03) Noncommercial use of a mark" shall not be
actionable under this dilution section.
As noted previously, because the latest dilution statutes presently include
objective criteria for evaluating whether a mark is indeed "famous" and
possesses a separable "persona" or commercial magnetism which is capable
of dilution, the statutes now provide clear definitions of how a court should
evaluate the protectable property. Moreover, since the new federal statute
provides clear limitations to dilution protection by expressly excluding
commercial advertising and noncommercial junior uses of the famous mark,
the enforcement costs and societal costs now become more aligned with
traditional patent, copyright and trademark statutes, each of which expressly
include limitations which balance these costs."'
Unfortunately, both the new federal statute and MSTB still fail to
adequately define dilution by providing clear examples of blurring and how
it differs from the types of tamishment actionable under the statute.
Consequently, a potential plaintiff in a state or federal action seeking to apply
these statutes can objectively present survey evidence and testimony which
a court can evaluate to determine whether the mark is indeed "famous" but
the potential plaintiff lacks any clear guidance of how a court will objectively
determine whether the junior use is a diluting use. "

258. Id. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 took effect on the date of its
enactment, January 16, 1996. The bill that became the Act, H.R. 1295, was generally endorsed
by the INTA (which was responsible for the first drafting of the bill), ABA, AIPLA, and PTO,
with Commissioner Phil Hampton of the PTO noting at the committee hearings that there is "no
good reason" for limiting the applicability of H.R. 1295 to famous marks only. Further, the
article highlights that "this limitation 'clearly undercuts the United States' position with its
trading partners that famous marks should be protected, regardless of whether the marks are
registered in the country where protection is sought.' " Legislation: Trademark Bills Win
General Support of PTO and Industry at House Hearing,50 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA) No. 1238, at 325 (July 27, 1995) (quoting Trademark Commissioner Phillip Hampton's
testimony at a July 19, 1995 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property) [hereinafter General Support].
259. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act, supra note 233, § 1125(c)(4).

260. Id.
261. See supra pt. ll.B.

262. This point was raised in the sub-committee hearings by Jonathan Moskin of Pennie
& Edmonds, who argued that H.R. 1295's definition of dilution does not clarify which property
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In order to fully define what constitutes "dilution," I propose amending
the statute as follows:
The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a registrant's
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, or the lessening/diminishing/depreciatingof the "persona"Iquality image associatedwith
a mark, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between
the registrant and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception.
I would further include definitional sections which distinguish blurring
from tamishment, along with illustrative examples from the legislative
history. The legislative history should further note factors a court may use

right is really being protected, since it essentially provides that a "famous mark will be deemed
diluted if it is diluted." General Support, supra note 258, at 326. Mr. Moskin opposed dilution
protection in an earlier article, but did "recommend[ ] the following alternatives for strengthening the [proposed federal] legislation: (1) limit it [dilution protection] to 'truly nationally famous
and distinctive marks'; (2) expand the fair use provision to provide a 'full fair use defense'; (3)
limit relief where a mark has already been diluted; and (4) establish a registry of famous marks."
Id. (quoting Jonathan Moskin). Of these four recommendations, I favor the second, with the
remaining concerns being addressed by further clarifying what constitutes dilution and fair use
in the plain language of the statute.
I expressly reject Mr. Moskin's first recommendation, since marks which have reached a
significant level of "fame" regionally or locally should similarly be allowed some reasonable
scope of dilution protection. As Laura Slenzak noted in a well-written article comparing the
dilution statutes of the U.S. and Canada, Canada applies a sliding scale analysis to evaluate how
broadly a mark is entitled to dilution protection. Slenzak, supra note 235, at 211. Fanciful and
inherently distinctive marks receive the broadest scope, with descriptive marks possessing
secondary meaning receiving a narrower scope of protection depending upon the level of
acquired distinctiveness. Id. U.S. courts could apply a similar sliding scale analysis, with
nationally famous marks being entitled to the broadest geographical scope of protection and
regionally famous marks being narrowly protected specifically in the geography where they are
in fact "famous" and capable of dilution.
263. I intentionally avoided the words "subliminal confusion/association" in my proposed
amendments. I believe that if the plain language of the statute includes these phrases some court
inevitably will apply a de-facto likelihood-of-actual confusion analysis. To avoid this, I
recommend instead including such language in the legislative history, so that courts will
understand that inherent in the definition of dilution is a resulting "subliminal association/confusion" with the original goods/services sold under the famous mark. Indeed, this would
be the economic motive behind a diluting use. Consumer-search cost and junior profitability will
both benefit from even a brief subliminal association with the features and quality image of the
senior's product.
I also avoided using the term "good will," which is what the Canadian dilution statute refers
to in its dilution and fair use provisions. See Slenzak, supra note 235, at 211 n.27 (quoting from
the Canadian Trademark Act of 1953, ch. 667, 57 R.P.C. 209, §§ 19-20 & 22 (1940)). 1 fear that
utilizing this term ultimately cuts against convincing courts and scholars that trademarks are
indeed protectable property instead of ethereal "good will" as enunciated in the HanoverMilling
line of cases discussed supra note 120.
264. Indeed Congress could use the testimony provided by James Baughman, assistant

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss5/1

82

Rose: Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous" Trademarks: An
DILUTION PROTECTIONFOR "FAMOUS' TRADEMARKS

to evaluate likelihood of dilution. Judge Sweet, in his concurring opinion in
Mead Data,takes a step in this direction by articulating the following factors
which he would use to evaluate "likelihood of dilution... :1)similarity of
the marks 2) similarity of the products covered by the marks 3) sophistication
of consumers 4) predatory intent 5) renown of the senior mark [and] 6)
renown of the junior mark ''

general counsel for Campbell Soup, who illustrated how the use of the famed "Campbell's"
script to identify an auto repair shop in Ohio would not create a likelihood of confusion with
the Campbell soup company, but would in fact weaken the power of this mark to distinguish
Campbells' products and reputation, since the "customers who brought this sign to our attention
were confused to find the trademark that they've known and trusted since childhood in a place
where it did not belong." General Support, supra note 258, at 326. Mr. Baughman pointed out
that such diluting uses "take advantage of [and blur] the reputation that we have built for over
a century and can undermine the uniqueness of our mark." This would be an excellent example
of blurring.
Regarding tarnishment, Warner Brothers Vice President and Senior Intellectual Property
Counsel Nils Montan produced a classic example of a how a junior use of the BUGS BUNNY
trademark on T-shirts emblazoned with a marijuana-smoking Bugs Bunny tarnishes the value
of Bugs Bunny to serve as a positive, fun-loving, quality-image and source-identifier for Warner
Brothers. Id. I concede that the Warner Bros. example may not be the best example, since one
could attempt to argue that this is a non-commercial parody of Bugs, but case law would not
support this position. See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prod., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 13536 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that portrayal of Pillsbury's POPPIN-FRESH characters in sexually
explicit positions on shirts diluted the distinctive quality of Pillsbury's marks through
"tarnish[ing] the reputation... of its advertising agents by placing them in a 'depraved
context' "). A clear case of tarnishment actionable under the model statutes would be a junior
use of TIFFANY on toilet paper or ROLLS ROYCE as a trademark for garbage disposal
services.
Federal courts are presently interpreting the Federal Dilution Act to include tarnishment. See,
e.g., Dr. Seuss Enterps., L.P. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1573 (S.D. Cal.
1996), aff'd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
For an example of a case where the court applied § 43(c) to find that blurring had occurred,
but not tarnishment, see Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 561-63 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (defendant's use of "BASIQUE" mark on skin care line held to blur but not tarnish
plaintiffs "CLINIQUE" mark for skin care).
265. Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1035. To the extent that dilution statutes protect against
competing and non-competing uses, I would delete the second factor, since it will cause courts
to erroneously insert either a competition or non-competition requirement into its evaluation.
Instead, the second factor might reference subliminal association or surveys related to subliminal
association. This would provide litigants with a concrete factor established via survey evidence
by a psychologist or specialized consulting group. Live testimony could also be used to quantify
the degree of subliminal associations the average consumer might make with the senior owner
of the famous mark. For example, in a hypothetical suit involving Eastman Kodak v. Kodak
Restaurant Services, I might present live testimony where I directly examine witnesses, and
query: "What corporation did you first think of when you saw the name KODAK and the
gold/black and red tradedress on this restaurant?" "How long did you think about Eastman
Kodak?... " Federal courts are now applying Judge Sweeney's multi-factor test to evaluate
"blurring" under the federal dilution statute. See Clinique Labs., 945 F. Supp. at 562 (citing
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Finally, I would enhance the fair use section of the statute to more
clearly define what constitutes non-commercial comparative advertising and
non-trademark uses.' An infamous dilution case involving comparative
advertising illustrates the problems that can result from a poorly-crafted
dilution statute which fails to provide for a "fair use" of the mark for
comparative advertisement, criticism or parody.
In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 7 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction that prevented the airing
of a commercial in which the defendant, MTD Products (MTD) spoofed the
John Deere "deer logo" by animating the deer and having it run from the
Yardman tractor in a comparative advertising context.' This use was found
to potentially dilute the majestic image of the static "deer logo" in violation
of New York's dilution statute.' The court first established that the Deere
logo was indeed a distinctive trademark that had acquired the requisite
secondary meaning to be capable of dilution.27 In its likelihood-of-dilution
analysis however, the court carefully distinguished its analysis from that of
the lower court, which held that animating the Deere logo constituted both
blurring and tarnishment.27 The Second Circuit expressly rejected the

Mead Data court) (court applys five-factor test to determine "BASIQUE" mark for skin care
blurs CLINIQUE skin care marks); see also American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
310, 316 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (applying six-factor test and concluding defendant's use of mark
"Don't Leave Home Without It" on its line of address books could not blur great distinctiveness
of American Express slogan).
266. Slenzak notes that Canada's fair-use provision is narrower than the U.S. equivalent
through providing the following liriiitation: although junior Canadian users can use their personal
name as a trade-name, or any use " 'of the geographical name of his place of business, or [ I
of any accurate description of the character or quality of his wares or services' " other than a
trademark, such fair use must be " 'in such a manner as is not likely to have the effect of
depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching to the trade-mark.' " Slenzak, supra note 235,
at 211 n.27 (quoting the relevant portions of the Canadian Trademark Act of 1953 ch. 667, 57
R.P.C. 209, §§ 19-20 & 22 (1940)). I am against adopting Canada's fair-use provisions since
they would clearly allow the John Deere comparative advertising scenario to qualify as
actionable "depreciating of the good-will" of the mark. As will be discussed shortly, extending
the property right this far begins to upset the balance which the United States seeks to obtain
between rewarding creators/protecting the public and free market competition/free dissemination
of ideas.
267. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
268. Id. at 45.
269. Id. at 41, 45.
270. Id. at 42.
271. Id. at 43-44. The district court noted that "the instant case is one of first impression"
because it involved a defendant's use of a competitor's trademark to refer to the competitor's
products rather than to identify the defendant's products. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 860
F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). For this reason, Justice Sweet's
six-factor test from Mead Data was inapplicable to determine whether there had been a
likelihood of dilution via blurring or tamishment. Id. at 119-20. The lower court focused only
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blurring and tarnishing findings, opining that this case failed to fit the classic
examples of either blurring or tamishment.m Nonetheless, the court noted
that "the blurring/tarnishment dichotomy does not necessarily represent the
full range of uses that can dilute a mark under New York law."
Although the court wealdy attempted to distinguish comparative
advertising as a permissible category of junior use of a famous mark, 4 it
still held that MTD's comparative advertising was actionable dilution because
of both "the degree to which the mark was altered and of the nature of the
alteration... ","

on the alteration of the static Deere logo resulting from MTD's animation and concluded that
this junior use constituted dilution because it was likely to diminish the strength of identification
between the original Deere symbol and Deere products and to blur the distinction between the
famous logo and other deer logos in the marketplace, including those in the insurance and
financial markets. Id. at 120-21.
272. Deere, 41 F.3d at 44. The court noted:
However the MTD commercial is not really a typical instance of blurring, because
it poses slight if any risk of impairing the identification of Deere's mark with its
products. Nor is there tarnishment, which is usually found where a distinctive mark
is depicted in a context of sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal activity.
Id. (citations omitted).
273. Id. (citing Shadow Box, Inc. v. Drecq, 336 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972))
(stating that § 368-d "protects... against any use of the symbol that may drain off any of the
potency of the mark"); Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1162, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defining dilution simply as "the whittling away of an established
trade-mark's selling power and value through unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar
products"') (citations omitted).
274. Deere, 41 F.3d at 44.
275. Id. at 45. The court reasoned:
But some alterations have the potential to so lessen the selling power of a
distinctive mark that they are appropriately proscribed by a dilution statue. Dilution
of this sort is more likely to be found when the alterations are made by a competitor with both an incentive to diminish the favorable attributes of the mark and an
ample opportunity to promote its products in ways that make no significant
alteration.
Wherever New York will ultimately draw the line, we can be reasonably
confident that the MTD commercial challenged in this case crosses it. The
commercial takes a static image of a graceful, full-size deer-symbolizing Deere's
substance and strength-and portrays, in an animated version, a deer that appears
smaller than a small dog and scampers away from the dog and a lawn tractor,
looking over its shoulder in apparent fear.
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Alterations of that sort, accomplished for the sole purpose of
promoting a competing product, are properly found to be within
New York's concept of dilution because they risk the possibility
that consumers will come to attribute unfavorable characteristics
to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with inferior goods
and services.276
The court's reasoning appears plausible on the surface, but the point of
comparative advertising is in fact to associate certain negative characteristics
with a competitor's goods in order to persuade the consumer that your goods
or services are better than the competition. As such, all comparative
advertising will indeed to some degree "tarnish" a famous mark.2' Arguably, the Second Circuit, in attempting to draw the line at the degree of
alteration, namely, reducing the size of the deer and animating it, is granting
more than a dilution right, but also a "moral right" in this logo. This appears
to impermissibly upset the balance between rewarding the creator of a famous
mark and allowing the public to use such marks in a fair use descriptive or
comparative advertising sense. Moreover, although the Deere court is
confident in its ability to draw the line concerning alteration of a famous
mark in a competitive context, other courts may not be able to effectively
draw such lines.278 I therefore recommend amending the new Model State

276. Id. (citing Sally Gee, 699 F.2d at 624-25) ('The interest protected by § 368-d is not
simply commercial goodwill, but the selling power that a distinctive mark or name with
favorable associations has engendered for a product in the mind of the consuming public.")
(citations omitted).
277. In fact, the Deere opinion includes numerous cites to cases wherein courts upheld
"tarnishing" junior uses of a mark under a fair use analysis, including parody and comparative
advertising, e.g., Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(denying preliminary injunction under Lanham Act and Illinois dilution statute where beer
manufacturer spoofed Energizer Bunny) and Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809
F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying injunction where magazine satirized another magazine).
Deere, 41 F.3d at 44-45. But, to support its position, the court does cite Wendy's Int'l, Inc. v.
Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (granting preliminary injunction under the
Lanham Act where "fast-food" chain made fun of competitors' trademarks). Deere, 41 F.3d at
45.
278. Interestingly, the Second Circuit appears to be able to draw reasonable lines. In
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996), the court, citing
Deere, distinguished that the wild boar character "Spa'am" from the movie Muppet Treasure
Island was a legitimate parody of Hormels' SPAM and failed to dilute Hormel's mark by either
blurring or tarnishment. Id. at 506-07. Regarding the blurring claim, the court opined that instead
of weakening the association between the mark SPAM and Hormel's luncheon meat, "Henson's
parody will 'tend[ ]to increase public identification' of Hormel's mark with Hormel." Id. at 506
(citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D.N.M. 1985)).
Regarding the tarnishment claim, the court noted that Hormel's reliance on Deere was
misplaced since Deere dealt with merchandise in direct competition and Henson's licensed
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Trademark Bill and Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 to address the
John Deere scenario as permissible fair use in a trademark context, while
noting that such alteration may be actionable under a state tort action which
provides for tamishmentY9
IV CONCLUSION

If the New Model State Trademark Bill and Federal Trademark Dilution
Act are amended to effectively provide a working framework to analyze
likelihood of dilution and fair use, they avoid challenges of creating anti-

merchandise from Muppet Treasure Island would not be in direct competition with Hormel's
ham product. Hormel,73 F.3d at 507. The court noted:
This [lack of competition] is an important, even if not determinative, factor.
"Dilution of this sort is more likely to be found when the alterations are made by
a competitor with both an incentive to diminish the favorable attributes of the mark
and an ample opportunity to promote its products in ways that make no significant
alteration."
Id. at 507-08 (quoting Deere, 42 F.3d at 45). The court's holding also turned on its concluding
that "[t]he sine qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiffs mark will suffer negative
associations through defendant's use" and here there was "no evidence that [the character]
Spa'am is unhygienic or that his character places Hormel's mark in an unsavory context." Id.
at 507; see also Elvis Presley Enterps., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 799 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(citing Hormel finding that defendant use of "Velvet Elvis" for its trendy retro bar failed to
dilute the family of "Elvis" marks under a blurring or tamishment theory. For the blurring claim
the court noted that "the defendant's social parody and "overt style of commentary is similar to
that employed in Hormel ... " and thus did not blur plaintiffs' mark. Regarding tarnishment,
the court held that the lack of substantial similarity and the fact that defendant's parody does
not ridicule plaintiff's mark for the purpose of self-promotion prohibits a finding of tarnishment).
Although the Second Circuit appears to narrowly apply Deere, query whether other circuits
will do the same, particularly since the court notes that "although the court below understood
Deere to create a new category of dilution, we find that our decision in Deere is better
understood as a recognition of a broad view of tarnishment, where that doctrine had been
sometimes narrowly confined." Id. (emphasis added).
279. Although the Federal Dilution Act presently includes limitations for fair use and
comparative advertising, it is unclear whether the John Deere scenario would still survive as
tarnishment which goes beyond comparative advertising and is actionable under the Federal
Dilution Act. As noted in footnote 264, federal courts are presently interpreting the Federal
Dilution Act to include tarnishment claims. Thus, I posit that a case like John Deere may still
raise problems under the federal scheme.
Indeed, in a recent federal case the court citing John Deere noted that "the blurring/tarnishment dichotomy does not necessarily represent the full range of uses that can dilute
a mark.. ." and held that "registering a famous mark as a domain name.., to the trademark
owner violates federal and state dilution statutes." Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp.
1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see also Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen,- 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240-41
(N.D. I11.
1996) (Toeppen's registration of domain name "Intermatic.com" held to dilute
plaintiffs INTERMATIC trademark under the Federal Dilution Act).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

87

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[V/ol. 47

competitive monopolies in trademark rights. Instead, such statutes, as
amended, would effectively articulate limits and boundaries for determining
when a trademark has reached a level of distinctiveness necessary to possess
a separable "persona!' or "quality image" and for detemilning how to
effectively measure when this image or persona has been diluted. Furthermore, including well-drafted "fair use" provisions, which expressly preserve
the right to utilize a mark effectively for comparative advertising, comment
or criticism, ensures that free market competition will continue to thrive and
further ensures that the public will retain its right to the "free dissemination
of ideas." Unquestionably, a well-drafted dilution statute should satisfy even
the most ardent anti-monopolist. Moreover, viewing dilution relief as
protecting an earned property interest should help engender a positive
presumption that dilution protection effectively protects the source identification, persona and quality assurance property of famous and "highly
distinctive" trademarks. Dilution statutes would finally mirror traditional
trademark, patent and copyright statutes by providing the most effective
balance between rewarding the creator of famous marks while simultaneously
promoting free market competition and the free dissemination of ideas. Atlas
will no longer shrug, but welcome the addition of these earned property
rights.
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